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“Above all, the hand touches the world itself, feels it, lays hold of it and transforms it.  
The hand contrives astonishing adventures in matter. It not only grasps what exists, 
but it has to work in what does not exist; it adds yet another realm to the realms of 
nature”
— Henry Focillon, The life of Forms in Art, 1934 —
Before I commend myself to the very substance of this thesis, I must thank my hands. 
Not just for being my tireless companions during the many hours of typing, but 
because they have taught me possibly everything I know about this world. This thesis 
is about hands as sense-making tools and as vehicles of expression. 
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When we interact with others, our hands are rarely at rest. They demonstrate, they 
describe, they point. They gesture. 
Gestures can be defined as expressive movements produced during communication 
exchanges (Kendon, 2004), often with the hands and arms, but also possibly with other 
body articulators such as the head. Together with speech, they convey information that 
listeners may pick up on, and benefit from (Beattie & Shovelton, 1999a, 1999b; Kelly, 
Barr, Church & Lynch, 1999; Graham & Argyle, 1975; Kendon, 1994; Hostetter, 2011; 
Özyürek, 2014).
This dissertation concentrates on “co-speech gestures”, also called “gesticulation”, 
a category that refers to the gestures that spontaneously accompany our verbal 
messages. Of particular interest are iconic gestures, gestures that bear a “close formal 
relationship to the semantic content of the speech” (McNeill, 1992, p. 78), usually by 
depicting imagistic, motoric or structural aspects of objects and events. Examples of 
iconic gestures are tracing an oval path in the air to symbolize a balloon, or imitating 
the actions of a character from a cartoon show.
Gestures are temporally and semantically coordinated with the speech they accompany, 
and usually depend on the speech portion and on the context to be interpreted by 
an addressee (McNeill, 1992; Kendon, 2004). Imagine a tennis instructor who uses 
gestures to indicate to a student the specific hand trajectory and orientation to 
perform a serve. Without having access to the context (the tennis court, the clothing 
of the instructor, etc.) and speech (the verbal explanation on how to serve), the “serve” 
movement would be hard to interpret and could have multiple meanings. For example, 
the forward-arced arm trajectory could mean “swimming”, “reaching for something” 
or even “smashing a fly on a table”. In a similar manner, the instructor’s explanation 
may have been accompanied by a different gesture altogether, for instance a gesture 
indicating the height at which the racket needs to hit the ball, a gesture tracing the 
optimal trajectory that the ball should follow, or simply no gesture at all. 
The example above illustrates that there are multiple ways in which events can be 
depicted gesturally, and speakers give saliency to particular perceptual and motoric 
aspects of these representations by employing different iconic strategies, such as 
demonstrating actions, enclosing distances or tracing shapes (Perniss & Vigliocco, 
2014; Müller, 2013; Streeck, 2008). Intriguingly, there are no formal, linguistic, rules 
establishing how gestures should be produced or what they should look like. That 
is, gestures are thought to be idiosyncratic, and speakers have even reported being 
unaware of producing them (McNeill, 1992; Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Casasanto & 
Jasmin, 2012). Yet, these gestures are produced perfectly timed with the accompanying 
speech and can convey meaning. What are the mechanisms that guide these gestural 
behaviors? To be precise, what is it that makes a speaker gesture about a particular 




The work presented in this dissertation attempts to provide answers to these questions. 
There are two goals that span over all four empirical chapters. The first goal is to explore 
the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to gesturing. The second goal is concerned 
with how hands can create meaning — specifically, with how speakers use different 
iconic strategies to express information. We address these topics by examining the 
connection between action and gesture, with a special focus on how the affordances 
(i.e., action possibilities) of objects can determine not only the frequency but also the 
content of our gestures during communication.
The remainder of this chapter provides a bird’s eye view of the basic concepts and 
theoretical framework used to delve into the research questions. All the key concepts 
will be developed in depth in the empirical chapters that follow.
Where do gestures come from?  
An embodied-cognition approach
There is considerable variation among people when it comes to gesturing behaviors. 
Some do it a lot, others barely, but, ultimately, we — as communicators — have all 
encountered ourselves in some situation where the use of hands seemed indispensable.
Historically, there have been two main approaches to understand gesturing. One 
is to examine the functions of gesturing, for instance by studying how gestures add 
up to communication (Kelly et al., 1999; Melinger & Levelt, 2005; Bavelas & Healing, 
2013; Hostetter, 2011) or how they support various cognitive processes (Goldin-
Meadow, 1999; 2014; Kita, Alibali & Chu, 2017). Another way to gain insight on why 
we gesture is to focus on the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to gesturing. These 
two approaches can be compared to effect and cause, respectively. Following Novack 
and Goldin-Meadow (2016), functional accounts are concerned with what happens 
after gestures are produced (effect), whereas mechanistic accounts are concerned 
with what happens before gestures are produced (cause). 
In this dissertation, we are interested in what causes speakers to gesture. That is, we 
seek for a mechanistic rather than a functional explanation for the act of gesturing. 
Never-theless, both perspectives are mutually-informing and necessary for the 
development of comprehensive models.
Action-based models of gesture production
Streeck (2002, p.20) writes that “the hands, the organs of gesture, are not purely and not 
primarily expressive organs. Before they have ever gestured, they have been out there 
handling, exploring, and making things”. Our point of departure to understand how 
gestures come to be is that gestures are, essentially, actions. By a better understanding 
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of the relationship between gesture and action, we can gain insight into how gestures 
are produced and how they come to bear meaning.
The idea that gestures are tied to action is, itself, neither new nor surprising. Several 
gesture production hypotheses attribute the origin of gestures to the same processes 
responsible for practical actions (Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008; Chu & Kita, 2016; Kita et al., 2017). In the interest of simplicity, however, most 
frameworks offer only coarse directions as to how exactly gestures emerge from motor 
processes. 
The Gestures as Simulated Action (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) changes that. The GSA 
proposes that representational gestures — i.e. gestures that “represent” aspects of 
objects and events — arise from the perceptual and motoric simulations that underlie 
thinking and speaking (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). This framework builds on the 
assumption that perception, action and cognition are tightly interwoven, and that 
processing language often, if not always, encompasses simulations of modal content 
(Fischer and Zwaan 2008). For instance, when we read a novel, we sometimes create 
mental images of what the detective looks like and the actions she undertakes. 
Crucially, while we mentally simulate these images and actions, the processes involved 
in actual perceiving and acting are susceptible to become covertly activated (Kosslyn, 
1994; Jeannerod, 2001). Furthermore, these language-driven simulations can interact 
with physical actions: a study by Glenberg & Kashak (2002) showed that participants 
judged sentences such as “Andy delivered the pizza to you” faster when the motion 
performed by a participant to record their response (e.g., towards or away from body) 
matched the direction implied by the sentence, suggesting that the motor system plays 
a role in the processing of language. In short, the GSA framework suggests a causal 
link these modal simulations that arise as we think and speak, and gesture production. 
At the heart of the GSA is the idea that the stronger our motor system is engaged 
during a simulation, the more likely it will be that a gesture is produced. For example, 
mentally revisiting our childhood bedroom (perceptual simulation) is likely to elicit a 
weaker motor response than mentally revisiting how our favorite soccer player scored 
a goal on their last game (motor simulation). A study by Feyereisen and Havard (1999) 
neatly illustrates this point. They had people speak about topics aimed at tapping onto 
different types of mental imagery, and found that speakers gestured more about topics 
eliciting motor imagery (e.g., tying a shoe), in comparison with topics eliciting visual 
imagery (e.g., describing a painting) and more abstract topics (e.g., politics). Similarly, 
the processing complexity required for a task (following Cornoldi & Vecchi, 2003) also 
plays a role in gesture production. Conceptually challenging tasks, like describing a 
complex spatial route, usually elicit more gesturing than easier tasks, like describing a 
simpler route (e.g., Melinger & Kita, 2007). 
Of course, the strength of a simulation cannot be the sole factor to account for gesture 




time. The GSA’s proposal for a regulatory mechanism comes in the form of a “gesture 
threshold”, defined as “the level of activation beyond which a speaker cannot inhibit 
the expression of simulated actions as gestures” (p. 503). The threshold’s height may 
not be the same across contexts and individuals. For example, in contexts with an 
added pressure to communicate (such as when repairing miscommunication, Hoetjes, 
Krahmer & Swerts, 2015), speakers are less likely to inhibit their gestures. Thus, with a 
lower gesture threshold, more gestures will be produced. 
The third factor that contributes for an action simulation to be realized as a gesture is 
the parallel engagement of the motor system that is necessary to articulate speech, 
which may make it harder to prevent other concurrent simulations (e.g., related to 
the speech being conceptualized) from reaching motor areas and being realized as 
movement.
While the GSA theory accounts nicely for the specific way in which gestures emerge 
from modal simulations, many aspects of the theory still need to be empirically tested. 
Although we know that explicit action, performed or observed, can influence gesturing 
(e.g. Hostetter & Alibali, 2010; Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009), the question arises whether 
action can also have more subtle impact on gesturing. For example, do effects on 
gesturing only emerge as a consequence of experiencing action directly? Or could 
simple action evocation influence speakers’ gestures as well? And, especially, how 
does an action-based model account for the selection of particular gestural forms? In 
this dissertation, we address these issues.
Most of the empirical chapters in this dissertation focus on the effects of action 
simulation on gesture. To test this connection, we will study how speakers communicate 
about objects with different affordances. “Affordances” can be defined as the potential 
actions that objects allow for (Gibson, 1986). For instance, a button affords pressing; a 
stone affords grasping, lifting, or being thrown; and a tree with dense foliage may afford 
hiding underneath. The notion of affordances is forcibly cemented in the link between 
perception and action, as it implies that perceiving certain properties in the objects 
arounds us predispose us to act by activating suitable motor plans (e.g., Gerlach, 
Law and Paulson, 2002; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Fischer & Dahl, 2006). Consequently, we 
expect that having to communicate about objects with clear affordances will generate 
stronger simulations of action, which should affect speaker’s gesturing behavior. 
How the hands construct meaning
It is certainly difficult to study the origins of iconic representation in gesture without 
making assumptions about the nature of mental representation. In this thesis, we 
depart from the idea that thought is multimodal (Barsalou, 1999; 2008), that is, it relies 
on abstract codes as well as modal content — which need not only be pictorial but also 
spatial, motoric and, arguably, sensorial. It is easy to connect this idea to the principle 
of simulated action. If gestures stem from simulations of modal content that is active 
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while planning the concurrent speech, we hypothesize that these gestures should look 
in some way like the simulations they germinate in. This taps directly into the second 
topic we address in this dissertation: the origins of iconicity in the manual modality.
Imagine two friends are trying to build an Ikea closet. The instructions seemed clear 
at first, but now they disagree about which piece comes next in the assembly process, 
and in what orientation. While one of them helplessly holds the wood dowels and the 
hammer, the other tries to explain that “the large door” is the piece that comes next 
(while separating the palms of his hands to indicate the size of the piece required), 
that it should first be fixed “like this” (while holding a flat hand turned sideways, 
perpendicular to the ground) and that the door needs to be attached “using a 
screwdriver” (while holding the door piece and repeatedly rotating a clenched fist 
over the mounting).
This illustrates an everyday situation I am sure we all have been in. Now, what is 
interesting here is the use of the hands to support communication. In the first case, the 
speaker uses the space created between the hands to enclose, and thereby represent, 
the size of the required piece. Next, through a flat handshape, the speaker’s hand 
“becomes” the door itself so that she can indicate its position during assembly. Lastly, 
she imitates the use of a screwdriver, required to attach the door to the closet’s body. 
This example showcases some of the depiction techniques that we can encounter in 
gestures if we pay close attention. 
Unlike verbal language, where we use conventional forms to refer to objects and 
ideas, iconic gestures are not constrained by convention. McNeill, in his classic book 
“Hand and Mind” (1992) writes that “lacking standards of form, individuals create 
their own gesture symbols for the same event, each incorporating a core meaning 
but adding details that seem salient, and these are different from speaker to speaker” 
(p. 41). The question is, what motivated the speaker above to produce a gesture for 
these three particular events? And, more importantly, how did she choose a particular 
iconic strategy to represent each object and event, seemingly so mindlessly and with 
such ease? Despite the pervasiveness of iconicity in the visuo-manual modality, there 
haven’t been many attempts to investigate the cognitive origins of iconic gestural 
forms. In the gesture-production chapters of this dissertation, we will be taking Müller’s 
classification of gestural forms (1998; 2013) as a blueprint for our analyses.
According to Müller (1998), iconicity in the gestural modality is achieved by using 
several modes of representation that find their origin in daily actions and artistic 
practices. She identifies four basic modes: imitating, molding, drawing and portraying. 
In the imitation mode, the speaker’s hands (and body) represent an (imaginary) 
character’s hands and imitate the execution of an action. This representation mode 
could be subdivided into transitive and intransitive action, depending on whether 
the action imitated involves an imaginary object or not. During portraying, the hands 




fingers to represent a pair of scissors, or when we extend our index finger as if it were 
a toothbrush. In molding, the hands “mold” or sculpt a three-dimensional shape in 
the air, as if palpating it. Although these gestures fundamentally express perceptual 
features such as shape, they may imply a stronger haptic component than other 
shape gestures, such as drawing. Lastly, when drawing, the hand traces a silhouette 
in the air, often with the index finger. These gestures also depict shape, but they do 
so schematically. The result — if captured in the air — resembling a two-dimensional 
blueprint.
In line with the GSA and with Müller’s classification, we here suggest that iconicity is both 
subjective and embodied. It is embodied because it relies on a toolset that humans 
have developed through their many interactions with the world (exploring, acting, 
building things) and it is forcibly subjective because of the individual differences in 
the range and frequency of bodily experiences accrued. Throughout this dissertation, 
we will look for patterns despite the individual differences. Particularly, we will examine 
how the type of iconicity that confer gestures their meaningfulness may be determined 
by the type of imagery that is activated in the mind of the speaker at the moment of 
speaking.
Outline of this dissertation
The studies in this thesis aim at unravelling underlying aspects of the production of 
gestures. A grosso modo, we explore the cognitive mechanisms that may give rise 
to gestures, as well as the origins of various types of iconic mappings in gestural 
depictions: what makes speakers opt for a specific representation technique? 
How does the nature of the referent, the environment or the constraints of the 
communicative exchange influence how particular gestures are selected? And, finally, 
how do interlocutors process and comprehend different types of gestural iconicity?
The research presented in this dissertation has seen the light in several peer-reviewed 
journal publications. This means there could be minor stylistic variations between the 
chapters, due to the requirements of each of the journals where the work has been 
published. In an attempt to stir the scientific community towards content that is freely 
accessible, all of our publications have been made Open Access. 
This dissertation is composed by four empirical studies (chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5), each 
being a self-contained narrative with their own abstract, introduction, methods, results 
and discussion sections. Chapter 2 lays the foundations upon which the experimental 
work presented on this thesis builds, by exploring multimodal communication about 
objects with different degrees of manipulability. Specifically, we ask whether the 
affordances of objects play a role in determining how frequently speakers gesture, 
as well as the content of these gestures. Chapter 3 takes these questions one step 
further, by studying whether (and how) the input modality of a gesture referent 
Chapter 1
8
(verbal or imagistic) further constrains the gestures produced by speakers during a 
communication task, once more by analyzing the iconic strategies that gestures build 
upon. Chapter 4 is the only study not concerned with gesture production, but with 
comprehension. It investigates how different types of iconic mappings (action- and 
perception-based) are processed, comprehended and liked by addressees. Chapter 
5 revisits the original question: do gestures emerge from motor simulations? In 
particular, it sets off to replicate a well-known motor cognition paradigm and adapt 
it to the study of gestures, to try and establish a causal link between simulated action 
and the production of gestures. The empirical chapters are capped by a general 
discussion of our experimental findings, which can be found on Chapter 6. There, we 
address remaining questions, most notably relating to the nature of action simulations 
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Can you handle this? 
The impact of object affordances on 
 how co-speech gestures are produced
This chapter is based on:
Masson Carro, I., Goudbeek, M. B., & Krahmer, E. J. (2016).  
Can you handle this?: The impact of object affordances on  
how co-speech gestures are produced. 




Hand gestures are tightly coupled with speech and with action. Hence, recent accounts 
have emphasised the idea that simulations of spatio-motoric imagery underlie the 
production of co-speech gestures. In this study we suggest that action simulations 
directly influence the iconic strategies used by speakers to translate aspects of their 
mental representations into gesture. Using a classic referential paradigm, we investigate 
how speakers respond gesturally to the affordances of objects, by comparing the 
effects of describing objects that afford action performance (such as tools) and those 
that do not, on gesture production. Our results suggest that affordances play a key role 
in determining the amount of representational (but not non-representational) gestures 
produced by speakers, and the techniques chosen to depict such objects. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to systematically show a connection between object 
characteristics and representation techniques in spontaneous gesture production 
during the depiction of static referents.
Keywords: gesture, action, representation techniques, simulation, affordances




Hand gestures produced in conversation convey meaning that is co-expressive 
with the content of speech (McNeill, 1992). This is particularly true for imagistic or 
representational gestures (McNeill, 1992; Kendon, 2004), which depict aspects of the 
objects or scenes they refer to. For instance, when speaking about an eagle, we may 
spread our arms away from the body symbolizing the wings of the eagle, whereas when 
referring to a house, we may use our index finger to trace an inverted “v”, symbolizing 
its roof, and if we speak about our new piano, we may mime the action of playing the 
piano. These examples highlight how different referents may elicit the use of noticeably 
different gestural representation techniques such as drawing, imitating an action, etc. 
(Müller, 1998). Gestures occurring alongside speech are assumed to be spontaneous, 
i.e., produced without conscious awareness of the speaker (McNeill, 1992; Goldin-
Meadow, 2003), and speakers seem to combine the use of these iconic strategies 
effortlessly (and successfully) when describing referents to an interlocutor. Identifying 
the factors that influence the choice and combination of representation techniques 
used by speakers to convey meaning is a central (but understudied) issue in gesture 
research, and one that may shed light on the nature of the conceptual representations 
that become active at the moment of speaking. Furthermore, speakers do not gesture 
about every idea they express in speech. While the amount of gestures produced 
by speakers is influenced by factors such as the communicative context (for instance, 
speakers often gesture to highlight information that is new for their addressees, 
Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004), it could be the case that certain features of objects are 
naturally more salient to speakers, and thus more likely to be gestured about. In 
this paper, we argue that the type of imagery that is activated upon perception of 
different object characteristics plays a role in determining (a) how frequently speakers 
gesture, and also (b) what manual techniques they may use in representing referents. 
Particularly, we focus on the effect of object affordances (i.e., action possibilities that 
objects allow for, Gibson, 1986) as a possible gesture predictor. 
Affordances, object recognition and language production
Affordances (Gibson, 1986) have been defined as potential actions that objects and 
other entities allow for. For example, a handle affords gripping, just like a doorknob 
affords twisting or a button affords pressing. According to Gibson (1986), humans 
are predisposed to pay attention to the affordances of objects. This attentional bias 
towards graspable or manipulable objects (e.g., see Handy Grafton, Shroff, Ketay 
& Gazzaniga, 2003) has led researchers to study the role of action affordances as 
facilitators of object recognition and categorization, mainly using neuroimaging 
techniques and visuomotor priming paradigms. These studies have revealed 
activation in the premotor areas of the brain (presumably involved in the planning 
of movement) when participants are presented with manipulable objects during the 
completion of categorization tasks (e.g., Gerlach, Law, & Paulson, 2002), laterality 
effects in motor response to affordance perception (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998), and 
handshape-affordance congruency effects (e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Bub, Masson, & 
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Bukach, 2003). Most importantly, these experiments challenge the view that motor 
planning requires a conscious intention to act.
 
Object affordances have also been acknowledged to influence language 
comprehension (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; for a review see Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008). In an experiment in which participants had to make sensibility judgments 
(i.e., identifying whether a sentence is sensible or not), Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) 
detected a compatibility effect between grammatical constructions and action 
understanding. Sentences such as “Andy delivered the pizza to you” were judged 
faster if the motion performed by the participant during the task (e.g., towards or away 
from body) would match the direction implied by the sentence. This facilitation effect 
suggests that processing language entails a certain degree of motor simulation (but 
note that other accounts have attributed these effects to linguistic, and not necessarily 
embodied, factors — see, for instance, Louwerse, 2011, or Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010, 
for further discussion). Strengthening these findings, several neuroimaging studies 
have shown that listening to sentences describing actions triggers the activation of 
the premotor brain areas related to the body parts involved in such actions (Hauk, 
Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Similarly, reading the names 
of objects that can be grasped (e.g., a grape) or manipulated (e.g., pliers) triggers 
simulations of grasping and of specific hand configurations (Glover, Rosenbaum, 
Graham & Dixon, 2004; Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008). 
In sum, the finding that the processing of action-related visual stimuli and language 
can evoke appropriate motor responses is relevant for the field of gesture studies: It is 
conceivable that such affordance-evoked motor responses may be partly responsible 
for the production of co-speech representational gestures, as has been recently 
suggested by Hostetter and Alibali (2008).
Affordances and gestures
Gesture and speech seem suited to convey different types of information (Beattie & 
Shovelton, 2002; Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009). Gestures occur often with content that 
is highly imageable (Hadar & Butterworth, 1997), and particularly so when speakers 
depict events that underlie spatial and motoric information (Feyereisen & Havard, 
1999; Chu & Kita, 2008; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). In these cases, gestures might help 
get across a meaning that is hard to encode linguistically but that is relatively easy to 
visualise. For example, Feyereisen and Havard (1999) conducted a series of interviews 
where they asked specific questions to elicit the activation of motor imagery (e.g., 
could you explain how to change the wheel of a car or to repair the tire of a bicycle?), 
of visual imagery (e.g., could you describe your favourite painting or sculpture?), or of 
no imagery (e.g., do you think more women should go into politics?). They found that 
speakers produced the highest amount of gestures when speaking about information 
related to action, and the lowest amount of gestures when speaking about abstract 
topics that, in principle, did not evoke imagery directly. Indeed, gestures are often 
depictive of (one’s own) motoric experiences, and we could say that the gestures we 
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perform daily reveal something about how we have acquired knowledge (Streeck, 
2009). 
In light of findings such as the above, Hostetter and Alibali propose their Gestures 
as Simulated Action framework (GSA — Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). This framework 
contends that the gestures that speakers produce stem from the perceptual and 
motor simulations that underlie thinking and speaking. According to the GSA, one of 
the chief factors that determine whether a gesture will be produced by a speaker is the 
strength of activation of the simulated action (p. 503). This rests on the assumption that 
different types of mental imagery can be organised along a continuum determined 
by the extent to which they are tied to action simulation. In practice, this implies 
that simulations of motor imagery (e.g., a person imagines herself performing an 
action) and of spatial imagery (e.g., a person imagines what an object will look like if 
perceived from a different angle) have a stronger action component than simulations 
of visual imagery (e.g., a person mentally visualises a famous painting in detail), and 
will culminate into higher representational gesture rates. 
Two studies investigated the differences in gesture rate when speakers were induced 
to simulate motor and spatial imagery, as compared with a visual imagery control 
condition (Hostetter & Alibali, 2010; Hostetter, Alibali & Bartholomew, 2011). Hostetter 
and Alibali (2010) showed that speakers gestured more while describing visual 
patterns that they had manually constructed with matches than while describing 
patterns they had only viewed. In the second study, Hostetter, Alibali and Bartholomew 
(2011) presented speakers with sets of arrow patterns, and asked them to describe 
the patterns either in the position in which they were presented, or imagining them 
as they would appear if they were rotated. In this case, too, higher gesture rates were 
observed when speakers had to simulate rotation, as opposed to when they directly 
viewed the patterns. Thus, both studies supported the notion that co-speech gestures 
are produced more frequently following spatial or motoric simulations. Nevertheless, 
in both studies, speakers still gestured to a fair extent in the (no simulation) control 
conditions. The authors suggest that visual imagery may in some cases trigger a 
certain degree of action simulation. For example, in Hostetter and Alibali (2010), 
participants might have simulated the action of arranging the matches by hand to 
form the visual patterns they attended to. Similarly, in Hostetter et al. (2011), the stimuli 
consisted of arrows, which may thus have generated simulations of motion. Taking 
this into account, it becomes apparent that a clear-cut distinction cannot be made 
between types of mental imagery, with various types of imagery sometimes becoming 
simultaneously active. 
The first question that we address in this paper relates to whether the perception of 
objects with a manual affordance (such as tools) will elicit simulations of object use 
and, hence, result in higher gesture rates. Typically, the perception of static scenes 
where no animate character or actor is involved should activate simulations of visual 
imagery, but the motor cognition literature has extensively shown that viewing objects 
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with affordances may generate simulations of object manipulation and object use 
(e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Bub, Masson, & Bukach, 2003; Glover & al., 2004). A handful 
of recent studies have asked whether objects that afford action performance elicit 
higher gesture rates during description tasks similar to the experiment reported in 
the present study (Pine, Gurney & Fletcher, 2010; Hostetter, 2014) but also during a 
mental rotation task and a subsequent motion depiction task (Chu & Kita, 2015). In 
an experiment designed to examine the intrapersonal function of gestures, Pine et 
al. (2010) presented speakers with pictures of praxic (e.g., scissors, stapler) and non-
praxic objects (e.g., fence, chicken), and measured their gesture rates while describing 
these objects to a listener under different visibility conditions. Their results showed that 
people produced more gestures in trials corresponding to praxic objects, regardless 
of whether they could directly see their addressee or not. Using a similar paradigm, 
Hostetter (2014) asked speakers to describe a series of nouns, and found more 
gesturing accompanying the descriptions of the items that had been rated highest 
in a scale of manipulability, also regardless of visibility. Both studies conclude that the 
likelihood of producing representational gestures is co-determined by the semantic 
properties of the words they accompany — specifically, by the motoric component 
evoked by such words. 
While these findings are suggestive, both studies have some limitations which we 
try to address in the current paper. First of all, in both studies, participants were not 
allowed to name the objects being described. It is likely that this type of instruction 
may have biased the speakers’ descriptions towards including information about the 
function of objects when possible, perhaps as the easiest communicative strategy to 
describe objects. This would make questionable the extent to which speakers gesture 
more about manipulable objects because of the action simulation that may underlie 
the representation of such objects, perhaps arguing in favour of an account where 
function is simply a more salient (and easier to gesturally depict) attribute, that leads 
to more successful identification.
Secondly, both studies provide no data about the occurrence of other non-
representational gesture types (e.g., rhythmic gestures such as beats) in relation to 
manipulable objects. While it is true that both the study by Pine et al. (2010) and 
the GSA (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, Hostetter, 2014) are specific to representational 
gestures, it may be the case that the activation evoked by descriptions with a strong 
action component is not restricted to the production of representational gestures, but 
that it primes gesturing in general. This could support what we may term a general 
activation account, by means of which the motoric activation evoked by action-related 
language may lower the speaker’s gesture threshold (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, p.503) 
enough to allow for other hand movements to be produced. However, whether both 
representational and non-representational gestures depend on the same threshold 
height is not specified in any gesture model to date, and remains to be investigated. 
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A recent study by Chu and Kita (2015) extends previous research by suggesting that 
gestures may arise in response to action potential independently of the content of 
speech, as evidenced by the increase in the number of gestures both while solving a 
mental rotation task (“co-thought” gestures) and during depictions of motion events 
(co-speech gestures) where the affordance component of the object presented (in 
this case, mugs with handles) was task-irrelevant. Furthermore, their study featured 
a condition in which the affordances of the mugs were obscured, by presenting 
participants with mugs covered in spikes (minimising grasping potential). In both co-
speech and co-thought conditions, participants were less likely to gesture about the 
mugs in the spiky condition, exposing a fine-grained sensitivity to the affordance of 
objects in speakers, even when these are task-irrelevant. 
So far the few studies that have examined gesture production about objects that 
afford action performance have mostly looked at the frequency of gesturing. However, 
gesture rate may not be the only aspect of gesture production influenced by perceiving 
affordances. Here, we argue that the representation technique chosen to depict a 
referent (e.g., Müller, 1998; Kendon, 2004; Streeck, 2008, 2009; van Nispen, van de 
Sandt-Koenderman, Mol & Krahmer, 2014) might be susceptible to such influence too. 
If we think of representational gestures as being abstract materializations of (selective) 
mental representations that are active at the moment of speaking, one can think that 
the techniques chosen to represent these images may reveal something about the 
nature and quality of the information being simulated by a speaker. Müller (1998) 
recognises four main representation modes employed by speakers in the construction 
of meaning. These gestures are perceivably different, and imply varying degrees of 
abstraction with respect to the referent they represent. These modes include imitation, 
which is by and large the most common technique associated to first-person (enacting) 
gestures, and consists of miming actions associated to an object; portrayal, where 
the hand represents an object or character, for example the hand pretending to be a 
gun; drawing, where a speaker traces a contour, typically with an extended finger; and 
moulding, where the speaker moulds a shape in the air, as if palpating it. Very little is 
known about what drives the use of one technique over another and, in general, about 
what determines the physical form that representational gestures adopt (Krauss, Chen, 
& Gottesman, 2000; Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton, & Prévost, 2008). 
One factor known to influence gestural representation modes is action observation 
(e.g., seeing a character perform an action, Parrill, 2010) or action performance (e.g., 
Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009). For instance, Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) had speakers 
solve the Tower of Hanoi problem and describe its solution to a listener. Solving this 
task consists of moving a stack of disks from one peg to another one, using an auxiliary 
middle peg. Half of the speakers performed the task with real disks, whereas the other 
half performed the task on the computer, by dragging the disks with the mouse. 
While no changes were observed in the speech and number of gestures in these 
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two conditions, gestures were qualitatively different. When speakers had performed 
the actions with real disks, they were more likely to use grasping handshapes — i.e., 
imitating the action that they just performed. Speakers who solved the task on the 
computer tended to use drawing gestures — i.e., tracing the trajectory of the mouse 
on the screen. This suggests that the type of action simulation may have an impact on 
the particular representation techniques used by speakers. However, it could also be 
that these results stem from priming effects, whereby speakers simply “reproduced” 
the action they had just performed. 
Chu and Kita (2015) also suggest a connection between affordance and representation 
technique. Although their study only included one object type (mugs), their results 
show that speakers were more likely to use grasping gestures to solve the rotation 
task when the mugs were presented with a smooth surface (affordance enhanced) 
as opposed to when the mugs appeared covered in spikes (affordance obscured). 
Hence, both of these studies highlight the importance of investigating not only 
the number of gestures produced by speakers, if we are really to understand why 
we produce gestures at all — as has been emphasised by recent studies on gesture 
production (e.g., Bavelas & Healing, 2013; Galati and Brennan, 2014; and Hoetjes, 
Koolen, Goudbeek, Krahmer & Swerts, 2015). Limiting ourselves to annotating the 
number of gestures produced can be compared to doing speech studies in which 
only the number of words — but not the content of speech — is analysed.
The present study
In sum, it seems that action simulation plays a role in eliciting gesture production, 
with recent studies suggesting that higher gesture rates may be evoked by visual 
inspection of objects that afford action performance, such as tools. Nevertheless, 
previous research has mainly focused on analysing gesture rates, therefore we have 
little knowledge of how object characteristics influence the strategies that gesturers 
employ in communicating about them.
The aim of this study is to assess the effects of perceiving objects with different (high, 
low) affordance degrees, on the production of speech-accompanying gestures during 
a communication task, focussing on the gestural techniques employed by speakers in 
the representation of objects. We predict that affordance will determine the number of 
gestures produced by speakers, with more gestures accompanying the descriptions of 
manipulable objects, in line with previous research (Pine et al., 2010; Hostetter, 2014; 
Chu & Kita, 2015). Currently, the predictions made by the GSA (Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008) are specific to representational gestures. In this study, we will also annotate the 
occurrence of non-representational gestures. On the one hand, it is conceivable, given 
that gestures are seen as outward manifestations of specific imagery simulations, that 
only the number of representational gestures is influenced by our condition. On 
the other hand, however, it could be possible that the activation evoked by action-
related language primes the production of hand gestures in general, including non-
representational types. 
Can you handle this?
21
2
When we look specifically at the presentation of gestures, we expect that 
communicating about objects that afford actions will trigger more imitation gestures 
(e.g., where the speaker mimes the function associated with the object) than tracing 
or moulding gestures (e.g., where the speaker traces or “sculpts” an object’s shape), 
given that the gestures should reflect the type of imagery being simulated at the 
moment of speaking. Conversely, we do not expect the occurrence of imitation 
gestures accompanying descriptions of objects that are non-manipulable (although 
they can occur — e.g., pretending to eat, when describing a table), but a predominance 
of moulding or tracing gestures.
Method
Participants
Eighty undergraduate students from Tilburg University (M = 21; SD = 2; 50 female) 
took part in this experiment, in exchange for course credit points. All participants were 
native speakers of Dutch, and carried out the experimental task in pairs.
Material and apparatus
Our stimuli set was composed of pictures of 28 objects: 14 with a high affordance 
degree (e.g., whisk), and 14 with a low affordance degree (e.g., plant) (see Appendix 
1 for the complete list of objects). We defined objects with a high affordance degree 
simply as manipulable objects operated exclusively with the hands, whose operation 
may induce a change in the physical world. For instance, the use of a pair of scissors 
typically results into the division of a sheet of paper into smaller units. Conversely, 
non-manipulable objects could not be directly operated using the hands, and we 
minimised the possibility for any object in our dataset to induce motor simulation. 
For instance, if an object might contain handles or knobs, we either chose a visual 
instance of the object without such features, or the features were digitally erased from 
the picture.
To validate the stimuli, we conducted a pre-test where we asked questions about the 
objects to 25 Dutch-speaking naïve judges uninvolved in the actual experiment, using 
Crowdflower (an online crowdsourcing service; http://www.crowdflower.com/). In 
this questionnaire, participants were asked to name each object in Dutch (we later 
computed whether the name was correct, and assigned it either a 0 — incorrect — or 1 — 
correct —), and also rated the manipulability, and degree of perceived visual complexity 
of each object on a scale from 0 to 100 (being 0 the least manipulable / complex, and 
100 the most). Our aim was to make sure that participants could name the objects 
correctly in Dutch, and that these objects were rated similarly in visual complexity, to 




The percentage of correctly named objects ranged between 90% and 100% for the 
selected items (MHIGH = 94.35, SD = 2.24, MLOW= 93.14, SD = 2.14), and fell below 
35% for their perceived visual complexity (MHIGH = 29.01, SD = 2.46, MLOW = 26.74, 
SD = 2.39). Most importantly, the scores did not differ between the high- and low-
affordance items for complexity (t(24) = 1.51, p =.14). The manipulability ratings for 
both affordance groups were statistically significant, as intended (MHIGH = 74.47, 
SD = 11.96, MLOW = 41.4, SD = 21.42) (t(24) = 9.53, p < .001).
NUMBER 1 NUMBER 2 NUMBER 3
Figure 1
Example of the stimuli presentation as seen by the speaker. Each object is embedded in one 
slide, occupying it fully, always preceded by a slide presenting the item number.
Procedure
The experiment introduced participants to a fictive scenario in which participant 
A (the speaker) was relocating, but due to an injury could not go by himself to the 
department store to buy utensils and furniture. Participant B (the listener) would go in 
his place, but for this to be possible they would have to agree beforehand on the items 
to be purchased. Thus, the speaker’s task was to briefly describe each of the items, in 
such a way that the listener would be able to visually identify them. The stimuli that 
the speaker would describe were displayed on a 13” laptop screen, placed on a table 
to the left side of the speaker. All picture items were compiled into a presentation 
document, where high- and low-affordance objects were mixed at random. Each 
object fully occupied the screen. Each object was preceded by a slide indicating the 
trial number (See Figure 1), to ease the coordination between the speaker and the 
listener’s tasks. The listener was given a paper brochure, in which pictures of all objects 
appeared forming a grid, each item accompanied by a letter. Next to it, the listener 
was given an answer sheet with two columns: one with the trial numbers, and the 
other with blanks to fill in the letters corresponding to the items described. Thus, the 
listener’s task was to identify each object in the brochure she was given, and annotate 
the letter corresponding to such object on her answer sheet. 
Each pair received written instructions, and had the chance to do a practice round 
before the actual experiment began, with an item that was not part of the stimuli 
set. Speakers and listeners were allowed to speak freely, and had no restrictions with 
respect to the way they designed their descriptions — for example, naming the objects 
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was not prohibited. A digital video camera was placed behind the listener, to record 
the speaker’s speech and gestures
Data analyses
We transcribed all words produced by the speakers (until the listener would write down 
her response) and annotated all gestures, using the multimodal annotation tool Elan 
(Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, http://www.
lat-mpi.eu/tools/elan; Wittenburg, Brugman, Russel, Klassmann, & Sloetjes, 2006). 
We categorised gestures as representational and non-representational gestures. 
Representational gestures were defined as hand movements depicting information 
related to the semantic content of the ongoing speech. Examples of such gestures are 
tracing the contour of a house with the index finger, or repeatedly pushing down the 
air with the palm, simulating the bouncing of a basketball. The non-representational 
gestures mainly comprised rhythmic gestures used to emphasise words (beats — 
McNeill, 1992), and interactive or pragmatic gestures directed at the addressee 
(Bavelas, Chovil Lawrie, & Wade, 1992; Kendon, 2004). We excluded from our 
annotation other nonverbal behaviours such as self-adaptors (e.g., fixing one’s hair). 
Each gesture was annotated in its full length, from the preparation to the retraction 
phase (see McNeill, 1992). When a gesture stroke was immediately followed by a new 
gesture, we examined the fragment frame by frame, and set the partition at the exact 
moment where a change in hand shape, or movement type would take place. 
Next, we annotated the techniques observed in the speakers’ gestures. Representation 
technique was coded only for representational gestures, assigning always one 
technique to each gesture. We took as our point of departure Müller’s four 
representation modes —imitating, drawing, portraying and moulding (Müller, 1998), 
and expanded the list, further sub-categorizing some representation modes, based 
on the gestures we observed in our dataset after screening the first five videos, and 
adding an extra category: placing (e.g., see Bergmann & Kopp, 2009). A detailed 
overview of the techniques annotated can be found in Appendix 2. While it is true 
that some representation modes are often associated to specific handshapes (for 
example, moulding is oftentimes associated with flat handshapes, and tracing is 
often performed with a single stretched finger), our main criterion in coding these 
representation modes was to ask “how the hands are used symbolically” (Müller, 1998, 
p.323). 
To validate the reliability of the annotations, a second coder, naïve to the experimental 
conditions and hypotheses, performed gesture identification in forty descriptions 
(produced by eight different speakers), and judged the representation technique 
used in a sample of sixty gestures produced by twelve different speakers (five 
gestures per speaker). In total, 146 gestures from twenty different speakers (9.8% of 
all annotated gestures) were analysed by the second coder. Cohen’s Kappa reveals 
substantial agreement with respect to the number of gestures produced by speakers 
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(κ = .71, p < .001), and an almost perfect agreement with respect to the representation 
techniques (κ = .84 p < .001).
Design and statistical analyses
The effects of affordance on our dependent variables were assessed using linear 
mixed models for continuous variables (i.e., gesture rates), and logit mixed models 
for categorical variables (i.e., representation techniques) (see Jaeger 2008). Mixed-
effect models allow us to account for fixed as well as random effects in our data 
simultaneously, thereby optimizing the generalizability of our results and eliminating 
the need to conduct separate F1 and F2 analyses. Thus, “affordance” (two levels: high, 
low) was the fixed factor in all of our analyses, and participants and items were included 
as random factors. In all cases, we started with a full random effects model (following 
the recommendation by Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily, 2013). In case the model did not 
converge, we eliminated the random slopes with the lowest variance. P values were 
estimated using the Likelihood Ratio Test, contrasting, for each dependent variable, 
the fit of our (alternative) model with the fit of the null model.
Results
The communication task elicited 1120 descriptions, 509 of which were accompanied 
by at least one gesture. 1483 gestures were identified. Representational gestures 
accounted for 72% (1070) of the gestures annotated, the remaining 28% (413) 
consisting of non-representational gestures. Our first research question was concerned 
with whether perceiving objects that afford manual actions would result into the 
production of more gestures. We computed a normalised gesture rate measure, 
whereby the number of gestures produced per description is calculated relative to 
the number of words spoken (Gestures / Words *100). Trials where no gestures were 
produced (null trials) were excluded, but in such a way that the ratio of descriptions 
for high and low manipulability objects for each speaker was preserved. Thus, we only 
excluded null trials for one condition if the same number of null trials could be excluded 
for the other condition, leading to the examination of gestures in 572 descriptions 
(286 per condition). We did this in order to reduce the variance in our dataset caused 
by the amount of 0-gesture trials, without either losing data or compromising our 
results. We computed the gesture rate two times, first for representational gestures, 
and second for non-representational gestures. The results show that affordance 
influenced the representational gesture rate, which was higher for high-affordance 
objects (MHIGH = 9.76, SD = 12.53) than for low-affordance objects (MLOW = 6.47, 
SD = 7.82) (ß = -2.91, SE = 1.17, p = .004). However, we found no effects of affordance 
on the non-representational gesture rate, which did not differ between manipulable 
(MHIGH = 3.83, SD = 6.33) and non-manipulable objects (MLOW = 3.71, SD = 6.01) 
(ß = -.15, SE = 0.74, p = .72). 
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Gesture rates for non-representational gestures (left) and representational gestures (right).  
The bars represent the mean number of gestures per 100 words, and the error bars 
represent the 95% confidence intervals. **Significant at p < .005.
Given that gesture rate is also dependent on the number words produced by a 
speaker, it could be the case that the number of words is also sensitive to affordance, 
which could in turn have influenced gesture rate. Hence, we computed the effects of 
affordance on the number of words uttered by speakers, and found no statistically-
supported differences between manipulable (MHIGH = 23.29, SD = 14.85) and non-
manipulable objects (MLOW = 24.41.4, SD = 15.2) (ß = .58, SE = 2.78, p = .1).
In sum, our results suggest that speakers do gesture more when faced with an object 
that they can manipulate with their hands, but this effect is restricted to the production 
of representational gestures (Figure 2). 
Analysis of representation techniques
Our results support the prediction that describing objects that afford manual action 
would elicit more gestures where the speaker pretended to execute the action 
associated to the object (ß = -4.46, SE = 0.93, p < .001) (MHIGH = .39, SD = .48; 
MLOW = .02, SD = .15), or pretended to handle (grip) such object (ß = -3.34, SE = 1.17, 
p < .001) (MHIGH = .16, SD = .37; MLOW = .02, SD = .14). In contrast, for objects in 
the low-affordance condition, speakers typically made use of moulding gestures in 
which the hands sculpted their shape (ß = 1.76, SE = 0.34, p < .001) (MHIGH = .28, 
SD = .45; MLOW = .66, SD = .47), and of placing gestures where the hands expressed 
the spatial relation between different features of an object (ß = 3.007, SE = 1.04, 
p < .001) (MHIGH = .02, SD = .14, MLOW = .13, SD = .33) (see Figure 3).
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Use of representation techniques across conditions
























Frequency of use of each representation technique (annotated only for representational 
gestures). The error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. ***Significant at p < .001.
Discussion
The experiment reported in this paper was designed to examine the impact of a core 
property of objects, namely their degree of action affordance, on the production of 
co-speech gestures. Particularly, we sought to elucidate (a) whether perceiving objects 
that afford manual actions (without attending to explicit action demonstrations) 
sufficed to increase the production of (representational) gestures, and (b) whether the 
action component intrinsic to these objects would be reflected in the representation 
techniques used to gesture.
Our analyses yielded a number of noteworthy results. Firstly, our results suggest that 
merely describing objects with manual affordances (e.g., tools), as opposed to objects 
whose daily function is not primarily executed with the hand, is indeed enough to 
elevate the rate of co-speech gestures produced by speakers. This result, however, 
was only found for representational gestures. This is consistent both with previous 
research (Pine, Gurney and Fletcher, 2010), and with the Gestures as Simulated 
Action (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), which specifically predicts more representational 
gestures accompanying stronger simulations of motor imagery. Currently, the GSA 
framework accounts solely for the production of representational gestures. Our study 
contributes to a possible instantiation of such framework, by showing that this effect 
does not extend to the production of non-imagistic gestures such as pragmatic 
gestures directed to the addressee (Kendon, 2004) and beats (McNeill, 1992) — which 
constituted most of the gestures annotated as non-representational in our study. The 
relationship between representational and non-representational gestures has been 
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largely ignored in currently-available gesture models, in terms of the mechanisms 
underlying the production of both gesture types, with nearly all accounts limiting their 
scope to representational gesture. This fact suggests that, although produced together 
in talk, both types of gestures may have their origin in different cognitive processes 
(Chu & Kita, 2015) and relate to imagistic and linguistic content in different ways. Our 
results emphasise this difference by showing that the activation caused by our stimuli 
was restricted to representational gestures, thereby suggesting that the response to 
the perception of affordances does not generate simple movement activation (going 
against what we earlier termed a “general activation” account), but that it seems to 
recruit motor responses that are specific to the features of the represented referents. 
The extent to which the production of affordance-congruent gestures is semantically-
mediated, or whether these gestures emerge from a more “direct” visual route to 
action is a question that requires further investigation. 
Despite our finding that more gestures were produced while describing high-
affordance objects, still a high amount of gestures were produced while describing 
low-affordance items. We hypothesise that objects in the low-affordance category may 
have evoked action simulations as well, but of a different kind. For instance, many of 
these objects had large flat surfaces, which may have activated haptic (“touching”) 
simulations in the speaker (e.g., a ball-shaped lamp affords to be palpated and its 
structure affords to be moulded with both hands; a flat surface affords running our 
palms over it, etc.). This explanation is supported by the predominant use of moulding 
gestures (mainly associated with flat handshapes) in the description of low-affordance 
objects. In addition, we observed a tendency in speakers to represent the objects in 
the low-affordance condition following a piecemeal strategy. That is, whereas for high-
affordance objects speakers could mime the performance of an action in one gesture, 
for low-affordance objects speakers tended to represent separately, in sequential 
gestures, the shape of different salient features of the object. For instance, it was 
common that a speaker would describe a shelves rack by first moulding its overall 
shape, then moulding the shape of one shelf (showing its horizontality, flatness and 
size) and then producing several placing gestures, indicating the location of the 
remaining individual shelves with respect to one another. Such detailed descriptions 
occurred very often in our dataset, and they may partly be due to the fact that our 
speakers had to describe pictures of objects, rich in visual detail, and not verbal items 
(as in Hostetter, 2014). It is therefore likely that speakers will produce even less gestures 
accompanying the descriptions of non-manipulable objects when the targets are not 
presented visually. Further studies comparing the production of gestures in response 
to both types of stimuli presentation (written versus pictorial) should clarify this issue. 
Representation modes in gestural depiction
While the use of different techniques to gesturally represent concepts has been 
described in the literature (e.g., see Müller, 1998; Kendon, 2004; Streeck, 2008, 
2009; van Nispen et al., 2014), it has received little scholarship thus far. If gestures 
stem from the imagery that underlies thought, we can conceive representational hand 
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gestures as visible materializations of certain aspects of a speaker’s mental pictures. 
In other words, there is a degree of isomorphism between mental representations 
and hand gestures, and therefore it is worthwhile investigating the iconic strategies 
that allow for the “transduction” of imagery into movement. In this study we originally 
looked at four representation modes that have their root on daily activity as well as on 
artistic expression modes: imitating, moulding, tracing and portraying (Müller, 1998). 
Our results show that objects that afforded manual actions were mostly represented 
through imitating gestures (particularly, object use and gripping gestures), whereas 
low-affordance objects were mostly represented with moulding and placing gestures. 
The remaining categories did not reveal significant differences (e.g., tracing), mostly 
because of the low frequency with which they occurred (e.g., enacting, portraying). 
In sum, it is likely that high-affordance objects evoked simulations of action in the 
speakers, and that this was manifested not only in the amount of gesturing, but also 
in the features of the referents that these gestures represented. The fact that most 
high-affordance objects were represented through imitating gestures (object use, 
grip) supports the notion that viewing objects triggers the activation of the motor 
processes associated with physically grasping those objects (e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000; 
Bub, Masson, & Bukach, 2003). Conversely, it is likely that the moulding gestures 
accompanying low-affordance objects stemmed from simulations of touching, having 
their root on everyday exploring through haptic perception (Lederman & Klatzky, 
1987). We have hypothesised about the connection between imitating and moulding 
gestures, and different types of simulated action. Nevertheless, we wonder about 
the cognitive origin of other representation modes, such as tracing, or portraying. 
One noteworthy aspect of the gestural techniques we analysed is that they display 
different degrees of abstraction or schematicity (see, e.g., Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014). 
For instance, miming the performance of an object is close to daily sensorimotor 
experience, and seems relatively “unfiltered” in comparison with drawing a contour, 
which implies the abstraction of a series of features into a shape, ultimately traced by 
the finger. It becomes apparent that these gestures also vary in terms of their cognitive 
complexity (e.g., Bartolo et al., 2003), and it is therefore likely that different gestural 
techniques originate in different processes. Thus, future research should address how 
cognitive and communicative aspects constrain the use of representation techniques, 
which will, in our opinion, inform greatly the creation of more comprehensive co-
speech gesture models.
In conclusion, this study showed that (action) affordances influence gestural behaviour, 
by determining both the amount of representational gestures produced by speakers, 
and the gestural techniques chosen to depict such objects. The present findings thus 
support and expand the assumptions of the GSA framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), 
and are compatible with previous research in the field of motor cognition showing 
specific handshape-affordance congruency effects during visual and language tasks 
(e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Bub, Masson & Bukach, 2003; Bub & Masson, 2006). In 
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addition, to our knowledge this is the first study to have systematically shown a 
connection between object properties and gestural representation techniques during 
referential communication. The insight gained by looking at such techniques highlights 
the importance of adopting a more qualitative approach to gesture research, as means 
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Description and examples of the representation techniques annotated in the present study.
Representation Mode Description
Object Use Represents a transitive action, whereby the actor simulates the performance 
of an object-directed action. 
Example: the hand acts as if holding a pen, with both thumb and index 
fingertips pressed together, imitating the act of writing
Enactment Represents an intransitive action, whereby the actor simulates the 
performance of a non-object-directed action. 
Example: the arms swing back and forth in alternated movements, 
simulating the motion of the upper body while running.
Hand Grip The hand acts as if it were grasping or holding an object, without carrying 
out any specific action. 
Example: fingers close into a clenched fist, as if holding the handle of a 
tool. 
Moulding The hand acts as if it were palpating, or sculpting the surface of an object. 
Example: a flat hand with the palm facing down moves along the horizontal 
axis, representing the “flatness” of an object’s surface.
Tracing The hand (typically using the index finger) draws a shape in the air, or traces 
the trajectory (to be) followed by an entity. 
Example: tracing a big square with the tip of the finger, representing a 
quadratic object such as a window.
Portraying The hand is used to portray an object (or character) in a holistic manner, as 
if it had become the object itself.
Example: with two fingers (index and middle) stretched out horizontally, 
and the others closed, the hand can portray a pair of scissors, and simulate 
the action of cutting through paper.
Placing The hand anchors or places an entity within the gesture space, or explicitly 
expresses a spatial relation between two or more entities. 
Example: when describing a scene, a speaker might use his hand to 
indicate the location of the actors and objects portrayed.
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In face-to-face communication, speakers typically integrate information acquired 
through different sources, including what they see and what they know, into their 
communicative messages. In this study, we asked how these different input sources 
influence the frequency and type of iconic gestures produced by speakers during a 
communication task, under two degrees of task complexity. Specifically, we investigated 
whether speakers gestured differently when they had to describe an object presented 
to them as an image or as a written word (input modality) and, additionally, when they 
were allowed to explicitly name the object or not (task complexity). Our results show that 
speakers produced more gestures when they attended to a picture. Further, speakers 
more often gesturally depicted shape information when attended to an image, and 
they demonstrated the function of an object more often when they attended to a 
word. However, when we increased the complexity of the task by forbidding speakers 
to name the target objects, these patterns disappeared, suggesting that speakers 
may have strategically adapted their use of iconic strategies to better meet the task’s 
goals. Our study also revealed (independent) effects of object manipulability on the 
type of gestures produced by speakers and, in general, it highlighted a predominance 
of molding and handling gestures. These gestures may reflect stronger motoric and 
haptic simulations, lending support to activation-based gesture production accounts.
Keywords: co-speech gesture, representation technique, iconicity, input modality, 
manipulability




Speakers often rely on iconicity (resemblance between form and referent) to gesturally 
depict attributes of referents, such as their shape or function (e.g., tracing a contour, 
or demonstrating the use of a tool). Despite the advancement in our understanding of 
how gestures are produced, we know little about the mechanisms driving the choice 
of such iconic strategies in spontaneous gesturing. Recently, researchers have begun 
to tackle this issue by studying the use of different modes of representation (Müller, 
1998) rooted in everyday habitual and artistic practices such as imitating or drawing, 
uncovering preferences in the way speakers manually depict objects. For instance, 
speakers exhibit a preference for imitating or handling gestures to represent objects 
that can be manipulated (e.g., pretending to handle a toothbrush and miming the act of 
brushing one’s teeth) over other suitable representation techniques such as letting the 
hand portray the object (e.g., using an extended index finger to represent a toothbrush, 
and miming the act of brushing one’s teeth) (Padden, Hwang, Lepic & Seegers, 2015). 
Conversely, when conveying shape information, speakers tend to produce molding 
or sculpting gestures more often than other potentially informative gestures like 
tracing a silhouette (Masson-Carro, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2016). Regularities have 
also been found in how speakers choose and combine different strategies to depict 
objects when gestures are used in the absence of speech (van Nispen, van de Sandt-
Koenderman, Mol & Krahmer, 2014), highlighting convergence in the way speakers 
manually depict visual information. Importantly, however, the experimental research 
available looking at representation modes in the manual modality has mainly relied 
on visuospatial stimuli (pictures or video), making it hard to evaluate the extent to 
which the speakers’ gestural depictions reflect conceptual knowledge, or merely 
depict information visually present in the stimuli. If we are to understand how gestures 
are depictive of a speaker’s mental representation, we should examine the gestures 
produced when speakers are provided with a visual representation in contrast with 
when speakers draw only from their own conceptual knowledge. This not only helps 
further the discussion of how different gesture types germinate, but it also offers new 
insight into the nature of multimodal representation.
In this paper, we explore the effects of visually-presented stimuli (pictures) as opposed 
to verbally-presented stimuli (words) on gesture production about objects differing 
in their degree of manipulability, ranging from low (“table”) to high (“pen”). Although 
both are thought to access semantic memory (e.g., Caramazza, 1996), pictures and 
words activate different (aspects of) representations in ways that are relevant for 
subsequent verbal and gestural representation. For instance, pictures are rich in visual 
detail and denote more concrete categories than words do (Amit, Algom, & Trope, 
2009), and they are likely to activate mental representations that are richer in motor 
content, which may influence both the frequency of gesturing and the form that 
gestures adopt. Furthermore, we will also examine whether the use of iconic strategies 
varies depending on the complexity of the descriptions speakers produce.
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In the next sections, we introduce the challenges of studying gestural representation 
modes, and we explore the processes that may give rise to gestures when speakers 
draw from conceptual and perceptual knowledge.
Background
Speakers are known for using their hands when conversing with others. Such gestures 
are known as co-speech gestures — as they typically occur alongside speech — and fulfill 
both cognitive and communicative functions (e.g., Alibali, Heath & Myers, 2001; Goldin-
Meadow, 1999). Among the various types of hand gestures (e.g., see Kendon, 2004, 
for a comprehensive review), iconic gestures (McNeill, 1992) depict characteristics of 
the referents alluded to in speech, in such a way that the gestures resemble or evoke 
their referents. For instance, tracing a square with one’s extended index finger creates 
an ephemeral image that an observer may associate with a real-world referent, say, 
a window or a box. Hence, these gestures receive the name “iconic” because they 
make use of iconicity (mapping between form and meaning, Emmorey, 2014; Perniss 
& Vigliocco, 2014; Taub, 2001;) to convey information. Despite its pervasiveness in the 
visual communication modality, iconicity has until recently not received much attention, 
deemed a more primitive form of communication in comparison with the arbitrary 
forms that populate speech (Tolar, Lederberg, Gokhale, & Tomasello, 2008). However, 
there is nothing simple about how we produce and comprehend iconic signs or 
gestures. From the point of view of the producer, executing a visual form that is iconic 
of a referent may entail a series of complex processes, such as activating a suitable 
modal representation, identifying and selecting salient features (visual, structural, 
functional, etc.), and selecting1 an encoding strategy, all whilst taking into account the 
affordances of the manual modality and of the environment. The processes underlying 
these operations, as well as the relations amongst them, remain poorly understood, 
especially in co-speech gestures. In contrast with signed languages where (iconic) 
form-meaning mappings have become conventionalized (Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014; 
Taub, 2011), the iconicity in spontaneous gestures produced by hearing speakers may 
be constructed anew with each manual depiction, and may consequently express 
different features of a single referent each time, or even the same feature in different 
ways. For instance, in depicting the function of a pair of pliers, Speaker 1 (Figure 1a) 
adopts a first-person perspective that allows her to demonstrate to her interlocutor 
how a pair of pliers is used, whereas Speaker 2 (Figure 1b) lets her hands represent 
or “become” the object, her hands opening and closing symbolizing the opening and 
closing of the pliers’ jaws. Technically, both these iconic gestures express action, but 
1a focuses on the figure of the actor and 1b focuses on the object — thus, both the 
perspective and the iconic strategy employed are different. Importantly, the speech 
produced by both speakers alludes to the same function of pliers by using similar 
1 Note that, although we use words such as “select” or “choose”, we do not mean to imply that this is a 
deliberate process. We hope to address the nature of the selection process specifically in further research.
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vocabulary (“gripping things”). Where do these different strategies originate, and what 
causes speakers to adopt a particular strategy to represent objects and events?
Figure 1
Two different gestures depicting the use of a pair of pliers, extracted from the current 
experiment. Speaker 1 (1a) demonstrates the use of pliers;  
Speaker 2 (1b) uses her hands to represent the object.
Representation Modes in Gestural Depictions
Much of the research on the use of iconic strategies in spontaneous gesturing has 
been inspired by the study of iconicity in signed languages (e.g., Klima & Bellugi, 1979; 
Mandel, 1977). This is unsurprising, given the common iconic basis underlying gesture 
and sign (Padden et al., 2015, p. 82). In the gesture domain, a few classifications of 
depiction techniques have been proposed, notably by Müller (1998) or Streeck (2008). 
Müller (1998) identifies four representation modes that are regularly used by gesturers 
to achieve iconicity. Such strategies may have naturally emerged from observing, 
and interacting with the world, and thus reflect habitual and artistic practices such as 
drawing, or sculpting. These modes comprise: imitation, where the speaker’s hands 
(and body) represent an (imaginary) character´s hands and imitate the execution of 
an action; portrayal, where the hands embody the object that they represent, such like 
when we extend the index and middle fingers to represent a pair of scissors; molding, 
where the hands “mold” or sculpt a shape in the air, as if palpating it; and drawing, 
where the hand traces a silhouette in the air, often with the index finger.
There are no formal proposals as to what mechanisms elicit the selection of a 
particular representation mode over another in spontaneous gesturing. In fact, 
the use of iconicity is underrepresented in most currently-available models of 
gesture production, which (in the interest of simplicity) only provide coarse-grained 
directions to how iconic gestures are generated. Most models share the assumption 
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that gestures arise from visuospatial representations activated or generated during 
conceptualization (e.g., de Ruiter, 2000; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kita, 2000; Kita & 
Özyürek, 2003). Although specific models differ in what happens next, they seem 
to agree that the form of gestures may be partly determined by the spatiomotoric 
properties of the referent or event, as well as, naturally, by the communicative intent 
of the speaker. One hypothesis, the Gestures as Simulated Action framework (GSA) 
holds that gestures emerge from the motoric simulations that underlie the act of 
speaking (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), based on the premise that processing language 
entails sensorimotor simulation (for a review, see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). In Hostetter 
and Alibali’s own words, “as one moves from visual images through spatial images to 
motor images, the amount of action simulation increases, and, according to the GSA 
framework, so does the likelihood of a gesture” (p. 510). A handful of studies provide 
support for such a simulation account, showing, for instance, that speakers gesture 
more when they speak about topics high in motor content (e.g., tying one’s shoelaces), 
in comparison with topics eliciting mainly visual imagery (e.g., describing a beautiful 
landscape) and abstract topics (e.g., discussing politics) (Feyereisen & Havard, 1999). 
Similarly, speakers gesture more when they discuss topics that are easier to generate 
a mental picture for (Beattie & Shovelton, 2002). In addition, speakers appear to be 
sensitive to the affordances of objects (the potential for action that objects evoke; 
Gibson, 1986), with studies showing that speakers gesture more when describing 
highly manipulable objects (e.g., a comb) than less manipulable objects (e.g., a table) 
(Hostetter, 2014; Masson-Carro, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2016; Pine, Gurney & Fletcher, 
2010). These affordance effects have also been observed in “co-thought” gestures, for 
instance when speakers solve a spatial task in silence (Chu & Kita, 2016), suggesting 
that gestures can be generated directly from action simulations and independently of 
speech.
If gestures are the physical outcome of imagery simulations, we could expect gestures 
to inherit aspects of such simulations. In the case of motor simulations, it seems 
reasonable to assume that gestures will resemble everyday actions. For other types of 
imagery simulation (e.g., visual imagery) the connection may seem less obvious, but it 
could be that speakers simulate sensorial patterns associated to objects, for instance 
their touch, or their weight on one’s hands as objects are moved or transported, 
and that this facilitates the transduction of a mental image into overt movement. A 
few studies yield insight into the use of iconic strategies in spontaneous gesturing. 
It appears that factors such as one’s own motoric experience (Cook & Tanenhaus, 
2009), the characteristics of the referent (Masson-Carro et al., 2016), or even the input 
modality (pictures or video) (Padden et al., 2015) can have a say in what gestural 
encoding strategies will be employed by speakers. 
For example, Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) had speakers explain the solution to 
the Tower of Hanoi task after having solved it using real objects, or on a computer, 
using the mouse pointer. Speakers in the real-action condition more often used 
grasping gestures while explaining the solution, but their computer counterparts 
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more often drew the trajectory of the mouse as it appeared on the screen during 
the accomplishment of the task. Thus, the gestural techniques used did more than 
just explaining the task, they gave specific insight into the speaker’s own motoric 
experience. Similar effects have been found in narration retelling tasks involving a 
character in a story. Parrill (2010) showed that speakers more frequently adopt a first-
person perspective (e.g., miming the performance of the actions that the character 
performs) when the character’s hands or torso are prominent in the original story — a 
possible case for mimicry effects (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). In contrast, speakers were 
more likely to depict actions from a third-person perspective (e.g., tracing the path 
along which the character moved) if the emphasis was not placed on the figure of the 
character.
Masson-Carro and colleagues (2016) analyzed the representation modes observed 
in gestures accompanying descriptions of objects, and found that manipulable 
objects predominantly elicited imitation gestures, whereas less manipulable objects 
predominantly elicited shape representations. Moreover, their study highlighted the 
predominance of two particular modes, namely (transitive) imitation (referred to as 
object use, p. 440) and molding gestures. This preference towards techniques that 
closer depict haptic knowledge is in line with embodiment accounts of gesture 
production and illustrates the claim that some iconic types stem from simulations 
of acting on objects (as is the case for imitation) and exploratory practices (as is the 
case for molding) such as contour following or enclosing, as proposed by Lederman 
and Klatzky (1987). Such preferences appear to be modulated by the modality of 
presentation. A study by Padden and colleagues (2015) compared the use of two 
representation modes to depict man-made tools, namely imitation (which they call 
handling) and portrayal (which they call instrument) in adult hearing speakers and deaf 
signers. They show that hearing speakers have a preference for imitating techniques to 
represent manipulable objects (e.g., pretending to handle a toothbrush and miming 
the act of brushing one’s teeth) in contrast to letting their hand portray the object 
(e.g., using an extended index finger to represent a toothbrush). Interestingly, their 
study featured two conditions, pictures and video, and although hearing speakers 
produced more imitating gestures in both conditions, portraying gestures occurred 
more often in the pictorial condition than in the video condition, and the opposite was 
true for imitating gestures. This study hints the importance of assessing the issue of 
representation by looking at different presentation modalities.
Van Nispen and colleagues (2014) assessed the use of representation techniques 
in pantomime (McNeill, 1992), more recently called silent gesture (e.g., Özçalışkan, 
Lucero & Goldin-Meadow, 2016), and found some regularities regarding what 
techniques were chosen to pantomime objects across participants, and also how they 
were combined, which led them to hypothesize that speakers may share intrinsically 
similar mental representations about objects (p. 3024). A recent study by Özçalışkan et 
al. (2016) supports this idea by showing that when speech is present, the way gestures 
concatenate to depict an event is constrained by the concurrent speech (an idea first 
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put forth by Kita & Özyürek, 2003), but when gestures stand on their own, a natural 
order of events comparable to SOV patterns (subject — object — verb) emerges.
Visual or Verbal Input Modality: Implications for Gesture Production
It becomes clear that representation modes are not just ways to convey information 
to an interlocutor, but that they hold the potential to reveal information about how 
speakers conceptualize objects and events. One key aspect that, in our opinion, 
has been overlooked, is the fact that most studies examine speakers’ gestures after 
being exposed to visual stimuli. This implies that speakers have been provided with 
a concrete visual representation on which to base their gestural depiction, either 
online (whilst seeing it) or from memory. It is only natural to assume that a speaker’s 
gestures may look different if describing a pair of scissors based on a picture than on 
a word. Processing pictures compared to words may lead to the activation of different 
representations, and may guide the aspects of a representation that speakers will pay 
attention to, which should affect the type of gestures produced. Extensive research 
from an embodied cognition perspective has shown that perceiving objects with a 
strong action component, whether in a visual (pictorial, video) or verbal form (written, 
audible), recruits motor processing (Borghi, 2015). From a gesture perspective, 
however, there are reasons why stimuli input modality might alter gestural output. First 
of all, we do not know the extent to which the motor evocation caused by words is 
the same as that caused by pictures (Bub & Masson, 2006, p. 1113), something that 
could influence the frequency as well as the form of gestures — following Hostetter 
and Alibali’s (2008) predictions. Secondly, although both pictures and words access 
semantic knowledge (Caramazza, 1996; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs & 
Frackowiak, 1996), they are in essence different representations, and even when 
referring to a concrete entity known by the speaker (e.g., the mug where someone 
drinks coffee from every morning), attending to each may confer saliency to different 
aspects of the same object. At a basic level, pictures are rich in visual detail and evoke 
more concrete categories than words do (Amit et al., 2009). One could hypothesize 
that richer (visual) representations may activate stronger simulations of perceptual and 
motoric content and thus give rise to more gesturing — and more gestures depicting 
action — because they highlight the potential for action. Further, it could be that 
pictures direct the speaker’s attention toward perceptual aspects of representations 
(like shape, size, or color), and words instead activate accessible and less variable 
attributes, such as function. In other words, it could be that when speakers attend to a 
picture, they will tend to produce gestures that depict perceptual aspects of a referent 
(e.g., shape) and when they attend to a word, they may be more likely to talk—and 
gesture — about function.
Few studies have examined the effects of stimuli presented as images (video, in these 
cases) or text2, on gestures. These studies have focused on narrative retellings from 
2 Note that, although written words or text are actually presented visually, we will refer to this condition 
throughout the paper as “verbal” condition, and use “visual” solely when referring to still or moving 
images.
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memory (Hostetter & Hopkins, 2002; Hostetter & Skirving, 2011; Parrill, Bullen, & 
Hoburg, 2010), with inconclusive results. Two of these studies (Hostetter & Hopkins, 
2002; Hostetter & Skirving, 2011) showed that speakers produced more iconic gestures 
while retelling a cartoon they had viewed, as opposed to after reading its description. 
The authors conclude that having access to a richer visual representation may have 
boosted stronger simulations of mental imagery, leading to an increase in gesturing. 
The content of gestures, though, was left unassessed in both studies, so it remains an 
open question whether speakers used similar depicting strategies across experimental 
conditions. Parrill et al. (2010) did not find differences in terms of gesturing frequency 
between the visual and verbal conditions. This study also examined gestural viewpoint 
but did not find speakers to produce more first-person viewpoint gestures (e.g., 
imitative gestures) in the video condition. One hypothesis as to why no effects were 
found is that in the textual condition speakers may have tried to visualize the content 
of speech more consciously in order to construct a good retelling for their addressee, 
which could have overridden a possible condition effect. This suggests that the effects 
of input modality on gesturing may vary depending on methodological factors related 
to, for instance, the effort put into a task. We find this makes an interesting aspect to 
investigate, from both a theoretical and a methodological standpoint. 
In this study, we operationalize task effort by having a condition where speakers 
produce simple descriptions by allowing them to name the objects during the task, 
and a condition where speakers produce more elaborate descriptions, by prohibiting 
them to name the objects. It is often the case that experimental paradigms forbid 
speakers to explicitly name (parts of) the target objects in communication tasks (e.g., 
Hostetter, 2014; Pine et al., 2010) but, while this is a valid approach, it is more often 
the case that speakers in real-life conversation know and can verbalize what they want 
to say, than not. Therefore, this manipulation will offer insight into whether speakers 
still produce gestures — and what kind of gestures — when they are given the choice to 
simply read out loud the names of the objects.
The Present Study
This study examines the effects of visual (pictures) and verbal stimuli (words) on 
gesture production about objects differing in functional manipulability in a referential 
task. Furthermore, we examine these effects under two levels of describing complexity, 
by allowing or forbidding speakers to name the objects during the task. 
In order to gain insight into how input modality influences gesture production, we 
will annotate (i) the occurrence of gestures, and (ii) the representation mode most 
predominantly associated to each gesture. In contrast to previous similar research 
(e.g., Hostetter & Skirving, 2011; Parrill et al., 2010), our visual stimuli consist of pictures 
of real-world objects, and not videos featuring moving entities or cartoons, and the 
stimuli will remain visible to the speakers during the task. In this way, our manipulation 
allows to examine representation techniques unconstrained by (1) salient narrative 
events, and by (2) possible mimicry effects stemming from watching a character move 
Chapter 3
44
and act, all while keeping the speaker’s memory demands to a minimum. In sum, we 
hypothesize that speakers will gesture more when they attend to images than when 
they attend to words. We also expect the presentation modality to guide what aspects 
of an object will be represented in gesture, with pictures giving rise to more perception-
based iconic strategies (e.g., molding or tracing gestures) and words leading to more 
action-based iconicity (e.g., pretending to handle an object).
Method
Design
Pairs of participants were recorded during a referential task in which speakers 
described a series of items to a listener, who subsequently accomplished a memory 
test. The experiment followed a mixed 3 x 2 x 2 design, with manipulability degree 
as within-subjects (high manipulability, low manipulability, and animals), and stimuli 
presentation (verbal and visual), and naming (allowed and forbidden), as the between-
subjects variables. 
Participants
Ninety undergraduate students from Tilburg University took part in this experiment, in 
exchange for course credit points. All participants were native speakers of Dutch, and 
carried out the experimental task in pairs where one was the speaker and the other 
was the listener, therefore we collected descriptions from forty-five speakers (M = 20.8; 
SD = 2.5; 29 female).
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of pictures and written words denoting objects that differed 
in manipulability, namely high-manipulability objects (e.g., toothbrush, comb), low-
manipulability objects (e.g., cross, castle), and animals (e.g., giraffe, elephant) (Figure 
2). We define highly manipulable objects as objects operated exclusively with the 
hands, whose operation may induce a change in the (physical) world (Masson-Carro 
et al., 2016). For instance, using a pen to write a sentence leaves a physical trace on a 
surface, provided that the object is used for its conceived purpose. On the contrary, 
the function associated with low-manipulability objects is not primarily executed 
by the human hands. For instance, we sit at a table to perform several actions (e.g., 
eating, writing), but none of these actions is typically carried out by direct, physical 
manipulation of the table itself. We included animals as a control condition, given that 
animals are animate entities, and according to our definition of manipulability they 
cannot be manipulated. 
One hundred images were selected from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS, 
Brodeur, Guérard & Bouras, 2014), a freely accessible dataset of visual stimuli. Although 
the stimuli in BOSS have been thoroughly standardized for several variables, including 
naming and manipulability, we conducted an additional pre-test to ensure that both 
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the pictures and the corresponding words denoting them were perceived similarly 
(see below) by a Dutch-speaking audience. We administered the pre-test using Crowd 
Flower (an online crowdsourcing service; http://www.crowdflower.com) to 62 native 
speakers of Dutch (M= 42.3; SD = 13.1), who were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: verbal or visual. 
In the visual condition, participants were first asked to name (in Dutch) the objects 
that were displayed on their screen. We did this to ensure (1) that the names we had 
assigned to the objects matched those assigned by the majority of the participants, and 
(2) that the objects were easy to name, to avoid possible effects of verbal encodability 
on gesture production (e.g., Morsella & Krauss, 2004). Secondly, participants rated the 
manipulability of the objects displayed on a scale from 0 to 100 (with 0 being the least 
manipulable and 100 the most). The definition of manipulability was adapted from 
Hostetter (2014, p. 1472: when I imagine this object, I imagine touching it, holding 










Three example items from the stimuli dataset, displayed both in their pictorial form  
(middle column), as well as in their verbal form (right column).
In the verbal condition, participants rated the words (denoting the same objects than 
the pictures did in the visual condition) for manipulability following identical guidelines, 
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and in addition they had to indicate if the words were easily imageable (i.e., when I 
imagine this word, it is easy for me to visualize the object it corresponds to; yes/no). 
Our criteria for stimuli inclusion were strict. First, all pictorial items where naming 
agreement was low (< 80%) or did not match the name we had assigned to the objects 
in the verbal condition were excluded. For the verbal condition, we excluded all items 
whose imageability scores lay under 90%. This led to the selection of 49 objects (49 
pictures and their corresponding 49 verbal affiliates): 19 highly manipulable, 17 low 
manipulable, and 13 animals. Thus, the stimuli were both easily nameable (M = 90.35, 
SD = 9.3) and highly imageable (M = 96.26, SD = 4).
Next, we computed the joint manipulability scores (word-based and picture-based) 
for all items. For highly manipulable objects, all items whose joint manipulability 
rating was below 90% were removed. The manipulability scores for low-manipulability 
objects ranged from 20% to 50%, and for animals the scores ranged between 12% and 
30%. Importantly, the scores in each object category were very similar in the visual and 
verbal conditions. Appendix A shows an overview of the scores for each of the items 
used in the study. 
The stimuli items for the task were compiled into a presentation document, where 
high- and low-manipulability objects, and animals, were interspersed. Each item was 
presented in a separate slide, therefore the speaker saw (and described) one object 
at a time, and moved forward through the items by pressing the spacebar on the 
laptop’s keyboard at the end of each description. The interspersion of the stimuli was 
achieved by generating a semi-randomized list with all items, which we then used as 
the presentation order (A). We ensured that same-type items would not repeatedly 
occur consecutively (e.g., three animals in a row). We created a second presentation 
list (B) where the items’ order was counterbalanced. 
Procedure
Upon arrival to the experiment room, participants were assigned the roles of speaker 
and listener in order of arrival (the first participant to arrive to the experimental room 
was assigned the role of speaker), and sat opposite each other in comfortable seats 
to facilitate their engagement in the interaction. To the left of the speaker, a low table 
was placed with a 15” laptop on top displaying the task’s stimuli, in such way that only 
the speaker, but not the listener, would see the content of the screen (Figure 3). A 
camera was positioned beside the listener, with the goal of recording the speaker’s 
full body movements. The experiment was conducted in three separate rooms due 
to availability issues, but the experimental set-up was kept identical for all participant 
pairs, with minimal variation in the camera angles.
Table 1 shows the order followed to assign pairs to the experimental conditions, 
which was done prior to the commencement of the testing phase. Crucially, half of the 
participants (23) saw pictures (visual condition) and 22 saw words (verbal condition). 
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We also included naming as a between-subjects variable in our design, with 19 
speakers being allowed to name the objects that had to be described, and 26 speakers 
being banned from doing so. The difference in number of participants for the naming 
allowed and forbidden conditions stems from unplanned dropout of participants. 
Before beginning the task, both participants read and signed the corresponding 
consent forms, and received written instructions regarding their role in the experiment. 
Each pair first completed one practice trial, consisting of the description of one item. 
The experimenter was present during the practice trial, and answered the participants’ 
questions, if there were any.
Figure 3
Example of the set-up, as captured by the camera videotaping the speaker. The image 
shows the speaker describing objects to the listener, who is located exactly in front. To the 
left of the speaker, the stimuli are displayed on a 15’’ laptop.
The experiment was straightforward: the participant who was assigned the role of 
speaker had to describe, one by one, a series of 50 items (49 target items, plus the 
training item) to the listener, who afterwards completed a memory test assessing the 
number of items she remembered correctly. Hence, participants thought that they 
were taking part in a memory experiment. This way, we ensured that speaker and 
addressee paid close attention to each other, instead of having a speaker produce 




Template used to assign pairs of participants to the experimental conditions.
Pair Condition Presentation order
Pair 1 Verbal — Allowed A
Pair 2 Verbal — Forbidden A
Pair 3 Visual — Allowed A
Pair 4 Visual — Forbidden A
Pair 5 Verbal — Allowed B
Pair 6 Verbal — Forbidden B
Pair 7 Visual — Allowed B
Pair 8 Visual — Forbidden B
Pair 9 Verbal — Allowed A
(et cetera) … …
No specific guidelines were given as to how the objects should be described, aside 
from the instruction prohibiting speakers to name the items in the no-naming condition. 
The instructions were identical in all conditions, and simply advised the speaker to 
describe each item as efficiently (but informatively) as possible. We expected that 
speakers might just name the objects when naming of the objects was allowed, but 
although they sometimes did, their descriptions often provided information about 
additional attributes (e.g., a lamppost, which emits light during the night; a lion is a 
dangerous, big animal; a shed, to store stuff; an ant, small insect). Appendix B shows 
the task instructions as received by the speakers in all four conditions, translated from 
Dutch to English. Neither the instructions nor the experimenter made any allusion to 
the use of gestures. 
During the description task, the listener was instructed to pay close attention to the 
speakers and to signal understanding of the items described. The listener could 
ask the speaker (clarification) questions at any time, thereby prompting dialogical 
interaction. After the description task ended, the speaker left the room, and the 
listener performed a recognition test on the computer. In this test, 100 verbal items 
(50 of them corresponding to the items described) were presented to the speaker in 
columns. The task of the listener was to drag and drop all the items she believed the 
speaker to have described into a box located on the right side of the screen. This test 
lasted approximately 5 minutes. 




The data annotation was performed using the multimodal annotation tool Elan (Max 
Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, http://www.lat-mpi.
eu/tools/elan; Wittenburg, Brugman, Russel, Klassmann, & Sloetjes, 2006). We marked 
the beginning of a description the moment when a speaker pressed the button that 
started a trial (trial = the description of a new object), and the end when the speaker 
concluded her description, or was interrupted by the addressee (e.g., feedback, 
clarification request, etc.). We then annotated all the speech and gestures for each 
description. Speech was transcribed verbatim, using a code word for hesitations 
(hm…, ehh…) so that they could be subtracted when computing the gesture rate (see 
below). 
Gesture annotation
We annotated each occurring hand gesture in its full length (from preparation to 
retraction, McNeill, 1992), and classified it as iconic or non-iconic. Iconic gestures were 
defined as movements of the hands and arms that conveyed information related to 
the objects referred to in the concurrent speech, for instance by describing physical 
qualities or actions related to such objects. An example of an iconic gesture is tracing 
a circular shape with the finger whilst talking of a basketball, or mimicking the use 
of an instrument or tool (as in Figure 1). Non-iconic gestures mostly comprised 
biphasic movements used to emphasize words (beats, McNeill, 1992) and interactive 
gestures directed at the addressee (Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & Wade, 1992; Kendon, 
2004). Adaptors (Ekman & Friesen, 1969) and other irregular movements such as, self-
scratching, or posture shifts were excluded from our annotation. 
Descriptions varied in terms of the number of words uttered. Therefore, in order 
to calculate gesture frequencies under our different experimental conditions, we 
computed a normalized gesture rate to account for the variability in speech. This 
gesture rate was computed by dividing the number of gestures by the number of words 
for each description, and multiplying the product by 100. In addition, we annotated 
all iconic gestures for representation technique. Our coding scheme consisted of 7 
categories stemming from Müller’s (1998) basic representation modes, and expanded 
based on Masson-Carro et al. (2016), and on our observations after screening the first 
videos of the dataset. Below are our categories (see also Figure 4), linked to Müller’s 
representation modes:
I. Imitation, where the speaker’s hands (and body) represent an (imaginary) 
character´s hands and imitate the execution of an action. This representation 
mode may be subdivided into transitive and intransitive action, depending on 
whether the action imitated involves an imaginary object or not. We refer to the 
former as handling gestures (term also used by Streeck, 2008; van Nispen et al., 
2014), and to the latter as enactments.
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II. Portrayal, where the hands embody the object that they represent, such like when 
a speaker extends the index finger as if it were a toothbrush (and may proceed 
to mimic the action of brushing one’s teeth). We refer to these as portraying 
gestures.
III. Molding, where the hands “mold” or sculpt a shape in the air, as if palpating it. We 
separate (dynamic) molding gestures from (static) enclosing gestures, the latter 
referring to the hands enclosing a shape in a static way.
IV. Drawing, where the hand traces a silhouette in the air, often with the index 
finger. These gestures also depict shape, but they do so more schematically 
than molding gestures, the result — if captured in the air — resembling a two-
dimensional blueprint. We refer to this category as tracing gestures.
V. Placing (see, e.g. Bergmann & Kopp, 2009; Masson-Carro et al., 2016) was added 
to the coding scheme to account for gestures that relate to the physical structure 
or distribution of objects. Thus, when placing, the hand anchors or places an entity 
within the gesture space, or explicitly expresses the spatial relation between two 
or more entities. For instance, in Figure 4, the speaker describes the pattern on 
a giraffe’s skin, and produces a sequence of strokes to place several dots on her 
own body. 
Figure 4
Examples of the representation techniques annotated in the present study.




The complete dataset was annotated by the main author. In order to validate the 
appropriateness of the coding scheme employed, a second rater (a researcher 
experienced in the annotation of gestures and of representation techniques but 
unaware of the experimental conditions or of the aim of this particular study) 
annotated the first three videos (147 descriptions) based on the coding scheme 
above. A Cohen’s Kappa test (Cohen, 1968) revealed substantial agreement for 
the annotation of representation techniques (κ = 0.73, p < .001); and a weighted 
Kappa test — suited for ordinal variables — showed very good agreement for gesture 
frequency (κw = 0.93, p < .001), based on the number of gestures identified by each 
rater for each description. 
Statistical analyses
Our statistical procedure relied on linear mixed models for continuous dependent 
variables (i.e., gesture rate; number of words), and logit mixed models for categorical 
dependent variables (i.e. representation techniques) (see Jaeger, 2008). In all of 
the analyses, the fixed factors were modality (verbal, visual), manipulability (high 
manipulability, low manipulability, animals) and naming (allowed, forbidden), and 
participants and items (stimuli objects) were included as random factors. We started 
with a full random effects model (following Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), and 




A total of 2067 gestures were produced during the task, of which 1188 were iconic 
and 879 were non-iconic. Our first aim was to investigate whether attending to pictures 
or to words — about objects differing in their degree of perceived manipulability — 
affected the frequency of gesturing. Figure 5 shows the iconic gesture rate means and 
confidence intervals for all experimental conditions, and Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics for all variables analyzed. We first review the main effects of manipulability 
and naming on gesturing frequency, to then focus on the effects of modality (visual, 




Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for the frequency of iconic and non-iconic gestures, 
and for the number of words per description, under each of the experimental conditions.
Iconic Gesture Rate   Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
High-Manipulable .83 (4.36 ) 4.71 (8.9 ) 6.55 (7.59 ) 4.35 (6.58 )
Low-Manipulable .85 (5.85 ) 3.89 (6.34 ) 3.95 (6.7 ) 1.51 (3.17 )
Animals .05 (.4 ) .87 (2.7 ) 4.38 (6.5 ) 1.94 (3.8 )
Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
High-Manipulable .92 (3.1 ) 1.67 (4.79 ) 3.21 (5.78 ) 2.8 (5.6 )
Low-Manipulable 1.2 (3.49 ) 2.68 (6.76 ) 3.39 (6.6 ) 2.97 (6.01 )
Animals .89 (3.39 ) 1.03 (3.83 ) 2.52 (5.76 ) 1.93 (4)
Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
High-Manipulable 10.1 (7.78 ) 10.78 (11.79 ) 20.11 (16.12 ) 17.09 (11.03 )
Low-Manipulable 10.6 (8.2 ) 16.46 (16.51 ) 19.02 (12.93 ) 20.43 (11.55 )
Animals 9.36 (7.57 ) 8.57 (8.93 ) 18.17 (12.78 ) 22.11 (15.48 )
We found a strong effect of manipulability on the iconic gesture rate, indicating 
that speakers gestured more when describing highly manipulable objects than less 
manipulable objects (β = 1.75, SE = 0.39, t = 4.47, p < .001), and animals (ß = 2.34, 
SE = 0.42, t = 5.55, p < .001). This effect was restricted to the production of iconic 
gestures, which means that we found no differences for non-iconic gestures about 
different object types (ß = 0.59, SE = 0.3, t = 1.94, p = .13; ß = -0.39, SE = 0.28, t = 1.36, 
p = .36), and for the number of words uttered per description (ß = -1.75, SE = 0.39, 
t = .12, p = .99; ß = -2.03, SE = 1.3, t = -1.55, p = .27). 
Next, there was a main effect of naming, indicating that speakers produced more 
gestures when they were not allowed to name the objects during the task—whether 
these gestures were iconic (ß = 1.8, SE = 0.82, t = 2.2, p = .03) or non-iconic (ß = 1.4, 
SE = 0.65, t = 2.16, p = .03). Naturally, speakers also spoke more when they could not 
name the objects (ß = 8.23, SE = 1.83, t = 4.48, p < .001), but it must be noted that the 
results regarding gesture rates do not merely result from participants speaking more 
in the naming-forbidden condition, as our gesture rate measures are already averaged 
by the number of words spoken per description to avoid such confound.
Naming Allowed Naming Forbidden





























































































































































































































































































































































Gesture rate means for iconic gestures as a function of manipulability, modality, and naming. 
The error bars indicate (95%) Confidence Intervals.
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There was no main effect of stimulus modality on iconic gesture rate (ß = -1.9, SE = 0.81, 
t = -.23, p = .81), non-iconic gesture rate (ß = .08, SE = 0.64, t = -.13, p = .89) or the 
number of words produced (ß = 1.1, SE = 1.81, t = .68, p = .54), which means that 
speakers spoke and gestured to similar extents when they described a picture or a 
word. Nevertheless, we found a crossover interaction between modality and naming 
(p = .001) that reveals an interesting, yet somewhat unexpected picture (Figure 6). 
Speakers did produce more gestures in the visual than in the verbal condition, as we 
had initially hypothesized, but this only happened when naming was allowed. When 
we forbade speakers to name the objects, speakers produced more gestures in the 
verbal than in the visual condition. Importantly, this pattern arises only for iconic 
gestures, and is not observed in either non-iconic gestures (p = .33) or in the number 
of words uttered per description (p = .76). 




















Verbal      Visual
Allowed Forbidden
Figure 6
Interaction effect between modality and naming, for iconic gesture rate.  
The error bars indicate the standard error.
Manipulation check
The names of the objects that were described in this study differed in terms of their 
complexity (e.g., simple nouns like “owl” and compounds such like “toothbrush”) and 
of their length (e.g., “ant”, 3 letters; “screwdriver”, 11 letters). We ran a manipulation 
check to ensure this did not have an effect on the number of gestures produced by 
speakers. For instance, it remains an open debate how people process compounds 
(Semenza & Luzziatti, 2014), so we cannot discard the possibility that the constituents 
in a word such as “screwdriver” are processed serially, or even that they activate 
simultaneous representations, something which could increase gesturing. The results 
showed that word complexity (2 levels, simple, and compound) did not have an effect 
on the number of gestures produced by speakers (ß = -.52, SE = 0.41, t = -1.27, p = .21) 
and the full model did not show significant differences when including or excluding 
word complexity as a factor (p = .12). Likewise, the correlation between the number 
of letters that words had and the number of gestures produced by speakers vas very 
weak, r(2194) = .12, p < .001. 




Our second aim was to investigate whether attending to pictures or to words affected 
the strategies that speakers employed to construct meaning with their hands. In 
general (all conditions collapsed), molding (M = .31, SD = .46) and handling (M = .29, 
SD = .45) were the most frequently used representation techniques to represent 
objects, followed by tracing (M = .11, SD = .31), enclosing (M = .11, SD = .31), portraying 
(M = .06, SD = .25), placing (M = .05, SD = .22), and enacting (M = .02, SD = .14). 
Our analyses reveal a main effect of manipulability on nearly every representation 
technique, and again a series of interactions between modality and naming, which 
co-influenced the representation techniques used by speakers independently of the 
manipulability degree of objects. All means and standard deviations can be found in 
Appendix C.
Manipulability determined what techniques speakers use to communicate about 
objects, as can be seen in Figure 7. When speakers described highly manipulable 
objects, they produced mostly handling gestures, in comparison with less manipulable 
objects (ß = 3.68, SE = .36, p < .001) and animals (ß = 5.09, SE = .75, p < .001). In 
contrast, they produced relatively few molding gestures, in comparison with when 
they described less manipulable objects (ß = -1.74, SE = .28, p < .001) and animals 
(ß = -1.82, SE = .31, p < .001), as well as fewer tracing gestures as compared with 
animals (ß = -.79, SE = .37, p = .03). 
Enacting and enclosing gestures were produced more often when describing animals 
than when describing highly manipulable (ß = 2.44, SE = .56, p < .001; ß = 1.02, 
SE = .22, p < .001 — respectively) and less manipulable objects (ß = 1.66, SE = .52, 
p = .004; ß = .58, SE = .24, p = .04 — respectively). In addition, speakers produced 
placing gestures mostly to describe low-manipulability objects (ß = -1.33, SE = .56, 
p = .04; ß = -1.93, SE = .48, p < .001).
There were no main effects of either naming or modality, but we found several 
interactions between the two (see Figure 8). We find a crossover interaction between 
modality and naming for handling gestures (ß = 2.12, SE = .51, p < .001). When naming 
was allowed, more handling gestures were produced in the verbal than in the visual 
condition. However, when naming was forbidden, the opposite pattern emerged, 
namely that speakers produced more handling gestures in the visual than in the verbal 
condition. For molding gestures, there was also a marginally generalizable interaction 
between naming and modality (ß = -.92, SE = .49, p = .06), with speakers producing 
more molding gestures in the visual than in the verbal condition, when naming was 
allowed. Such a difference is not observed in the naming-forbidden condition. We find 
similar trends for other techniques that depict perceptual and structural properties of 
objects, such as tracing (ß = -1.33, SE = .78, p = .08) and placing gestures (ß = 1.33, 
SE = .56, p = .01) (see Figure 8).
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Molding Handling Enacting Enclosing Placing Portraying Tracing
Animals          High-Manipulable          Low-Manipulable
Figure 7
Mean representation technique frequency, as a function of manipulability.  
The error bars indicate (95%) Confidence Intervals.
Interactions Modality * Naming for Representation Techniques
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Interaction effects between modality and naming, for handling, molding, tracing, and 
placing gestures. The error bars indicate the standard error.
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In sum, our results (1) highlight the preference for handling and molding representation 
techniques when depicting objects; (2) suggest that the technique used to represent 
an object is dependent of the degree of manipulability of the target object; and (3) 
show that speakers resort to different iconic strategies depending on the task at hand: 
With a simpler task (naming allowed), speakers depicted the shape of an object more 
often when they had seen a picture, and demonstrated the function of an object when 
they had read a word; with a more complex task (naming forbidden), these patterns 
disappeared. 
Discussion
In spontaneous talk, speakers integrate information from various sources into their 
communicative messages, prominently information from the immediately accessible 
visual environment acquired through the senses, and information that they retrieve 
from their own conceptualizations of objects and scenes. In this paper, we investigated 
how information acquired from these two sources influences the generation of co-
speech gestures — particularly, how it influences the type of iconicity upon which these 
manual signs are constructed. To this aim, we designed a task in which speakers had to 
describe objects that differed in their manipulability degree to a peer based on either 
a word or a picture. In the first case, speakers would rely solely on their conceptual 
representation to generate a description, and in the second case, they would rely on a 
rich visual representation of the objects. Furthermore, we varied the complexity of the 
descriptions elicited, by allowing or forbidding speakers to explicitly name the target 
objects. We first discuss our results regarding gesture frequency, to then focus on the 
use of iconic strategies by speakers.
We expected speakers to gesture more in the visual condition regardless of task 
complexity, because speakers are faced with a higher volume of detail when looking at 
an image than when reading a word, much of this information being susceptible to be 
encoded in gesture (e.g., concrete information about shape, size, proportion, etc.). We 
argued that the lifelikeness and proximity evoked by pictures might render speakers 
prone to perceptual and motoric simulations which, in turn, may prompt gesturing, as 
proposed by Hostetter and Alibali (2008). Our results are partially compatible with this 
hypothesis. We found speakers to gesture more when describing an object presented 
as a picture than as a word, but this only happened when speakers were cued to 
produce simple descriptions. 
One could interpret this pattern in terms of a cognitive difficulty continuum. It is 
likely that when describing became more complicated because speakers had to 
purposefully avoid naming the object, they resorted to a more deliberate strategy to 
circumvent the problem that may have overridden the effects of input modality. Past 
studies have shown that speakers tend to gesture more when a task is conceptually 
more challenging (e.g., Melinger & Kita, 2007). In this light, our experimental conditions 
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could be organized based on the difficulty they imposed on the speaker, ranging from 
the least complex (participants describing a word whilst being allowed to name it) to 
the most complex (participants describing a word whilst not being allowed to name 
it, and without having access to a visual representation). As it turns out, the easiest 
condition generated the lowest number of iconic gestures, and the most difficult 
condition elicited the most gesturing (recall Figure 6). Importantly, this interaction 
between modality and task complexity was only found for iconic gestures, and it was 
not mirrored by either non-iconic gestures or by the number of words spoken by 
participants. 
We think that these data reflect the richness of everyday interaction, as we compared 
gesture production in two frequent communicative scenarios, namely a scenario in 
which object naming was enough to complete a task and the use of gestures was 
less necessary, and a scenario where communicating required more elaboration. Our 
results suggest that gestures support speech differently when speakers performed 
more, and less, complex language tasks, with speakers adapting, and incrementally 
producing gestures, the more effort the task requires.
The Use of Iconic Strategies
The mechanisms by means of which speakers select a particular iconic strategy 
during (spontaneous) gesturing, such as tracing a shape, remain poorly understood. 
By definition, co-speech gestures are idiosyncratic, in that they do not rely in codes 
and conventions like (sign) languages do (e.g., see Kendon’s continuum, McNeill, 
1992). Yet, recent studies have suggested that there might be some regularities in 
how speakers choose, and even combine iconic strategies while depicting concepts 
manually (e.g., Ortega & Özyurek, 2016; Padden et al., 2015; van Nispen et al., 2014). 
Our study contributed to the existing body of literature in a number of ways. 
First, our results revealed that handling and molding were the most frequently used 
iconic strategies to gesturally depict objects, and that the affordances of objects 
constrained the type of iconicity used — replicating findings by Masson-Carro and 
colleagues (2016). Although indirectly, this lends support to simulation-based accounts 
of gesture production (e.g., Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), as both of these iconic strategies 
closely reflect direct interaction with objects, in the form of utilization (handling) and 
of haptic exploration (molding) of an invisible object that acts as the anchor for the 
movement. If gestures are indeed a window into our conceptualization of objects, our 
results suggest that action knowledge is prominent in the mind of the speaker, even 
during (non-goal-directed) communication tasks. Other iconic devices may not result 
from simulations of interaction with the described objects, but may be constructed 
upon, or recreate, graphic representations of such objects the way we create them 
on other media — as may be the case with drawing. Thus, iconic gestures seem to 
be constructed based on difference sources, one being action schemas containing 
knowledge on how to utilize an object and how that object may feel to the human 
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hand, as well as action schemas related to the representation of knowledge on other 
media, which may be taken as a template to construct new gestures.
Secondly, our study showed that input modality and task complexity jointly — and 
independently of manipulability — influenced how speakers made use of iconicity 
in their gestures, with speakers being biased towards gesturally depicting action 
information when they described words, and towards gesturally depicting shape 
information when they described pictures, when naming of the objects was allowed. 
Pictures and words are very different representations, even when referring to the 
same objects. When speakers are asked to describe an image, they have access to 
more information than when they face a word. For example, an image representing 
a “toaster” also tells us whether it is old or new, whether it allows for one or multiple 
loaves of bread, whether it has a timer knob or a button, etc. Therefore, it is likely that 
a description based on an image will be guided by perceptually salient elements such 
as shape and color of the particular token displayed. When speakers need to describe 
a concept based on a word, they may still activate modal representations relative to an 
object’s shape or color, but it is likely that other elements such as function may become 
more salient given the communicative goal of the task. This prominence of function 
information when speakers access only their conceptual knowledge seems justified. 
A limited number of studies support the idea that character viewpoint gestures—
which depict events from a first-person perspective, notably through enactments and 
imitative gestures (McNeill, 1992; Parrill, 2010) — are more informative to speakers 
(Beattie & Shovelton, 2001, 2002). This is sensible from an information processing 
point of view, as the function of objects could be perceived as a more invariable and 
distinguishing attribute, and may lead to better object recognition than information 
about other visual cues such as shape, which often varies across tokens of the same 
object in the real world. Future research is needed to find out to what extent speakers 
think of particular iconic gestures as more communicative, and how they may use 
iconicity as a strategy to communicate more efficiently. 
One important limitation of the present study is that we do not report analyses on 
the semantic content of speech. Some of the effects found in gesture may have 
been reflected in the words used by speakers as well. For instance, it could be that 
the increase in handling gestures while describing objects in the verbal, naming-
allowed condition may have been accompanied by an increase in words describing 
function. Although this need not change our interpretation of the data, it raises the 
issue of at what point of the gesture generation process a particular iconic strategy to 
represent an object is selected. This is a question that is difficult to address within the 
current paradigm and should be targeted in a dedicated study, specifically designed 
to disentangle whether the iconic strategy chosen in gesture directly stems from a 




Pinpointing the Effects of Manipulability
This study also has implications for how object affordances are processed. Earlier in 
this paper, we hypothesized that gestures may emerge from simulations of modal 
content and, as such, they inherit aspects of such simulations. Nevertheless, this 
could erroneously lead to the idea that the speaker herself has little control over the 
gestures she produces. We want to emphasize that we do not think this is the case. 
As this paper shows, producing simple references to objects resulted in gestures that 
took on aspects that were prominent in the modality the objects were presented in. 
Complex descriptions, on the other hand, may be exemplary of more strategically 
planned multimodal messages, constrained by the specific communicative pressures 
of the situation. Thus, it may be that either seeing or thinking of objects automatically 
activates several motor programs, and a regulatory mechanism is in charge to select 
among these obeying to constraints imposed by task and context (Borghi & Riggio, 
2015). This idea resonates well with what we observed in this study, with the modality 
effects disappearing when the task had added constraints (i.e., preventing speakers 
from naming the object). Still, the automaticity with which such a regulatory mechanism 
operates is not fully understood, and the same can be said for the choice of an iconic 
strategy in gesture. Gestures are assumed to be rather spontaneous, in the sense that 
speakers often seem unaware of having produced them. At the same time, previous 
research has shown that speakers seem to design the form of their gestures with their 
addressee’s in mind. For instance, Hoetjes, Krahmer, and Swerts (2015) found that 
after cases of miscommunication with an addressee, speakers enhanced the form of 
the gestures they produced to succeed at meeting the task’s goals. Similarly, Campisi 
and Özyurek (2013) showed that speakers used more iconic gestures, and these were 
larger, when explaining how to prepare coffee to children—in comparison with to 
adults. We suggest that addressee adaptation may be reflected in speakers’ use of 
iconic strategies too, and we envision that similar paradigms to Hoetjes et al. (2015) or 
Campisi and Özyurek (2013) could be applied to study whether speakers tailor their 
use of specific representation techniques, and how deliberate or automatic this type 
of adaptation might be. 
Conclusion
In this study, we showed that the input modality (verbal, visual) matters in determining 
what aspects of a representation speakers will gesturally depict, but this is modulated 
by the complexity of the task. In addition, this study showed that the choice of an 
iconic strategy is dependent of the properties of the referent (i.e., its degree of 
manipulability) and, in general, highlighted a preference for handling and molding 
gestures, both of which closely reflect direct interaction with objects.
In the introduction to this paper, we argued that, in order to construct a manual sign 
that is evocative of a referent, a series of processes might be involved such as feature 
selection, schematization and the conversion into a motor program. Elucidating the 
relations among these processes is crucial so that we can implement the results into 
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speech and gesture (both production and comprehension) models. A few questions 
that remain unexplored in this study, but that we think are crucial, relate to the nature 
of simulation — e.g., how could we gather direct empirical evidence to test whether 
gestures indeed stem from simulations of action?—as well as to the nature of iconic 
strategies: How are they exploited and combined by speakers in more complex 
situations? How do the different techniques stem from, and support thinking processes? 
How are different iconic devices processed, and comprehended by addressees? At 
what point(s) of the gesture generation process do the different constraints apply? We 
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Task instructions administered to speakers (translated to English)
Verbal condition, naming allowed
Thanks for your participation in this experiment.
After you press the spacebar, you will see a number of words referring to objects. You 
will describe these objects one by one, and you may mention the name of the object. 
Your task is to describe each of the objects in such a way that your partner understands 
what item you are describing. At the end of this experiment, your partner will complete 
a memory test. In this memory test, your partner will mark all items which he / she 
thinks you have described.
Press the spacebar to start with the first object, as well as to advance through the 
experiment.
Verbal condition, naming forbidden
Thanks for your participation in this experiment.
After you press the spacebar, you will see a number of words referring to objects. 
You will describe these objects one by one, and you may not mention the name of 
the object. Your task is to describe each of the objects in such a way that your partner 
understands what item you are describing. At the end of this experiment, your partner 
will complete a memory test. In this memory test, your partner will mark all items which 
he / she thinks you have described.
Press the spacebar to start with the first object, as well as to advance through the 
experiment.
Visual condition, naming allowed
Thanks for your participation in this experiment.
After you press the spacebar, you will see a number of images referring to objects. You 
will describe these objects one by one, and you may mention the name of the object. 
Your task is to describe each of the objects in such a way that your partner understands 
what item you are describing. At the end of this experiment, your partner will complete 
a memory test. In this memory test, your partner will mark all items which he / she 
thinks you have described.
Press the spacebar to start with the first object, as well as to advance through the 
experiment.
How What We See and What We Know
69
3
Visual condition, naming forbidden
Thanks for your participation in this experiment.
After you press the spacebar, you will see a number of images referring to objects. 
You will describe these objects one by one, and you may not mention the name of 
the object. Your task is to describe each of the objects in such a way that your partner 
understands what item you are describing. At the end of this experiment, your partner 
will complete a memory test. In this memory test, your partner will mark all items which 
he / she thinks you have described.





Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for the use of each representation technique  
under all experimental conditions.
ENACT Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable 0 0 .01 (.11) .06 (.07)
Non Manipulable 0 0 .02 (.15) 0.02 (.16)
Animals 0.14 (0.35) .05 (.22) .08 (.27) .06 (.24)
ENCLOSE Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable .04 (.19) .03 (.18) .13 (.34) .05 (.22)
Non Manipulable .24 (.43) .05 (.23) .14 (.35) .09 (.28)
Animals .19 (.4) 0.5 (.22) .21 (.41) .25 (.44)
MOULD Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable .04 (1.9) .22 (.42) .13 (.34) .14 (.34)
Non Manipulable .48 (.51) .53 (.5) .47 (.5) .47 (.5)
Animals .42 (.5) .42 (.51) .47 (05) .45 (.5)
HANDLE Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable .8 (.4) .49 (.5) .49 (.5) .64 (.48)
Non Manipulable .03 (.17) .01 (.08) .03 (.17) .09 (.28)
Animals 0 0.05 (.21) 0 .01 (.12)
PLACE Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable 0 .01 (.09) .03 (.16) .02 (.15)
Non Manipulable .06 (.24) .12 (.33) .11 (.31) .13 (.34)
Animals .04 (.21) .09 (.3) .03 (.17) .01 (.12)
PORTRAY Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable .11 (.32) .06 (.24) .09 (.29) .08 (.27)
Non Manipulable .06 (.24) .03 (.18) .06 (.24) .06 (.24)
Animals 0 .23 (.43) .05 (.22) .03 (.17)
TRACE Allowed Forbidden
  Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Manipulable 0 .18 (.39) .08 (.28) .04 (.19)
Non Manipulable .12 (.33) .23 (.43) .11 (.31) .08 (.28)
Animals .19 (.4) .09 (.3) .13 (.34) .15 (.36)
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The Processing and Comprehension  
of Action and Shape Iconic Gestures
This chapter is based on:
Masson Carro, I., Goudbeek, M. B., & Krahmer, E. J.  
The Processing and Comprehension of Action and Shape Iconic Gestures. 




Hand gestures convey information that, in addition to spoken language, may boost the 
comprehension of a message, but this may depend on the kind  of gesture. This study 
investigated the processing and comprehension of action and shape iconic gestures 
that were depicting the use or form of manipulable objects (tools). In Experiment I, 
participants were primed with short videos with action or shape gestures, followed 
by a word or a picture target. They then indicated whether prime and target were 
related while their response times were registered. Experiment II complemented the 
first study with two open-ended tasks where participants hat to identify the gestures 
and rate how appropriately they depicted the intended object. Both experiments  
showed that action gestures were processed faster than shape gestures and led to 
higher accuracy scores in the closed and open-ended tasks. Furthermore, participants 
were faster to map gestures to their referent when the referent was presented as 
a picture, as opposed to as a word — possibly due to the shared imagistic basis of 
gestures and pictures. In sum, these results suggest that action gestures are at a 
cognitive and communicative advantage when it comes to identifying (manipulable) 
referents, mirroring the bias towards action-based iconicity found in previous gesture 
production studies. 
Keywords:  gestures; iconicity; action; shape; processing; comprehension




Human communication is multimodal. It exploits the affordances of bodily articulators 
— including the hands and face — to convey rich and complex information. For instance, 
a speaker may complement their description of a tool with a manual demonstration of 
how the tool is typically used, or with an aerial trace of the tool’s shape. This serves as 
an example of what we know as an iconic gesture (McNeill, 2014; 1992): a movement 
of the hands that depicts visuospatial aspects of the objects it refers to. 
Gestures that accompany speech are said to be produced spontaneously, and 
speakers are often unaware of producing them (McNeill, 1992). Yet, research has 
consistently shown communicative value in the production of gestures. For instance, 
speakers adapt their gestures to match their addressees’ needs (e.g., Hoetjes et al., 
2015; Campisi & Özyürek, 2013; Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004), they produce more and 
larger gestures when they know they can be seen (Mol, Krahmer, Maes & Swerts, 
2011), they more evenly distribute necessary information over the verbal and gestural 
modalities when they choose to gesture (Melinger & Levelt, 2004), and they mark 
the communicative relevance of their gestures using eye gaze and ostensive speech 
(Slonimska, Özyürek, & Campisi, 2015). 
Considering that gestures are often produced with a communicative purpose, it is 
natural to assume that these gestures succeed at communicating information. Various 
studies have shown that listeners form richer representations when they see (iconic) 
gestures in addition to listening to speech (e.g., Hostetter, 2011). However, the 
notion of iconicity is broad in its scope and englobes different types of form-meaning 
mappings (e.g., action-based and perception-based, Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014), which 
speakers seamlessly combine during talk (Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 
2016). In this paper, we are interested in how addressees process and comprehend 
different types of iconicity in gesture-specifically, action and shape gestures-focusing 
on how the two types contribute to referent identification. In addition, we investigate 
the effect of referent modality, that is, whether addressees map gestures to picture or 
word representations differently. 
Gesture Comprehension
To what extent do addressees glean information from iconic gestures? To answer 
this question, research has typically examined how speech is comprehended when 
presented alone or accompanied by gestures (Beattie & Shovelton, 1999a, 1999b; 
Kelly, Barr, Church, & Lynch, 1999; Graham & Argyle, 1975). A meta-analysis conducted 
by Hostetter (2011) compared gesture comprehension in a set of studies where speech 
had been presented to listeners in isolation or accompanied by gestures. Interestingly, 
83% of the studies showed a positive effect of gestures on the comprehension of 
the co-occurring speech. The analyses uncovered a number of factors moderating 
the communicative benefits of gestures, such as whether the information conveyed 
by gestures added to the information conveyed by speech. For instance, Kelly et al. 
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(1999) showed that addressees were more likely to add additional information to their 
recollection of speech fragments if the speaker in the video stimulus had produced a 
gesture expressing information not contained in speech; and Beattie and Shovelton 
(1999b) found that listeners benefitted most from gestures depicting relative location 
or size, especially in face-to-face contexts (Holler, Beattie & Shovelton, 2009).
A second line of research has focused on the semantic integration of speech-gesture 
utterances. Using a priming paradigm, Kelly and colleagues showed that participants 
who had to relate speech-gesture combinations to an action prime (a video where 
an actor performed an action) were faster in effectuating their response when 
speech and gesture were congruent (i.e., conveyed the same meaning) than when 
they were incongruent (i.e., conveyed different meanings) (Kelly et al., 2010). A later 
study revealed that semantic incongruence effects are stronger for speech-gesture 
combinations than for speech — action combinations (Kelly et al., 2015). The authors 
suggest that, although actions may communicate more information than gestures 
because they are richer representations, gestures may be treated as communicatively 
more informative in relation to the accompanying speech (p. 522), rendering addressees 
more sensitive to perceive semantic incongruence in gesture. Gestures have also been 
found to facilitate the recognition of semantically-related words (Yap, So, Yap, Tan, & 
Teoh, 2011). Using a cross-modal priming paradigm, Yap and colleagues presented 
participants with words (e.g., bird) and non-words (e.g., flirp) preceded by primes that 
consisted of related (hands flapping) or unrelated (tracing a square) gesture clips. A 
priming effect arose for semantically-related pairs, with participants responding faster 
to words that were compatible with the gesture prime (e.g., bird with flapping hands). 
These findings are extended by neurocognitive studies highlighting similarities in 
the semantic processing of gestures and other meaningful representations such as 
words (Wu & Coulson, 2005) and photographs (Wu & Coulson, 2011). In general, 
they suggest that semantic information from linguistic and non-linguistic domains is 
integrated into the sentence context (Özyürek, 2014; Özyürek, Willems, Kita & Haagort 
2007; Willems & Hagoort, 2007).
Nevertheless, the research conducted up to date has treated iconicity as a unified 
notion — when, in fact, iconicity comes in types and degrees. One basic distinction is 
that between action-based and perception-based types of iconicity (Tolar, Ledeberg, 
Gokhal & Tomasello, 2008; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014). This relates to whether iconic 
gestures depict actions associated to referents, for instance pretending to hold a 
glass and producing a drinking gesture, or whether they depict perceptual features 
of the referent, for instance tracing the shape of the glass (see Figure 1). In addition, 
iconic gestures vary in their abstraction degree, with action gestures being more direct 
mappings of the actions they imitate, and shape gestures such as forming a triangle 
with our hands to depict a pyramid, being more schematic.
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Types of Iconicity in Gesture
Figure 1
Two different iconic gestural representations of a wine glass.  
Left, the actor mimes the act of bringing the glass close to his mouth to drink (action 
depiction); Right, the actor traces the shape of the glass (shape depiction).  
The face of the actor is only blurred for publication purposes.
Recent production studies have uncovered regularities regarding the choice and 
combination of iconic strategies to depict objects (Ortega & Özyürek, 2016; van 
Nispen, van de Sandt-Koenderman, Mol, & Krahmer, 2014). In particular, gesturers 
exhibit a general preference for action-based iconic strategies that closely mimic the 
interaction with objects (Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2017, 2016; Ortega 
& Özyürek, 2016; Padden, Hwang, Lepic, & Seegers, 2015; Padden, Meir, Hwang, 
Lepic, Seegers, & Sampson, 2013). The preference for a depiction technique is 
further constrained by the semantic category of the referent. Objects that rate high in 
functional manipulability — such as tools — are more often depicted with action-based 
iconicity, and objects rating low in manipulability with perception-based iconicity 
(Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2016; Ortega & Özyürek, 2016). The bias for 
action is consistent with gesture production accounts that advocate for the grounding 
of gestures in sensorimotor processes (Chu & Kita, 2016; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), 
and that attribute the origins of depiction techniques to manual interaction with the 
world (e.g., Müller, 2013, 1998; Streeck, 2008). 
Moreover, from a communication perspective, gesturers may exhibit this preference 
for action-based iconicity because action gestures are perceived as less ambiguous 
and more informative than perception-based iconicity, since they more transparently 
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map onto the actions they depict. The question then becomes, does this preference 
also shape listeners’ comprehension of gestures?
Studies investigating this question are scarce and their evidence is inconclusive. 
Beattie and Shovelton (2002) conducted a study to test whether character and 
observer viewpoint gestures differed in terms of their informativeness. Character-
viewpoint gestures moderately overlap with action-based types of iconicity, in that they 
typically depict action from a first-person perspective; whereas observer-viewpoint 
gestures are associated with perceptual types of iconicity, as they depict events more 
schematically and focus on aspects such as shape, size or path (albeit from a third-
person perspective). Participants watched gesture clips and were interviewed about 
a range of semantic features (e.g., identity, action, shape, size, etc.), in order to assess 
how much information each gesture type added to event narrations. The results from 
their study showed that character viewpoint gestures scored higher in all categories 
with respect to observer viewpoint gestures, although only “size” and “relative position” 
(importantly, not “action”) reached statistical significance. By contrast, a recent study 
by van Nispen and colleagues (2017) showed that handling gestures describing line 
drawings led to better referent-identification scores than shape gestures both in a 
forced-choice and in an open-ended task.
Processing the Meaning of Action and Shape Iconic Gestures
Action gestures may be more informative than gestures depicting perceptual aspects 
of referents, but convincing evidence for this idea is currently lacking. Furthermore, the 
processing of action and shape gestures remains unexamined. How fast do addressees 
map different iconic gestures to their referents? A study by Ortega and Morgan (2015) 
showed that iconic signs (from British Sign Language) prime semantically-related 
lexical items in hearing non-signers. Interestingly, whether the iconic signs were action- 
or perception-based did not influence processing times. Their study, however, did not 
distinguish between semantic categories such as manipulable and non-manipulable 
objects, and it is unclear whether both iconic mappings (action and perceptual) were 
presented for each object, or whether each object was assigned a mapping. 
The current study aims to investigate the processing and comprehension of action-
based and perception-based iconic forms in relation to manipulable objects. Our main 
hypothesis is that action gestures will result in faster, and more accurate recognition 
of manipulable referents than shape gestures. Given the potential involvement of the 
motor system in gesture processing (e.g., Ping, Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2014), we 
argue that gestures that more strongly activate the motor system (in this case, action 
gestures) should facilitate referent recognition. Furthermore, the richness and relative 
transparency of action gestures should lead these gestures to perform better in 
various comprehension tasks, extending previous findings (Beattie & Shovelton, 2002; 
van Nispen et al., 2014).
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Our hypotheses are also informed by research on manipulability and conceptual 
processing. It has been suggested that manipulable features of objects play a role in 
linguistic processing. Myung, Blumstein, and Sedivy (2006), for example, show that, 
in lexical decision tasks, participants respond faster when word-word pairings shared 
manipulation features (e.g., a piano and a typewriter) than when they do not (e.g., 
a piano and a blanket). Similarly, participants fixate their eyes more on pictures of 
objects that shared manipulation features with the target object (e.g., “typewriter” for 
the target “piano”) than on objects that shared perceptual similarity with the object 
(e.g., “couch” for the target “piano”). Kalenine and Bonthoux (2008) showed that both 
children (5- and 7-year olds) and adults are faster to process perceptual similarity for 
non-manipulable objects, and functional similarity for manipulable objects. Their study 
used pictures as the stimuli, but similar findings have been obtained using gestures. 
A study by Monoud, Duscherer, Moy, and Perraudin (2007) showed that children 
aged 9 to 12 and 5 to 11 were faster to recognise tools when they had been primed 
with a video showing an action pantomime. However, the effects became weaker the 
older children were, which could mean that the bias towards mapping actions to tools 
decreases with age, which leaves open the question of how adults process action 
gestures. This resonates with recent research showing that children have a preference 
for action-based types of iconicity (Ortega et al., 2017), but this preference — though 
prevailing — decreases in adulthood (Masson-Carro et al., 2015).
The present study
The present study examines the processing and comprehension of action and shape 
gestures depicting manipulable objects. To this aim, we conducted two experiments. 
In Experiment I, participants watched video primes consisting of either an action or a 
shape gesture, followed by a word or a picture target, either related or unrelated to the 
prime. Participants had to indicate whether prime and target were related by pressing 
a key, while we recorded their response times. Using the same stimuli, Experiment 
II tested a new set of participants on their free comprehension of action and shape 
gestures (i.e., freely guessing the object that was being depicted for each gesture 
clip). To complement our data, a second task asked participants to rate how well they 
thought each gesture depicted its referent. 
Based on the literature reviewed above, we predicted that (1) prime-target related 
trials (regardless of the condition) would elicit faster responses than unrelated trials; 
action gestures would be (2) processed faster and (3) comprehended better than 
shape gestures (both in the reaction times and open-ended tasks), as well as (4) 
rated as more suitable to depict their referents. In the present study we also assess 
the mapping speed of the different iconic types to arbitrary referents (words) and 
to imagistic referents (pictures). In addition, a production gesture conducted by 
Masson-Carro and colleagues (2017) showed that during simple language tasks (i.e., 
producing short references to objects), speakers produced a larger proportion of 
action gestures when describing items based on words, and a larger proportion of 
shape gestures when describing items based on pictures. The authors concluded that 
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words activated functional information more strongly than pictures, whereas pictures 
lent saliency to the perceptual aspects of the objects. Following these production 
results, we predicted that (5) action gestures could be mapped faster to words, and 
shape gestures could be mapped faster to pictures.
Experiment I
The goal of Experiment I is to examine how listeners process iconic action and shape 
gestures. To this end, we designed a task in which participants were primed with 
gesture videos showing either an action or a shape gesture, followed by a target word 
or image. Participants determined whether the word or image shown was related to 
the prime (yes / no responses). Their response times (RTs) and accuracy scores were 
measured. Given the current movement towards preregistered studies (see Gonzalez 
& Cunningham, 2015, Asendorpf et al., 2013) we preregistered all studies in this report. 
Experiment I’s preregistration form is available on the Open Science Framework at 




106 individuals took part in Experiment I, 71 of them female and 35 of them male 
(M = 21.8 years, SD = 2.3). Participants were recruited through the university’s pool 
of participants, and their participation was compensated with course credit. All had 
normal or corrected to normal vision. We rejected data from two participants who did 
not follow the instructions and pressed the wrong keys throughout the experiment.
To determine our minimum sample size, we used the software G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to conduct an a-priori power analysis (F-test, within subjects). 
Our goal was to obtain at least .80 power to detect a small to medium effect size at 
the standard .05 alpha error probability. The resulting recommended sample size was 
90 participants. 
Stimuli creation
We created a dataset of action and shape gesture video clips representing 34 
manipulable objects. The video clips were used as primes in the experiment, and 
words and pictures denoting the objects were used as the task’s targets.
The objects that were described were selected from two sources: The Bank of 
Standardized Stimuli (BOSS, Brodeur et al. 2014), and the kitchen tools dataset used 
in Masson-Carro et al. (2016). All objects have been rated as highly manipulable and 
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have been successfully used in gesture production studies (see Masson-Carro et al., 
2017, 2016).
We created the video clips dataset by means of a gesture elicitation task where 
four different non-professional actors — two females and two males — were cued to 
depict the function and the shape of 34 manipulable objects (Figure 2). Each object 
was presented to the actor on an individual slide showing both the picture and the 
word denoting the object, and remained on the screen for 3 seconds. Object slides 
were separated by a 2-seconds fixation cross. The actors were asked to produce one 
gesture per object. During Round I, they were cued to produce an action gesture for 
each of the objects (“Using your hands, can you show me how you use the following 
objects”?). During Round II, the actors were cued to produce a shape gesture for 
each of the objects (“Using your hands, can you show me the shape of the following 
objects”?). The aim of this task was to record the first action and shape gesture that 
would come to the producer’s mind. This led to the collection of four action and four 
shape gestures per object, totalling to 272 clips. The clips lasted 2.54 seconds on 
average (SD = 0.63 seconds.), and each clip showed a gesture in its entirety (from 
preparation to retraction, Kendon, 1980). Of the materials, we singled out 4 objects 
and their corresponding gesture clips for practice purposes, leaving the remaining 30 
objects and their corresponding 240 gesture clips for the experimental trials.
Figure 2
Example from the gesture elicitation task. In Round I, actors were cued to gesturally  
depict the action associated to each of the 34 objects. In Round II, actors were cued to 




Participants performed the task individually inside a sound-proof booth to minimise 
distraction. They sat facing a 21-inch computer screen located at approximately 45 cm 
from the participant’s head. The entire experiment lasted approximately 20 minutes.
The experiment was built in Open Sesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and 
consisted of two blocks: a word block and a picture block (see Table 1). Each block 
was composed of a practice round consisting of 8 trials and an experimental round 
consisting of 60 trials. All trials had the same structure: a gesture clip was played, 
followed by a potential target — a word, in the case of the world block; and a picture, in 
the case of the picture block. Participants were instructed to respond “yes” or “no”, by 
means of a keypress, to indicate whether the object shown on the screen was related 
to the gesture presented in the beginning of the trial or not. Trials were separated by 
a fixation cross that remained on screen for 800 milliseconds.
As mentioned, the gesture primes were produced by four different actors. Within 
each block, one action and one shape gesture video from different actors was played 
for every object (i.e., 2 x 30 = 60). We created different lists to counterbalance the 
distribution of actors within and across experimental blocks. So, if participants saw 
videos by actors 2 and 3 during the first block, they saw videos by actors 1 and 4 
during the second block. This means that each participant saw and responded to 120 
unique gesture clips in total.
Similarly, each gesture clip was paired with a related or an unrelated target. In order for 
clips not to be always paired with the same target in unrelated trials, we created two 
different lists where the unrelated trial cells were filled at random with objects from the 
unrelated objects’ list for that gesture clip. The implementation of these lists was also 
counterbalanced across participants.
We also counterbalanced block order, so that participants would be directed evenly to 
a word plus picture block, or a picture plus word block. Within a block, the presentation 
order of the trials was automatically randomised by the software. Table 1 presents a 
summary of the experimental design.




The experimental design. Note that Word and Picture blocks are counterbalanced and  
that prime and actor are (pseudo-) randomised.
Example Gesture 
Prime
Related Example Target Number of clips
Word block Action gesture YES Word “Brush” 15
 “using brush” NO Word “Glass” 15
  Shape gesture YES Word “Brush” 15
   “shape brush” NO Word “Glass” 15
Picture block Action gesture YES Picture of a brush 15
 “using brush” NO Picture of a glass 15
  Shape gesture YES Picture of a brush 15
   “shape brush” NO Picture of a glass 15
TOTAL       120 clips
Data Analyses
We manipulated three variables: gesture prime (action gestures; shape gestures), 
target modality (words; pictures) and whether prime and target are related (related; 
unrelated). The outcome variables are reaction times, and accuracy scores. 
In order to answer our research questions, we resorted to Linear Mixed Models 
because of their flexibility in allowing us to consider the fixed and random effects 
within one single analysis. We performed two analyses, one for reaction times scores 
(continuous) and one for accuracy scores (categorical). The predictor variables where 
always gesture prime (action; shape), target modality (word; picture), and prime-target 
relatedness (related; unrelated). We included participants, items, and the gesture 
actors as random factors. Additionally, we conducted a third analysis to specifically 
check for the interaction between prime and target modality. 
As indicated in the preregistration, all data points below or above 3SD from each 
participants’ mean in the reaction times’ task were treated as outliers and removed, 




Experiment I asked three questions: (1) Are action gestures processed faster than 
shape gestures? (2) Do action gestures lead to higher response accuracy than shape 
gestures? (3) Does the modality that the target is presented in (word or picture) 
influence either reaction times or accuracy?
Our results show main effects of gesture prime on reaction times (ß = 217.37, SE = 
6.9, t = 31.52, p < .001) as well as on accuracy scores (ß = -1.59, SE = .05, z = -29.63, 
p < .001). Consistent with our prediction, we found participants were faster to link 
action gestures to their referent (M = 898 ms, SD = 415 ms) than shape gestures 
(M = 1116 ms, SD = 470 ms), as can be seen in Figure 3. Likewise, action gestures 
resulted in higher accuracy scores (M = .88, SD = 0.32) than shape gestures (M = .67, 
SD = 0.47), as can be seen in Figure 4. 













Response times (in ms) for action and shape gestures.
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Referent identification accuracy scores (%), for action and shape gestures.
We also asked whether target modality would have an effect on how people interpret 
gestures, even though we abstained from making a prediction about the directionality 
of such effect, as can be seen in the preregistration. The modality in which the target 
object, or referent, was presented (i.e., as a word or as a picture) had an effect on 
reaction times (ß = 108.97, SE = 6.91, t = 15.77, p < .001) but not on accuracy scores 
(ß = -.09, SE = .05, z = 1.76, p = .08). The data shows that participants were faster 
in matching gestures with pictures (M = 952 ms, SD = 440 ms) than with words 
(M = 1062 ms, SD = 466 ms) (see Figure 5). Their accuracy in guessing correctly was 
not different for pictures (M = .77, SD = 0.42) and words (M = .78, SD = 0.41).
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Figure 5
Response times (in ms), as a function of target modality (word and picture referents).
The interaction effect we had predicted between gesture prime and target modality 
was not significant, for either reaction times (ß = 3.68, SE = 13.81, t = 0.27, p = .79) or 
accuracy scores (β = .05, SE = .09, z = -0.52, p = .6), as Figure 6 indicates.
Lastly, relatedness had an effect on both processing times (β = 46.46, SE = 6.89, 
t = 6.74, p < .001) and accuracy (ß =-1.58, SE = .05, z = -29.47, p < .001), but not 
like we had predicted: participants were a little bit faster to identify unrelated trials 
(M = 983.7 msec., SD = 419.57 msec.) than related trials (M = 1030 ms, SD = 490 ms), 
and they were more accurate identifying unrelated (M = .88, SD = 0.32) than related 
(M = .67, SD = 0.47) gesture — target pairs.
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Figure 6
Response times for prime — target related and unrelated trials.
Experiment II
Experiment II complements the results of Experiment I. We used the gesture clips 
created for Experiment I, and conducted an online study where participants were 
assigned two tasks: an open-ended task where they guessed what object each gesture 
clip depicted, and a rating task where participants were confronted with gestures and 
their original referents, and had to indicate how suitably the gesture represented 
its referent. Experiment II’s preregistration form is available on the Open Science 
Framework at https://osf.io/uyr67. Data, materials and supplemental information can 
be accessed at: http://osf.io/n8yba. 
Method
Participants
72 participants, M = 20.8 years, SD = 3.2, were recruited via the university pool of 
participants. 53 of them were female and 19 of them were male. Participants were 
compensated with course credit for their participation. The only requirement for 
eligibility was not to have participated in Experiment I, given that both experiments 
shared the same stimuli. 
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We used the software G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to conduct an a-priori power analysis 
(F-test, within subjects). Our goal was to obtain at least .95 power to detect a medium 
effect size at the standard .05 alpha error probability. The recommended minimum 
sample size, for both tasks, was 54 participants. 
Stimuli
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment I. 
Design and procedure
The task was built using the online research platform Gorilla (www.gorilla.sc/about). 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment, participants read and signed a digital form 
where they gave their consent to participating in the experiment. 
Participants accomplished an open-ended task first, followed by a rating task. In the 
open-ended task, participants saw 30 gesture clips and they were asked to write down 
the name of the object they believed was depicted in each of the gestures. Participants 
had to input their response in the box below the video, and press “continue” (see 
Figure 7).
Figure 7
Screenshot from the open-ended task in Experiment II. Participants see a gesture  
produced by an actor, and they are prompted to answer the question  
“what object is indicated with this gesture?”
The stimuli consisted of 240 gesture clips (30 objects, two gestures per object, four 
actors). Each participant accomplished 30 trials (one per object, so that there would 
be no repetition of objects), which means that we created 8 versions of the task where 
we semi-randomly distributed the gesture type (action and shape) and the gesture 
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actor over the versions. We assigned each new participant to a different version. Within 
a version, the administration order of the trials was fully randomised by the software.
In the rating task, participants were shown gesture clips accompanied by their 
referent, which could be presented in the form of a word or of a picture. The task of 
the participant was to rate, from 1 to 5, how well they thought the gesture represented 
the accompanying word or picture (see Figure 8). Once more, each participant 
accomplished 30 trials (one per object). Because in this case, each of the 240 gesture 
clips was paired to either a picture or a word, the number of potential task versions was 
multiplied by 2, resulting in 16. Thus, each new participant was directed to one of 16 
task versions. Within a version, the order of the trials was fully random.
Figure 8
Screenshot from the rating task in Experiment II. Participants see a gesture produced by an actor,  
and they are prompted to rate “how well the gesture describes the object presented on the right”  
on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very well).
Data analysis
The responses obtained in the open-ended task were coded by the first author and 
checked and, if needed, revised by the second and third authors. Correct responses 
were assigned a 1, and incorrect responses were assigned a 0. We considered a 
response to be correct when it matched (or was a clear synonym of) the word that 
each gesture was set to depict. Semantically close but incorrect responses were coded 
as incorrect3, along with verbs. For instance, for the object “wine glass”, we accepted 
both “glass” and “wine glass”, but we rejected the words “mug” or “cup”, or the verb 
“drinking something”. Similarly, while semantically close, the tobacco pipe is not a 
3 Note that this coding scheme is slightly different from what we preregistered. In the preregistration 
of the task, we had included a third category for semantically close but incorrect responses. However, 
the responses given by the participants were less ambiguous than anticipated, which led us to opt for a 
simpler correct / incorrect coding scheme.
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“cigar” or a “cigarette”. Empty responses and “I don’t know” responses were coded as 
N/A. During the coding phase, the experimental condition was obscured.
The data were analysed using the R Statistical Package (R Core Team, 2013). To analyse 
our results, we conducted two Linear Mixed Models, one for the open-ended task 
(with categorical data) and one for the rating task (with continuous data). For the open-
ended task, the predictor variable was gesture prime (action; shape). For the rating 
task, the predictor variables were gesture prime (action; shape) and target modality 




Our prediction was that action gestures would lead to more correct responses in an 
open-ended task than shape gestures. Our results confirm this hypothesis. Even though 
the accuracy scores were, on average, very low (which is often the case in open-ended 
gesture interpretation tasks), participants correctly identified the referents of action 
gestures more often (M = .4, SD = 0.49) than the referents of shape gestures (M = .05, 
SD = 0.22) (ß = -3.23, SE = .21, z = -15.68, p < .001), as can be seen in Figure 9.





















Accuracy scores (%) for action and shape gestures in the open-ended  
gesture interpretation task.




We predicted that action gestures would be judged as more suitable to represent 
manipulable objects than shape gestures. Our data are consistent with this prediction 
(see Figure 10). We found that participants rated action gestures as more suitable 
(M = 3.25, SD = 1.34) than shape gestures (M = 159, SD = .89) (β = -1.7, SE = .041, 
z = -40.6, p < .001). We did not find any effect of target modality (β = -.06, SE = .041, 
z = -1.39, p = .16), which means that whether the target objects were presented as 
words (M = 2.39, SD = 1.38) or as pictures (M = 2.43, SD = 1.44) did not influence the 
participants’ rating of the gestures. There was a mild interaction between gesture type 
and target modality (β = .17, SE = .08, z = 2.01, p = .04), which suggests that action 
gestures obtained slightly higher ratings when paired with picture referents (M = 3.33, 
SD = 1.36) than with word referents (M = 3.17, SD = 1.33). 















Rating scores (1 to 5) for action and shape gestures. The scale describes how  
well participants perceived that a gesture described its corresponding referent.
Discussion
People generally benefit from seeing gestures in addition to listening to speech 
(Hostetter, 2011). However, this benefit might vary between different kinds of gestures. 
Therefore, in this study, we explored how different types of gestures are comprehended. 
We focused on how addressees process, comprehend and rate action and shape 
iconic gestures, when these are used to depict manipulable objects. In experiment 
I, participants watched short gesture clips followed by a potential referent and had 
to decide whether gesture prime and target were related or not, while we measured 
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their accuracy and response times. Experiment II complemented these results with an 
open-ended task where participants freely interpreted the meaning of each gesture 
clip, and with a rating task where participants indicated how well they thought each 
gesture depicted its referent. 
Our results were clear: action gestures were processed faster than shape gestures, led 
to higher referent identification accuracy in both closed and open-ended tasks, and 
were preferred over shape gestures to represent manipulable objects. Furthermore, 
although participants mapped gestures with equal accuracy to word and picture 
referents, they were faster to link gestures to picture referents. These results are novel, 
yet intuitive when considered from a cognitive and a communicative perspective. 
The bias for action
From an embodied cognition perspective, the processing advantage of action 
gestures for manipulable object recognition makes sense, and provide support 
for our (preregistered) hypotheses. According to the Gestures as Simulated Action 
framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), gestures are a by-product of perceptual 
and motor simulations that underlie speech and thought processes. Although the 
framework focuses on gesture production, the key idea that stronger activation of 
the motor system leads to more gesturing (e.g., see also Hostetter & Alibali, 2010; 
Masson-Carro et al., 2016) can also be understood in reverse. Thus, action gestures 
may engage the motor system more strongly than shape gestures, which could in turn 
facilitate the identification of manipulable objects. This is in line with previous research 
showing that observing actions facilitates object recognition (Helbig, Steinwender, 
Graf & Kiefer, 2010; Mounoud et al., 2007) as well as with prior work by Ping et al. 
(2013) suggesting that the engagement of the motor system could be one of the key 
facilitators of gesture processing.
From a communicative perspective, action gestures may be less ambiguous than 
shape gestures. Firstly, because they may be more “transparent”, in the sense that they 
more directly resemble the actions they depict (Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014) and can be 
mapped to a narrower set of referents. The same cannot always be said about shape 
gestures. For instance, how many objects out there could be classified as “round” or 
as “square”? Secondly, action gestures may convey richer information than shape 
gestures because, in addition to representing an object’s function, they may be giving 
away extra information about the position, size or even shape of the object that is 
being described (Beattie & Shovelton, 2002). 
We suggest that addressees infer meaning from gestures by mapping the gestural 
forms onto their own bodily experiences (i.e., motor schemas they are familiar 
with), and that gestures that more directly map onto actions are at a cognitive and 
communicative advantage.
The Processing and Comprehension of Action and Shape Iconic Gestures
91
4
Observers are good at recognizing gestures, even without context
Participants were, in general, fairly good at inferring meaning from gesture. In the 
forced-choice task, accuracy scores ranged between 65% and 90%. Note that these 
numbers are lower than those reported in other studies which found ceiling effects 
(e.g., van Nispen et al., 2017), but this may be due to intrinsic and extrinsic task-related 
factors. First of all, in our study we used all stimuli objects both as targets and as 
distractors, and all objects belonged to a single category (tools), which means the 
task was rather difficult. Furthermore, the speeded response component most likely 
increased the cognitive load in participants. In light of these factors, the accuracy 
scores are actually remarkably high. 
In contrast, the open-ended task yielded low accuracy scores (40% for action gestures, 
and 5% for shape gestures). We could conclude that observers cannot reliably interpret 
shape gestures when the context is lacking. For action gestures, a 40% accuracy score 
is quite impressive, taking into account the nearly unlimited number of possible 
referents gestures could in principle be mapped to. 
Our reaction times task uncovered one puzzling finding, namely that unrelated 
prime-target trials were responded to faster (by about 40 msec.) than related trials. 
Past research has shown that, when speech and gesture are presented together, 
incongruities between the information in the gesture and in the speech (e.g., speakers 
hear “chop” and see a gesture showing “twist”) are slower to process than when speech 
and gesture allude to the same information (e.g., speakers hear “chop” and see a 
gesture showing “chop”) (Kelly et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2015). At first sight, our results 
appear contradictory with that finding. However, our task dealt with linking gestures 
to subsequently presented objects, and not with the joint processing of multimodal 
utterances (which would be interesting to address in future studies). In this context, 
it could be easier for a participant to dismiss a gesture that clearly did not match a 
specific referent (e.g., piano-playing gesture, followed by the picture of a glass) than to 
commit to a positive response. This aligns with studies showing longer response times 
for semantically related (word and picture) items during categorization tasks (Lotto, 
Job & Rumiati, 1999). 
Mapping gestures to picture and word referents
We predicted that shapes would be mapped faster to pictures, and actions to words, 
given previous findings from gesture production studies showing that, during simple 
language tasks, speakers more often used shape gestures when describing objects 
based on pictures, and more often used action gestures when describing objects 
based on words (Masson-Carro, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2017).
Instead, we found that all gesture types were mapped faster to picture referents than to 
word referents. Even though similar neural structures are activated by the processing 
of words and pictures (Gates & Yoon, 2005; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs & 
Frackowiak, 1996), it has been argued that pictures have somewhat of a “privileged 
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access” to the semantic system (Taikh, Hargreaves, Yap & Pexman, 2014). It is likely 
that it takes longer for participants to match gestures to words because additional 
visuospatial information needs to be invoked for words that is readily-available in 
the pictorial representations, resulting in slightly longer response times for the word 
condition.
Furthermore, our results can also be explained in terms of a modality switch cost. 
Although both pictures and word targets were presented visually, there may be more 
overlap in the perception of the gesture primes and of the pictures, both relying on 
visuospatial processing. This is consistent with research by Wu and Coulson (2011) 
revealing commonalities in how we understand iconic gestures and other image-
based representations such as photographs — which could have facilitated processing, 
leading to overall lower response times to pictures in our study.
Our participants gave action gestures higher scores than shape gestures when asked 
how well they represented object concepts, but the scores were even higher when the 
referents were pictorial. This may be explained by the richness and concreteness of 
pictorial representations. Arguably, seeing pictures made object affordances salient, 
which in turn allowed participants to establish a stronger connection between the 
action gesture and the perception of its pictorial referent.
Limitations and future research
This study constituted a first attempt to examine the processing and comprehension of 
different types of iconic gestures. Since we aimed to have an experimental setting that 
was as controlled as possible, there are limitations to be addressed in future studies. 
Although referring to objects in our environment is one of the basic building blocks 
of communication, obviously not all communication consists of speaking about tools. 
Thus, our findings might not generalise to other semantic categories. In fact, it is likely 
that they do not. Some of the actors that participated in the stimuli creation mentioned 
that it was difficult to produce shape gestures for some of the objects. Although 
anecdotal, the fact that producing shape gestures to depict manipulable objects might 
seem unnatural highlights the preference to depict manipulable objects by resorting 
to their typical function. This, of course, does not undermine the communicative 
usefulness of shape gestures. Our study examined gesture comprehension in a non-
contextual setting, but there are many contexts in which depicting shape may be the 
disambiguating element to distinguish between two objects. It may even be that for 
objects that cannot be manipulated, shape may become the preferred technique, as 
has been suggested by gesture production studies (e.g., Masson-Carro et al., 2016). 
Future research should examine whether action gestures are at a processing and 
comprehension advantage even when they may not directly be representative of the 
intended referent — for instance, when we see an eating gesture accompanying the 
related concept “table”. 




In conclusion, this study showed, for the first time, that action gestures are at a 
cognitive and communicative advantage when it comes to representing tools. Our 
results parallel findings on gesture production that show a bias for producing action 
gestures when depicting manipulable entities (e.g., Ortega et al., 2016; Masson-Carro 
et al., 2016) and extend prior research on gesture comprehension, by specifying that 
the benefit of different iconic types may vary as a function of the intended referent’s 
semantic category. We furthermore showed an effect of referent modality on gesture 
processing times: gestures and pictures are both imagistic representations, thus it is 
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 in gesture production
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What are the mechanisms responsible for spontaneous gesture production? Driven 
by the close connection between gesture and action, recent research suggests that 
gestures originate in perceptual and motoric simulations that occur while speakers 
process information for speaking (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Here, we test this 
claim by highlighting object affordances during a communication task, inspired by 
the classic Stimulus-Response compatibility paradigm by Tucker & Ellis (1998). We 
compared gestures in situations where target objects were oriented towards the 
speakers’ dominant hand (grasping potential enhanced), with situations where they 
were oriented towards the non-dominant hand. Before the main experiment, we 
conducted a replication attempt of Tucker and Ellis’ (1998: Experiment 1) to test the 
object stimuli. Contrary to expectations, we could not replicate the original findings. 
However, compatibly with our replication results, the gesture data showed that 
enhancing grasping potential did not increase the amount of gestures produced. 
Vertical orientation nevertheless did, with upright objects eliciting more gestures than 
inverted ones. Our results challenge the automaticity of object affordance effects in 
linguistic and non-linguistic tasks, and suggest that previous findings on gestures and 
affordances could be driven by communicative purposes. 
Keywords: gesture, affordances, Stimulus-Response compatibility, replication.




The act of speaking is often accompanied by spontaneous hand movements, known 
as co-speech gestures (McNeill, 1992) or gesticulation (Kendon, 2004). We use these 
gestures daily for different communication purposes, such as requesting objects, 
emphasizing important ideas, or describing the shape and use of tools. At the heart 
of the study of gesticulation lies the fundamental question of why we gesture. This 
question has often been approached from a functional perspective that offers insight 
into the role of gestures as communicative devices (Kelly, Barr, Church & Lynch, 1999; 
Melinger & Levelt, 2004; Hostetter, 2011) and as facilitators of cognitive processing 
(Goldin-Meadow, 1999, 2014; Kita, Alibali & Chu, 2017). In this paper, we look at this 
question with a focus on the cognitive mechanisms gestures emerge from. Specifically, 
we delve into action-based theories of gesture production and explore the use of new 
tasks to elucidate the connection between gesture and action. 
This paper will comprise two experiments: the first is a replication of a classic action 
priming paradigm developed by Tucker and Ellis (1998, exp. I); the second experiment 
adapts this paradigm to the study of gestures to investigate how the potentiation of 
affordances might influence gesturing. 
Action-based accounts of gesture production
We use our arms and hands both to act on the world and to communicate about 
it. Both actions and co-speech gestures are physical movements, controlled by the 
same motor system — with the difference that, unlike actions, gestures are essentially 
perceived as representational (Novack, Wakefield and Goldin-Meadow, 2016), and 
their production does not cause any physical change in the environment (Cartmill, 
Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2012). It is therefore natural to find connections between 
hand gestures and practical actions. The connection between gesture and action is 
particularly relevant for theories about gesturing and, by extension, about human 
communication. Throughout the years, several hypotheses have been proposed 
to account for the production of gestures. Some of these hypotheses attribute the 
production of co-speech gestures to the mechanisms responsible for planning 
practical actions (Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Chu & Kita, 2016), 
and further suggest that speech and gestures constitute two separate streams which 
interact at several points of the speech production process (e.g., Kita & Özyürek, 
2003). Experimentally, however, the action component of gestures has received little 
attention, even when it is a key factor to understanding the process of how gestures 
come to be, how they come to bear meaning, and how they may act as a bridge 
between lower and higher-order cognitive processes.
One particular account, the Gestures as Simulated Action framework (henceforth 
GSA, Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) suggests that representational gestures (i.e., gestures 
that depict visual and functional attributes of the referents described) stem from the 
perceptual and motoric simulations that underlie thinking and speaking (Hostetter & 
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Alibali, 2008). In practice, this implies that processing (action) information involves the 
automatic activation of related motor patterns which, in turn, increase the likelihood 
of a gesture being produced. This framework is different from others (e.g., Krauss, 
Chen & Gottesmann, 2000; de Ruiter, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003) in that, rather than 
providing a model of the relation between gesture and speech, it focusses specifically 
on explaining how gestures may arise from embodied processes. 
Simulation is one of the basic building blocks of the GSA framework. Simulations 
can be defined as “re-enactments of perceptual, motor, and introspective states 
acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 618). 
Simulations involve the activation of the sensorimotor system, with both visual and 
motor simulations relying on similar neural mechanisms as those involved in perceiving 
and acting (Kosslyn, 1994; Jeannerod, 2001). Some simulations may be conscious, 
such as when we mentally examine or transform a visual representation (e.g., recalling 
the appearance of a loved one; solving a puzzle), whereas other simulations remain 
outside of conscious experience, for instance when we observe the actions of others 
and our body becomes ready to act (Jeannerod, 2001). 
Visuomotor simulations are key to the planning of actions, as they enable humans to 
predict the sensory consequences of particular movements, as well as to recognize 
and understand the actions performed by others. It has been proposed that overt 
actions are always preceded by a (covert) simulation stage, although the simulation 
need not always lead to the execution of the corresponding action (Jeannerod, 2001). 
Rather than being a concrete phenomenon, simulation can be conceptualized as a 
computational principle (Barsalou, 2008, p. 622) that operates across diverse processes 
in the brain and supports a wide array of high order cognitive processes, ranging from 
imagery (see Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis, 2006) to language comprehension (see 
Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). 
So how might simulation relate to gesture? According to the GSA, three factors co-
determine the likelihood of producing a gesture. Firstly, and most importantly for the 
current study, a simulation must be strong enough to allow activation to spread from 
the premotor to the motor areas of the brain and culminate in a physical movement. 
Hostetter and Alibali (2008) introduce the concept of a gesture threshold, defined 
as “the level of activation beyond which the speaker cannot inhibit the expression 
of simulated actions as gestures” (p. 503). Thus, the motor activation caused by a 
particular simulation must be strong enough to surpass that threshold. The amount 
of action activation is dependent on the type of imagery that is simulated, and of the 
level of active processing. Hostetter and Alibali (2008, p. 510) explain this by means 
of a two-dimensional continuum of activation that builds on Cornoldi and Vecchi 
(2003), where (1) the closer a simulation is bound to action, the more activation it will 
generate, and (2) activation increases together with processing effort. In other words, 
tasks that involve spatial and motor imagery (e.g., mental rotation, or interpreting Ikea 
assembly instructions) generate more motor activation than pure visual imagery (e.g., 
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scanning an image). Likewise, challenging tasks in terms of visuospatial processing 
(e.g., playing Tetris) will generate more activation than more passive processes (e.g., 
recalling somebody’s eye color). This is in line with the findings that speakers produce 
more gestures when working memory is highly taxed (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, 
Kelly and Wagner, 2001; Melinger & Kita, 2007).
Two other factors play a role besides simulation. One is the height of the gesture 
threshold in a particular context and for a particular individual. For instance, Spencer, 
Byrne and Holler (2011) showed that speakers produced more gestures when 
they believed the information they were conveying was particularly useful for their 
interlocutors. The other factor is the concurrent involvement of the motor system 
to control the vocal apparatus, thereby increasing the chances for overall activation 
to surpass the gesture threshold — an idea that gains in strength when the close 
coordination of hand and mouth movements is taken into account (Gentilucci, Dalla 
Volta & Gianelli, 2008; Krahmer & Swerts, 2007). 
We now outline some of the evidence that supports such a simulation-based account 
of gesture production. Beattie and Shovelton (2002) conducted a study to assess the 
effect of the “imageability” of speech units on gesture production. Following Paivio 
(1965), they defined “imageability” as “the ease or difficulty with which the speech 
unit arouses a mental image” (p. 409). Their results showed that speech units that 
were rated as more imageable were accompanied by a larger amount of gesturing, 
compared to less imageable speech units. In line with the GSA’s predictions, the type 
of imagery that was elicited also influences the amount of representational gestures 
produced by speakers: Feyereisen and Havard (1999) showed that speakers produced 
more gestures when they discussed topics primarily eliciting motor imagery (e.g., tying 
a shoe, replacing a flat tire), in comparison with topics eliciting visual imagery (e.g., 
describing one’s favorite painting), and abstract topics (e.g., politics). In a similar vein, 
Hostetter and Alibali (2010) showed that speakers gestured more while describing 
geometric patterns they had themselves manually constructed using matches (eliciting 
motor imagery), than patterns they had only viewed in their final form. Another source 
of evidence stems from studies manipulating the speakers’ action experiences. For 
instance, in Cook and Tanenhaus (2009), participants had to solve the Tower of Hanoi 
problem, and then retell its solution to a listener that waited in a separate room. 
Half of the participants solved the task using real disks, and the other half played a 
computerized version of the game. Interestingly, there were no differences in the 
words participants used to explain the task, but the gestures produced revealed the 
manner in which the task had been accomplished, with participants who used real 
disks producing more grasping gestures, and participants who had completed the 
task on the computer tracing the mouse trajectories. Thus, the gestures expressed 
aspects of the speakers’ particular motoric experiences.
Further evidence for a simulation-based account comes from a new line of research 
exploring gestures in relation to the affordances of objects (Masson-Carro, Goudbeek 
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& Krahmer, 2016; Chu & Kita, 2016; Ortega & Özyürek, 2016). Affordances have been 
traditionally defined as the potential for action offered by the environment (e.g., see 
Gibson, 1986; Borghi, 2015), much like a cave offers animals shelter from the rain, 
or a small object such as a stone affords grasping, carrying, lifting and throwing, to 
animals with hands. Perceiving the affordances of objects predisposes subjects to act, 
by guiding suitable motor responses (e.g., Gerlach, Law and Paulson, 2002; Tucker 
& Ellis, 1998; Fischer & Dahl, 2006). A handful of studies have examined gesture 
production during the communication about objects with different affordances, under 
the assumption that objects that more strongly afford being acted upon, such as tools 
and other manipulables, should elicit more gestures. Such studies have shown that, 
during object description tasks, speakers gesture more about objects that are highly 
manipulable (e.g., a hammer or a stapler) than about less manipulable objects (e.g., a 
fence or a chicken) (Pine, Gurney & Fletcher, 2010; Masson-Carro et al., 2016; Masson-
Carro, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2017). This effect seems to be restricted to the production 
of representational gestures that depict visual and functional attributes of the referents 
described (Masson-Carro et al., 2016), suggesting that action activation does not simply 
give rise to mere bodily movement, but to movement that is compatible with the way 
the referred-to objects are handled. This was further corroborated by the finding that 
speakers use more imitating (action) gestures when describing highly manipulable 
objects such as screw-drivers, and more moulding (contour-following) gestures when 
describing less manipulable objects such as tables, suggesting simulations of acting 
on, and touching those objects, respectively (Masson-Carro et al., 2016). 
In spite of the suggestive evidence that perceiving action potential may boost 
gesturing, the question remains whether the increase in gesture production in 
response to manipulable objects during communication is the result of stronger 
action simulations, or whether speakers simply gesture more about manipulable 
objects like tools because their function is communicatively salient and leads to easier 
identification by an addressee. Please note that, by drawing this distinction, we do not 
mean to imply that gestures are not produced with a communicative purpose. On the 
contrary, we acknowledge that cognitive and communicative aspects act in tandem 
to define how co-speech gestures are produced, even though this paper seeks to 
analyze the cognitive aspects that give rise to gesturing in relative isolation.
To disentangle communicative saliency and perceived action potential, the 
experimental manipulation should be task-irrelevant, so that the effects found cannot 
be explained by communicative strategies developed by participants to better solve 
the task at hand in a given condition. One study provides evidence for the connection 
between gestures and (covert) simulations of motoric imagery in this way. Chu and 
Kita (2016) showed that obscuring the affordances of objects (e.g., covering a 3D 
model of a mug with spikes) during an affordance-irrelevant task (spatial rotation 
problem explanations) resulted in fewer gestures accompanying speech, in contrast 
with a condition in which the affordances of objects were not manipulated. Thus, 
because it could be painful to manipulate an object covered in spikes, the evocation of 
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graspability was diminished, and this in turn was reflected on the speakers’ gesturing 
behavior. 
Our aim is putting to test the connection between affordances and gestures in real 
interaction contexts and with real objects. In doing so, rather than comparing two 
different object categories or types, we aim to use the same target objects across 
experimental conditions, and enhance their action potential extrinsically.
Previous research has shown that when perceiving visual scenes, our attention is drawn 
to the potential actions that objects afford (Handy, Grafton, Shroff, Ketay & Gazzaniga, 
2003; Garrido-Vasquez & Schubö, 2014). One question that has received a significant 
amount of attention is whether viewing objects that can be grasped automatically 
activates the motor system in a way that facilitates a possible interaction with such 
objects (Grezes & Decety, 2002; Tipper, Paul & Hayes, 2006; Makris, Hadar, Yarrow, 
2011; Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi & Nicoletti, 2010). This paper, for the first time, 
applies a well-known visuomotor priming paradigm that has been used to show 
automatic activation of the motor system in the form of stimulus-response compatibility 
effects to the study of spontaneously-produced co-speech gestures. 
Experiments investigating stimulus-response compatibility effects (e.g., Tucker and 
Ellis, 1998; Tipper, Paul & Hayes, 2006) have typically shown that the processing of 
visual stimuli occurs faster when the participant´s body is optimally positioned to 
exploit the affordances of objects. A classic study by Tucker and Ellis (1998, experiment 
I) had participants make orientation judgements (is this object upright or inverted?) on 
a series of manipulable objects (e.g., saucepan, jug or teapot) by pressing a button 
with either their right or left hand. The critical manipulation was that objects were 
shown with their handles either oriented towards the speaker´s response hand, or 
with their handles oriented towards the non-response hand. Their results showed that 
participants were faster in effectuating their response when the handles of the objects 
were aligned with the responding hand, presumably because merely perceiving the 
towards-hand orientation of the object already recruited motor processing. Studies 
such as the above challenge the view that an intention to act is required for a motor 
program to be initiated. 
The present study
In this study, we seek to answer the question of whether increased gesturing 
while describing objects that can be manipulated stems from covert simulations 
of motor imagery, or whether speakers simply gesture more about such objects 
due to communicative reasons. In particular, we aim to find out whether the action 
compatibility effects found by studies such as Tucker and Ellis (1998) can be extended 
to co-speech gestures. Adapting their paradigm into a referential communication task 
(i.e., speakers describe objects presented with different orientation angles to a peer) 
using real-life objects allows us to manipulate only the degree of grasping potential 
without varying the communication demands, the saliency or the intrinsic properties of 
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the to-be-described objects — in other words, while keeping the height of the gesture 
threshold constant. Hence, we compare gesture rates during descriptions of the same 
objects in two main (within-subjects) conditions: when the handles of such objects are 
aligned with the speakers’ dominant hand (grasping potential enhanced), and when the 
same objects are vertically mirrored, with the handles aligned with the speaker´s non-
dominant hand. Finding evidence that gesturing increases when the object handles 
are oriented towards the speaker’s dominant (gesturing) hand — in comparison with 
when the same object handles are oriented towards the non-dominant hand — would 
provide strong support for activation-based accounts of gesture production (e.g., 
Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Chu & Kita, 2016).
To obtain a more complete picture of the effects caused by our manipulation, and in 
view of the recent emphasis on replication research (Munafò et al., 2017; OSF, 2015), 
the gesture experiment will be preceded by a replication of Tucker and Ellis’ original 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC) task. In conjunction, these studies will provide 
a more complete picture of the processing of object affordances in communicative 
and non-communicative contexts, and shed light on the cognitive processes that give 
rise to gesturing.
Experiment I
Experiment I is a close replication of Tucker and Ellis Stimulus-Response Compatibility 
task (1998, exp. I) in which participants will attend to photographs of 22 objects in 
four orientations (upright, upside down, with the handles facing left and with the 
handles facing right) and effectuate key-press responses with their right or left hand 
in response to the vertical orientation of objects (i.e., is this object upright or upside 
down?). Following their original study, we hypothesize that responses will be faster 
when the handles of the objects are aligned with the participant’s responding hand. 
All aspects of the experiment—creation of the materials, procedure, and data analyses 
— strictly follow Tucker and Ellis’ methods, as described in the original paper. 
Experiment I and Experiment II received joint approval (as a double study) by our 
institutional Research Ethics Committee (code 24-60-2015).
Method
Participants
42 students from Tilburg University — 29 female and 15 male, M = 20 years (SD = 
2.1)  — took part in the experiment individually (in contrast to the 30 that participated 
in the original study), in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and reported being right-hand dominant (determined 
by writing hand). All participants read and signed the ethics consent form prior to 
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the commencement of the task and were informed that they could withdraw their 
participation anytime. 
We based our sample size decision on the effect size estimate of the original study 
(Tucker & Ellis, 1998, exp. 1). Following Thalheimer and Cook, (2002), we used the 
F value / MSE to calculate Cohen’s d. Based on this approach, the estimated effect 
size for the original study ranges from d = 0.46 (based on the difference between the 
means and the reported MSE) to d = 0.9 (based on the F value for the most relevant 
effect, the two-way interaction).
Current standard power analysis programs such as G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) do not offer power calculations for two-way within-subjects designs 
when all main effects and interactions are of interest. However, when only the crucial 
interaction is considered, the power analysis can be approximated with a paired t-test, 
which for a power of .9 and an effect size of 0.46 requires 42 participants. Approximating 
the required sample with a 4 way within participants design (effectively ignoring the 
interaction) requires only 8 participants, while ignoring the repeated structure of the 
design and determining the sample size for a between-subjects experiment with 2 
factors, with both main effects and the interaction being relevant, led to a required 
sample size of 46 participants per cell. Based on these considerations, we aimed at 
a sample size of forty or more participants. This way, we should be able to detect the 
smallest reported effect size (0.46) with a probability of about 90%. 
Stimuli and apparatus
We created a high-definition dataset based on the original stimuli by Tucker and Ellis 
(1998), consisting of 22 objects photographed in two horizontal orientations (handles 
oriented towards the left or towards the right) and two vertical orientations (upright, 
and inverted), resulting in 88 images (see Appendix A and Figure 1). Two objects from 
the original list in Tucker and Ellis were replaced: the electric carving knife was replaced 
by a regular bread knife, and the glass saucepan was replaced by a glass saucer. This 
was done because both objects are not common anymore in The Netherlands. We 
added two additional objects, to be used as stimuli during the training phase of the 
experiment.
All objects were photographed with their handles aligned at 60 degrees with respect 
to the x axis, as observed from above. The camera was placed 45 cm away and 25 cm 
above the object, to create the feeling that the observer is facing the object and has 
good grasping potential. Each object was photographed twice (upright and inverted), 
and we created mirrored copies of the photographs to obtain both left and right 
horizontal orientations (Figure 2). All items were further treated digitally using Adobe 
Photoshop to erase possible text on the objects (e.g., brand names), or elements 
other than the objects, table and background. Our aim was to recreate the dataset 





Example of six objects in the dataset, photographed in an upright position with  
their handles oriented towards the right.
Participants were seated in front of a 21-inch computer screen situated at approximately 
45 cm from the participant’s head, inside of a sound-proof booth. The stimuli were 
presented full-screen. The left and right hands of the participant were resting on top 
of two response buttons 35 cm apart. 
Figure 2
Stimulus object portrayed in the four experimental orientations  
(upright left; upright right; inverted left; inverted right)




The reaction times experiment was built using Open Sesame (Mathôt, Schreij & 
Theeuwes, 2011) and consisted of 176 trials, divided into two rounds of 88 trials each 
(see experimental design in Figure 3). Within one round, participants saw all objects in 
all four orientations (22 x 4). 
The task of the participants was to respond to the stimuli shown on the screen by 
pressing a key with their right or left hand depending on whether the object displayed 
was upright or inverted. They were instructed to be as fast and accurate as possible 
in their responses. The instructions were administered by the program, and included 
two visual examples of upright and inverted (non-target) objects. Following Tucker 
and Ellis, after finishing the first round, we reversed the response hand, in such a way 
that if a participant had responded with the left hand when objects were upright 
during round 1, in round 2 she would respond with the right hand for upright objects. 
Before each round, the researcher made sure the participants had understood the 
instructions, and there was a brief practice session consisting of 8 trials. We alternated 
the administration of two versions of the task (see Figure 3) where the instruction order 
(i.e., responding to upright objects with the right, or left hand) was counterbalanced. 
Each trial began with a fixation cross that remained visible for 2 seconds4, followed 
by the target image. The target image disappeared the moment the participant 
pressed a response key. If the participant failed to provide a response, the target 
image disappeared after 3 seconds. Participants were not provided with feedback on 
response speed, but they heard an error sound upon pressing the wrong key. At the 
end of each round, they were provided with feedback regarding their overall accuracy 
in indicating whether objects were upright or upside down. 
To ensure that the objects were distributed uniformly, we organized all trials within 
each round into four blocks — a manipulation that was invisible to the participants. 
Each object appeared once per block (see Figure 3), and within the block, all trials 
were automatically randomized. This manipulation allowed us to more systematically 
explore possible build-up or task learning effects by looking at the reaction times 
across all 8 blocks. 
4 In the original study, 4 seconds separated target trials. However, during a pilot session of our study, 





Depiction of the experimental design. Participants were alternately  
administered Version 1 or 2. 
Data analyses
The data were analyzed using the R Statistical Package (R Core Team, 2013). In the 
original experiment, Tucker and Ellis eliminated data from (a) participants with more 
than a 10% error rate, (b) individual error trials, and (c) reaction times above or below 
2SD from the mean RT. In the interest of consistency, we applied the same treatment 
to the data — which resulted in the elimination of 1280 trials out of 7392, including 
the removal of data from 6 participants who did not reach the 90% mark of correct 
answers5.
Next, we used Linear Mixed Models6 (LMM) to assess the effects of instruction type 
(right hand to indicate uprightness; left hand to indicate uprightness), compatibility 
(responding hand compatible with horizontal orientation; yes, no) and order (blocks 
1 to 8) on the log-transformed reaction times measurements. Object and participants 
were included as random effects. 
5 We also performed all analyses on the full dataset (including outliers and error trials). These results will 
only be reported if they differ from the results obtained in the primary analyses.
6 Note that Tucker and Ellis reported ANOVA F statistics, complemented by the calculation of Min F’ 
(Clark, 1973). We opted for state-of-the-art statistical models that are able to account for fixed as well as 
random effects simultaneously. 
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A second LMM analysis explored the general effects of vertical orientation (object 
upright or inverted), horizontal orientation (object handle facing left or right side), 
and response hand (hand effectuating a response; left, right). Finally, we conducted a 
third analysis to explore response accuracy (correct and incorrect responses). All of the 
LMM’ analyses were conducted using the lme4 package v. 1.1 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker 
& Walker, 2015). The p-values provided were estimated using the package lmerTest 
v.2.0 (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Rune, 2017).
Results
We found a main effect of instruction type (ß = 1.23, SE = 9.08, p < .001), indicating 
that participants were faster when they had to respond with their left hand for upright 
objects (M = 894.82 ms; SD = 183.15), in comparison with when they were instructed 
to respond with their right hand for upright objects (M = 916.95 ms; SD = 179.75). 
This pattern is opposite to what Tucker and Ellis found in their data, where right-hand 
responses to upright objects were on average 34ms faster than left-hand responses 
to upright objects.





Blocks 1 to 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 4
Reaction Times as a function of order (blocks 1 to 8), based on the raw, untreated data.
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Although Tucker and Ellis did not report on the responses over time, we consider 
these data crucial to the interpretation of the effects. We found an expected learning 
effect, as evidenced by a main effect of order (ß = -7, SE = 1.98, p < .001). Participants 
became faster in their responses as the task progressed. In addition, Figure 4 shows 
that there was more variation in RTs in blocks 1 and 5. This peak in variation in block 5 
was expected, given that block 5 was the first block from the second round, where we 
changed the instruction regarding what hand participants had to respond with. We 
also found order to interact with instruction type (ß = 1.78, SE = 9.08, p = .05). Figure 5 
shows that the learning effect is steeper for the left-hand responses to upright objects, 
in comparison with right-hand responses to upright objects.











0 1000 2000 3000
Response Times (ms) 
Figure 5
Interaction effect between instruction type (left-hand responses to upright objects;  
right-hand responses to upright objects) and order (blocks 1 to 8),  
based on the raw, untreated data.
Importantly, we found no effect of compatibility on the response time measurements 
(ß = -2.31, SE = 9.07, p = .79), suggesting that there were no differences in how long 
participants took to respond when the handle of the objects was oriented towards the 
response hand (M = 905.53 ms; SD = 181.06) as opposed to when it was oriented 
towards the non-response hand (M = 906.19 ms; SD = 182.53) (Figure 6). 
As previously mentioned, we also conducted the same analyses on the raw dataset 
(including all outliers and error trials), as well as on the non-log-transformed data, all 
exhibiting similar patterns (if not identical) than those presented above. Furthermore, 
for the sake of consistency, we also conducted an ANOVA following Tucker and Ellis’ 
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original statistical methods, and found no interaction between “handle orientation” 
(handles facing left or right) and “response hand” (left or right hand), F(1, 6104) = 0.001, 
p = 0.97.









Reaction Times as a function of compatibility (left) and block (right),  
based on the raw, untreated data.
Additional analyses showed no effects of vertical orientation, horizontal orientation 
or response hand (nor any interactions): Participants took a similar amount of time 
to produce an answer when the objects were shown upright (M = 905.01 ms; 
SD = 182.07) or upside-down (M = 906.73 ms; SD = 181.53) (ß = 1.28, SE = 1.01, p 
= .2), whether they were shown with their handles facing right (M = 904.79 ms; SD 
= 182.35) or facing left (M = 906.95 ms; SD = 181.24) (ß = -1.11, SE = 1.01, p = .27), 
and whether they responded in general with the left (M = 905.6 ms; SD = 182.13) or 
right hand (M = 906.13 ms; SD = 181.46) (ß = 6.97, SE = 1.01, p = .48). An additional 
analysis showed no effect of object as a fixed factor (ß = 1.05, SE = 1.12, p = .92), nor 
any interaction between object and compatibility (ß = -1.19, SE = 1.59, p = .94).
Finally, an accuracy analysis (based on the raw data) revealed that incorrect responses 
were slower (M = 1142.73 ms; SD = 364.72) than correct responses (M = 964.79 ms; 
SD = 248.72) (ß = -55.07, SE = 7.78, p < .001) (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7
Reaction Times as a function of accuracy, based on the raw, untreated data.
Discussion
Our first experiment attempted to replicate the findings of a classic paradigm by 
Tucker and Ellis (1998, exp. I), who showed that responses to a certain property of 
objects (whether they were presented in an upright or inverted orientation) were faster 
and more accurate when the object handles were oriented towards the participant’s 
responding hand. Because in these paradigms the orientation of the object handles 
is task-irrelevant, the effect is taken to suggest that appropriate motor programs are 
automatically activated upon perceiving the affordances of objects, which in turn results 
in the facilitation of compatible lateralized responses. Contrary to our expectations, we 
were unable to replicate the aforementioned effects. 
Experiment I showed that participants did not effectuate faster, or more accurate 
responses during compatible trials (i.e., handle oriented towards response hand). This 
challenges the automaticity and specificity of affordance effects. 
First, it could be that that perceiving compatible affordances may not automatically 
prime the motor system for action under all circumstances, but that certain preconditions 
may need to be met. This idea is intuitive, given that it could be inefficient if the human 
body reacted to all the affordances that may be within reach at any given moment. Yu, 
Abrams and Zacks (2014), for example, only found affordance effects when they had 
participants consciously engage in motor simulation while they were performing the 
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task (i.e., imagining using the objects). Similarly, Tipper and colleagues (2006) found 
affordance effects when participants attended to object properties that relate to action, 
such as shape, but not when they attend to action-irrelevant properties such as color.
The specificity of the primed action may also be an issue in eliciting affordance 
effects. A study by Wilf, Holmes, Schwartz and Makin (2013) suggested that graspable 
objects do activate the motor system, but this activation is general rather than body-
part specific. In their study, participants were faster in producing responses towards 
graspable than to non-graspable objects, but laterality effects emerged for both 
object types, suggesting an abstract spatial priming effect (the so-called Simon Effect 
— see Cho & Proctor, 2010; Proctor & Miles, 2014; Bub, Masson & Kumar, 2017). 
A further problem is the nature of the key-press task. Typically, handled objects should 
elicit a reach-and-grasp response, which differs in terms of both hand shape and arm 
kinematics with respect to performing horizontal key-presses when one’s fingers are 
already resting on the keys. A study by Bub and Masson (2010) showed that responses 
to color were faster when a beer mug handle was aligned with the response hand, 
but only when the responses involved grasping, as opposed to merely effectuating a 
key-press. Thus, if the simulated action (grasping) is not entirely compatible with the 
required action (pressing a key), it is likely that an affordance effect will not emerge.
Our study tried to replicate Tucker and Ellis’ as faithfully as possible. However, we must 
acknowledge that, although we used the same materials, our recreated visual dataset 
naturally differed from the original dataset. Our aim was to recreate the dataset in 
a more realistic way (e.g., color photographs, background more closely resembling 
a daily scene, etc.), thereby increasing the ecological validity of the study and — we 
had hypothesized — the strength of the effect, given that richer visual representations 
with more depth of field have proven better at eliciting affordance effects (Symes, 
Ellis & Tucker, 2007). Pappas (2014) conducted an experiment to dissociate spatial 
and affordance effects, by presenting participants photographs and silhouettes. The 
study revealed that more abstract representations (the silhouettes) gave rise to spatial 
compatibility effects, whereas photographs gave rise to affordance effects. In this 
respect, it is conceivable that Tucker and Ellis’ effects indeed stemmed from spatial 
compatibility, as their stimuli was less rich in detail (black and white transparencies) 
than more recent studies like ours, or Yu and colleagues’ (2014). 
Another issue worth discussing is that Tucker and Ellis also found that participants 
to be faster in responding with their right hand to upright stimuli, whereas we found 
the opposite: a response advantage for trials where participants were instructed 
to respond with their left hand to upright objects. We believe that this left-hand 
advantage may result from a compensating mechanism. This becomes apparent when 
we examine Figure 5, which shows a slight right-hand advantage during the first trials 
(Block 1), followed by a steep learning curve suggesting that participants got better at 
the task, but especially so when performing left-hand responses. We suggest that this 
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effect could be symptomatic of our participants being fast at generating a response 
strategy that ignored handle orientation. Future replication attempts could envision 
using eye-tracking in conjunction with the main task, to be aware of what parts of the 
objects participants try to keep their focus on. 
A related issue concerns the participants in our experiment. Although by the time 
the original study was conducted (late 1990s) the use of personal computers was 
becoming widespread, our participants were born into the digital age and have been 
constantly in contact with games and interfaces that challenge their spatial skills, 
which would perhaps make them better at developing strategies to cope with hard 
computerized tasks than the participants of former studies.
In sum, our results do not entirely disprove that motor activation occurs when in 
presence of objects that afford grasping, but they challenge the finding that these 
effects arise automatically, and (or) that they operate at the level of specific body-part 
components. Furthermore, it is questionable whether preparing for a reach-and-grasp 
action can also facilitate different actions performed with the same limb, such as key 
presses. Thus, the question is perhaps not so much whether affordance effects emerge 
when simply viewing objects, but when and how these effects emerge, and what the 
key factors are that modulate the activation of motor programs. It is still likely that 
affordance effects emerge in less constrained tasks where a specific manual response, 
such as a key-press, is not required, as it would be the case when one gestures. Hence, 
in Experiment II we test whether enhancing graspability can have an effect in speakers’ 
gestures during a language task, using a similar set-up as in Experiment I.
Experiment II
Experiment II adapted the paradigm used in Experiment I, by transforming it into a 
Director  — Matcher communication task carried out in pairs, where one participant 
assumed the role of speaker (the Director), and described the objects from Experiment 
I in all four orientations, one by one, to a second participant (the listener, Matcher). The 
listener had to search and mark each object on a grid containing pictures of all the 
items, plus two distractors. 
The aim of Experiment II was to find out whether describing objects with enhanced 
graspability — that is, with their handles oriented towards the speaker’s dominant 
hand—increased the production of iconic gestures.





The same participants that took part in experiment I were scheduled to come to the lab 
two weeks later to participate in Experiment II. With the exception of 5 students who 
canceled their participation, the remaining 37—25 female and 12 male — successfully 
completed the task with a partner of their choice. Participants were compensated 
with either course credit, or five euro. Before the experiment began, participants read 
and signed the Ethics consent form, and were informed that they could retract their 
participation anytime.
Stimuli
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment I, although both the task and 
the experimental setup were adapted (see below).
Design and procedure
Upon arrival, each participant was assigned a role by the experimenter. The participant 
who had previously taken part in Experiment I was assigned the role of the speaker 
(Director) in Experiment II, and the new participant was assigned the role of the listener 
(Matcher). 
Next, both participants took a seat facing each other. Our aim was to have a setup as 
similar as possible to that of Experiment I, where the task was displayed on a 21-inch 
computer screen in front of the participant in such a way the objects appeared life-
size. However, we also wanted speaker and addressee to keep eye contact during 
the communication task, since blocking visibility has been found to negatively affect 
gesture production (e.g., see Bavelas & Healing, 2013). Therefore, we placed the 
screen in front of the speaker at a low height, in such a way that the objects appeared 
to be within grasp, while keeping the upper body of the speaker visible to the listener 
(see Figure 8). A camera was placed behind the listener to record the speaker’s speech 
and upper bodily movements. Both participants received instructions and completed 




Graphic depiction of the experimental setup, with the Director on the right and  
the Matcher on the left.
Again, the experiment was programmed using Open Sesame (Mathôt et al., 2011). 
There were of 88 trials divided into 4 blocks (see experimental design in Figure 9). 
Each trial corresponded to the description of one object. 
Figure 9
Summary of the experimental design. Speakers described 88 items to their  
interlocutor, divided into 4 blocks. Each item appeared only once per block.  
The two experimental orders were administered alternately.
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The task of the speaker was to describe, one by one, all the objects that appeared on 
the screen. The experiment was computer-paced, so that the speaker did not need to 
interact with the computer to move to the next trial. Each trial began with a 2-second 
fixation cross, followed by a full-screen picture of the target object that remained 
visible for 14 seconds while the speaker produced a description. This duration was 
established during pilot testing. 
The 88 trials were divided into 4 blocks. The end of each block was indicated with an 
on-screen message, and there was a 20-second pause until the next block began. We 
divided the trials in blocks, first of all, so that all objects appeared evenly throughout 
the task, and, secondly, so that one object would not appear more than once per 
block. This was done to avoid that either the vertical or horizontal orientation of the 
objects would be a discriminating property when it came to describing and identifying 
the objects. Thus, speakers were told to produce concise but informative descriptions, 
but they were warned that each object only appeared once per round, therefore 
obsoleting the use of orientation information. Other than that, speakers had freedom 
to design their descriptions in any way they deemed fit, and listeners were told they 
could ask clarification questions, to encourage interaction. 
The listener received one A3 sheet per block, displaying a grid with pictures of 24 
objects: the 22 target objects, plus 2 distractors that were different for each block. 
The task of the listener was to look for each object the speaker described in the A3 
grid, and strike through each object that was referred to with a marker pen. During 
the between-blocks pause, the speaker instructed the listener to move on to the next 
grid. By the end of all 4 blocks, 8 objects remained undescribed. The participants had 
to mark the number codes corresponding to these 8 objects on answer sheet. If a pair 
completed all 4 blocks correctly, both participants entered a draw to win a 20-Euro 
voucher from a national books and electronics online store.
Data analyses
All the videos were imported into the multimodal annotation tool Elan (Wittenburg, 
Brugman, Russel, Klassmann, & Sloetjes, 2006). All descriptions were segmented and 
transcribed, word by word, by a native Dutch speaker. We included in our analyses all 
first descriptions of an object, which means we excluded clarifications prompted by 
the listener.
The first author annotated all occurring gestures. Gestures were annotated from 
preparation to retraction (McNeill, 1992) and classified as iconic or non-iconic. Iconic 
gestures depicted physical or functional characteristics of the object being talked 
about (e.g., tracing a shape, or forming a fist with the hand to indicate how an object 
is handled), whereas non-iconic gestures consisted mainly of gestures directed to 
the addressee (e.g., shrugging with the hand palms facing up), rhythmic gestures to 
emphasize words, or gestures pointing at physical objects in the room. During the 
gesture annotation phase, all the tiers containing information about the objects, their 
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vertical or horizontal orientations, were obscured, so that gesture annotation was 
performed blind to condition.
A second coder, blind to the experimental conditions, performed data annotation on 
a subset of four speakers (352 descriptions). The second coder was asked to annotate 
all occurring gestures and to classify them into iconic or non-iconic. In total, the second 
coder identified 137 gestures in all four clips — in contrast to the 132 identified by 
the first coder. A weighted Cohen’s Kappa analysis (Cohen, 1968) revealed an almost 
perfect agreement for the number of iconic gestures per description (κw = 0.91), and 
moderate agreement for non-iconic gestures (κw = 0.69). 
Statistical analyses
All statistical analyses were performed using the R Statistical Package. We conducted 
one main linear mixed model to assess the effects of vertical orientation (objects 
displayed in an upright or inverted position), horizontal orientation (objects displayed 
with their handles facing right or left) and block (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th) on iconic, and non-iconic 
gesture rate, and on the average number of words per description. Participants and 
objects were included as random effects. In sum, we expected enhanced graspability 
to increase iconic gesture production. That is, we expected participants to gesture 
more when describing the objects with the handles oriented towards their dominant, 
gesturing hand (i.e., the right).
We used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to conduct a post-hoc power analysis (F-test, 
within subjects). Our power analysis reveals a power of .84 for main effects with two 
levels (i.e., vertical orientation and horizontal orientation) aimed to test for medium 
effects (Cohen’s F = 0.25) with α set at .05, and a sample size of 37 participants. The 
power analysis for the predictor “block” (4 levels) was .95.
Results
We experienced technical difficulties with one of the video files, resulting in the loss 
of 30 descriptions from one participant. Taken together, speakers produced 3226 
descriptions, containing 1100 iconic gestures and 356 non-iconic gestures. We found 
an effect of vertical orientation on the iconic gesture rate (Figure 10), showing that 
speakers gestured more about objects displayed in an upright position (M = 3.38; 
SD = 7.99) than about objects that were upside down (M = 2.92; SD = 7.04) (ß = -.51, 
SE = .24, p = .03). This effect was not found for the average number of words spoken 
per description (upright: M = 9.46; SD = 7.16; upside down: M = 10.02; SD = 7.04; 
ß = -.24, SE = .17, p = .17) and neither for non-iconic gesture rate (upright: M = 1.41; 
SD = 5.69; upside down: M = 1.09; SD = 4.38; ß = -.3, SE = .17, p = .08).
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Iconic gesture rate as a function of vertical object orientation.
There were no effects of horizontal orientation on iconic gesture rate (left: M = 3.13; 
SD = 7.47; right: M = 3.17; SD = 7.61) (β = .03, SE = .24, p = .88) (Figure 10), non-iconic 
gesture rate (left: M = 1.26; SD = 4.9; right: M = 1.25; SD = 5.25) (ß = -.01, SE = .17, 
p = .93), or the average number of words per description (left: M = 9.69; SD = 6.75; 
right: M = 9.79; SD = 6.81) (ß = .11, SE = .17, p = .52) (Figure 11). This means that 
speakers produced roughly the same amount of gestures and of words when the 
handles of the objects were oriented towards their dominant hand, and when not. To 
rule out that the effect could be found at a more specific level, we plotted the amount 
of iconic gestures produced with each hand (see Figure 12), in case participants 
had responded to left-oriented handles with more left-hand gestures, and to right-
oriented handles with right-handed gestures. The plot roughly indicates that most 
gestures produced are right-handed, and gestures for left- and right-facing handles 
are distributed almost equally for each handedness category.
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Iconic gesture rate as a function of horizontal object orientation  






















Gesture handedness (left, right, two-handed) plotted by horizontal object orientation  
(right-oriented handle, left-oriented handle).
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Lastly, we found an effect of block on the rate of iconic gestures produced (ß = 
-3, SE = .11, p = .005) as well as on the average number of words per description 
(ß = -1.71, SE = .79, p < .005), showing that the number of gestures (Figure 13) and the 
number of words (Figure14) decreased with repeated mentions to the same objects. 
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Figure 13
Reduction in the number of gestures across trials.
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Figure 14




Even though the hand gestures produced during a conversation are often evocative of 
daily actions, the connection between gesture and action is not yet well understood. 
It has been proposed that gestures emerge from the same action generator that is 
responsible for practical actions (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2016; Kita, Alibali & Chu, 2017), and 
particularly that gestures may originate in perceptual and motoric simulations that occur 
while speakers process information for speaking (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Proving 
a causal effect of these embodied simulations on spontaneous gesture production 
poses a challenge for gesture researchers, given the multiplicity of phenomena that 
are involved in real-life interaction. 
The aim of this study was to gather empirical evidence for the claim that gestures 
emerge from simulations of perceptual and motoric content. To test this, we adapted 
a classic action-compatibility paradigm (i.e., Tucker & Ellis, 1998) and had participants 
describe 22 objects to a peer in various orientations. We compared the speakers’ 
gesture rates when they described the same objects with their handles facing towards 
the speaker’s non-dominant hand (grasping potential diminished) and towards the 
speaker’s dominant hand (grasping potential enhanced). We hypothesized that action 
would be more strongly primed when the objects were shown with their handles 
oriented towards the speaker’s dominant hand, thereby increasing the gesture rate. 
Unlike in previous studies (Masson-Carro et al., 2016; Chu & Kita, 2016), the intrinsic 
properties of the task objects were not manipulated, preventing any possible effect to 
arise from stimuli complexity or from communicative demands. 
Contrary to our main hypothesis, enhancing grasping potential did not increase the 
rate at which speakers gestured. Given that the results from Experiment I were also 
negative — we found action compatibility not to facilitate responses to stimuli — we 
tentatively conclude that enhancing object graspability failed to increase action 
activation, which in turn did not increase the chances of a gesture being produced. 
However, there are other possible explanations which we need to explore. First, one 
must consider the stimuli used in our task. Most of the objects described in the task are 
of daily use (a jug, a pan) but can and are often grasped by one’s non-dominant hand. 
For instance, while cooking it is not uncommon to hold a pan with one hand while the 
other stirs its content with the spoon. Hence, bimanual experience with objects could 
result in the simultaneous activation of reach-and-grasp programs for both hands, 
which could possibly explain why no effect was found. 
Another possibility is that handle orientation influenced gestures at a more specific 
level — i.e., that lateralized motor plans were activated. We examined the amount of 
left- and right-hand gestures in response to handles facing left or right (recall Figure 
12), but the graphs showed that participants did not gesture more with their left hand 
when they viewed left-facing handles and with their right hand when they viewed 
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right-facing handles. Hence, participants were not primed to produce gestures that 
were laterally compatible with handle orientation either.
In sum, our results show that enhancing the grasping potential of an object does not 
necessarily result in more gesturing or in the production of gestures that are laterally 
compatible with the object handles. Past research has shown that speakers gesture 
more when they describe objects rated high — as opposed to low — in manipulability 
(e.g., Pine et al., 2010; Masson-Carro et al., 2016; 2017). It is possible that these 
results stem from communicative reasons, for instance because showing the function 
of an object to an addressee facilitates object identification. Or, more simply, that 
manipulable objects afford a larger range of manual depiction strategies than non-
manipulable objects (e.g., not just depicting shape and size, but also function), which 
could in general lead to more gesturing. 
It is still a possibility that gestures arise from simulations of perceptuomotor content, 
but that these occur in different circumstances than those given during our task. 
For instance, speakers could experience stronger activation of the motor system 
when consciously performing mental imagery (e.g., image transformation), or when 
inferring functional information from objects to generate a description, than when 
producing fast-paced descriptions in response to very similar stimuli, as was the case 
in Experiment II. In other words, it is likely that top-down action activation plays a larger 
role in determining gesturing behavior, than bottom-up activation (which is what the 
current paradigm aimed to elicit).
One further way to disentangle whether more gestures in response to manipulable 
objects are produced because of cognitive or communicative reasons could be to 
implement a visibility paradigm to explore whether an effect of handle orientation 
emerges when visibility between speaker and addressee has been blocked. In the 
past, visibility studies have shown that when speaker and addressee can’t see each 
other, their gesture rate diminishes (see Bavelas & Healing, 2013, for a review). In 
this context, visibility can be used experimentally to separate those gestures whose 
primary aim is explicitly to communicate to an addressee, from cognitively “for-the-
self” produced gestures. If speakers still produced more gestures for manipulable 
objects when visibility was obscured (thus, when gestures would communicate little 
to an addressee), it would constitute quite solid evidence for the GSA claim that some 
gestures emerge from action plans and are difficult to suppress.
Experiment II yielded two noteworthy results. Participants gestured more when 
describing objects shown in an upright, as opposed to an upside-down position. This 
was an unexpected, yet interesting finding. First of all, one could think that speakers 
would gesture more about upside down objects simply because they deviate from 
the norm and provide a very clear cue to the addressee for identification, or because 
building an upright mental image of an object is cognitively costly, in which case 
speakers could use more gestures to facilitate the cognitive operation (Melinger & 
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Kita, 2007; Chu & Kita, 2011). As far as we are aware, there are no antecedents of 
speakers gesturing more to upright objects in the gesture literature. Our results could 
suggest that objects that are placed upside down are often more difficult to grab (e.g., 
think of an iron), and do not immediately afford carrying out the object’s conventional 
function — e.g., containing liquid in the case of a jug or pot. Upright objects could 
therefore have elicited an affordance effect, perhaps even more strongly than handle 
orientation. We remain cautious with respect to this interpretation.
Also noteworthy was the effect of “block” on gesture rate. Block referred to whether 
speakers described an object for the first, second, third or fourth time, regardless 
of the particular orientation of the object in each of these blocks. Past research 
has shown that, in dialogue settings, when speakers refer several times to a same 
entity, their speech becomes shorter (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), less articulatorily 
precise (Bard et al., 2000) and contains fewer semantic attributes (Masson-Carro, 
Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2016b), presumably because the increase in shared knowledge 
between speaker and addressee results in less information being necessary to reach 
understanding. However, the question whether speech-accompanying gestures also 
become less frequent and precise in repeated descriptions of objects has yielded 
mixed results (e.g., Holler, Tutton & Wilkin, 2011; Galati & Brennan, 2014; Hoetjes, 
Koolen, Goudbeek, Krahmer & Swerts, 2015). This study showed not only a decline 
in the number of words uttered per description across blocks, but also a decrease of 
the gesture rate. Taking into account that gesture rate has already been normalized 
by how many words speakers uttered per description, we conclude that the use of 
gestures was reduced more drastically throughout the task than the amount of words. 
This relatively steep decline may be due to the non-demanding nature of the task and 
to the flexibility of gestures as communicative devices. 
Conclusion
This paper reported two experiments exploring action compatibility effects in a non-
communicative as well as in a communicative task. Experiment I found no evidence 
supporting the claim that participants effectuate faster responses when reacting to 
objects whose handles are oriented towards the responding hand, thereby failing to 
replicate the original findings by Tucker and Ellis (1998, exp. 1). Our results revealed a 
learning effect: participants became faster at the task overtime, and the learning was 
steeper for left hand responses to upright objects. We hypothesized that participants 
were fast at generating a task resolution strategy that was able to ignore handle 
orientation. This should be addressed in future investigations, perhaps with the aid of 
eye-tracking technologies exploring where the participant’s visual attention is directed 
to during the completion of the task.
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According to the Gestures as Simulated Action (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), the likelihood 
of producing a representational gesture will depend on three factors: the strength 
of a simulated action or perception, the level of the gesture threshold (sensitive to 
cognitive and contextual factors), and the simultaneous engagement of the vocal 
apparatus for speaking. In Experiment II we sought to manipulate the first variable 
only (action activation), by enhancing the grasping potential of a series of objects to 
be described by speakers. Our results revealed no effects of handle orientation on 
gesturing frequency, which is consistent with and extends the findings of Experiment 
I. Interestingly, however, we found that speakers gestured more when describing 
upright objects, which — as far as we know — is a novel insight in the gesture literature, 
and could be taken as evidence that canceling an affordance by turning an object 
upside down results in less gesturing about said object.
In conclusion, this paper doesn’t disprove action-compatibility effects altogether, but 
it challenges the ubiquity and power of such effects, and emphasizes the need to 
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This dissertation took an embodied cognition perspective to investigate one of the 
most prevailing but least understood aspects of communication: the hand gestures 
we spontaneously produce when we talk to others. Our goal was to better understand 
two fundamental aspects of manual gestures, namely the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying gesture production (how gestures come to be), and the factors motivating 
the selection of particular iconic strategies to depict meaning (how gestures come to 
bear meaning). 
To this aim, we conducted a series of four empirical studies designed to tap into the 
relationship between action and gesture using a variety of experimental methods 
(referential paradigms, stimuli norming studies, perception tests or reaction times’ 
tasks). This final chapter provides a summary of the main empirical findings, along with 
a brief discussion of the theoretical implications of our work. 
Outline of the main findings
The influence of object affordances on gesture production  
(Chapter 2)
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, laid the foundations of the work conducted 
throughout this dissertation, by testing the main claim made by the Gestures as 
Simulated Action framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) that simulations of action are 
essentially what underlies the production of gestures. If this is true, speakers should 
produce more gestures when faced with objects that they can manipulate than with 
objects that they cannot. And, arguably more importantly, their gestures should inherit 
aspects of the mental simulations resulting from the manipulable objects.
To test this, we created a communication game that introduced participants to a 
fictitious scenario where they had to describe objects to a peer, who should find and 
mark them on their “shopping list”. We disguised this classic referential paradigm as a 
game to increase spontaneity and dialog between interactants. The key manipulation 
was applied to the stimuli that had to be described, which consisted of pictures of 
kitchen objects and furnishings rated high and low in manipulability. When compiling 
and testing the stimuli dataset, we ensured that all the objects were easy to name, and 
rated equitably in term of their visual complexity. We then analyzed all the gestures 
produced by speakers during the communication task, and classified them into 
representational and non-representational. All representational gestures were further 
analyzed in terms of the iconic form of the gesture used (following Müller, 1998). 
Our findings supported the GSA claims by showing that speakers produced more 
gestures when describing manipulable than when describing non-manipulable 




across conditions. This suggests that perceiving highly manipulable objects does not 
give rise to general movement activation, but activates motor plans that are specific 
and compatible with the ways objects are held and operated (cf., Bub & Masson, 2006; 
Bub et al., 2003). Our analysis of representation techniques corroborated this idea by 
showing that manipulable objects were most often represented with action gestures that 
demonstrated how the objects are used, and non-manipulable objects with molding 
gestures that gave away information about shape and size. This is an important finding 
because it offers a starting point for addressing a severely understudied question 
in gesture research: how do speakers select a particular strategy to manually depict 
objects? Our results suggest that this process is not random, that there is consistency 
across gesturers when it comes to using their hands to build knowledge, and that 
the affordances of objects are an important constraining factor in the iconic strategy 
selection process. These findings are in line with more recent, related studies (e.g., 
van Nispen et al., 2017; Ortega & Özyürek, 2016) which also show a bias for action 
gestures in different communication tasks.
How task complexity and the visual context impact gesturing  
(Chapter 3)
In the first study (Chapter 2), our stimuli consisted of images of objects. Could this 
factor have influenced our results? Earlier gesture studies often included verbal-only 
(Hostetter, 2014) or visual-only stimuli (e.g., Pine, Gurney & Fletcher, 2010), but rarely 
compared the two. A similar point can be made about the freedom given to speakers: 
often, in referential paradigms, speakers must avoid naming the target objects directly 
— and while it is certainly true that we cannot always recall the names of objects, it is 
generally not the usual state-of-affairs. Taking into account these concerns, Chapter 
3 investigated the effects of referent modality (whether referents were presented as 
words or pictures) and task complexity (whether speakers were allowed to or prevented 
from naming referents) on gesture production during a description task similar to the 
paradigm used in Chapter 2.
Our results, first of all, successfully replicated the manipulability findings obtained 
in our first study, and these effects were independent of referent modality and task 
complexity. This conceptual replication was performed using a larger and more varied 
dataset than the one used in Chapter 2, adding extra validity and generalizability to 
our original findings.
 
The study yielded several additional findings, the most noteworthy being that in simple 
description tasks, speakers relied more on perceptual features (e.g., shape, size) when 
they gesturally depicted objects they could see, and on conceptual features (e.g., 
function) when they gesturally depicted objects that they had to imagine based on 
a verbal referent. Altogether, our second study showed that what is available in the 
immediate visual context while we talk to another person, and how much effort we 
put into designing our communication message, influences not only how much we 
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gesture but also how we “choose” particular iconic strategies to express information 
(e.g., what we gesture about).
The comprehension of action and shape iconic strategies  
(Chapter 4)
The first two studies thus suggest that there is a strong connection between the function 
of objects and how speakers gesture about them. Is this bias towards action mirrored 
in gesture comprehension? According to recent research (Ping, Goldin-Meadow & 
Beilock, 2014), the motor system could play a role in gesture comprehension: watching 
someone gesture is likely to cause simulations of action in the perceiver, which could 
in turn facilitate the comprehension of such gestures. If so, we would expect gestures 
that strongly depict practical actions to be more readily mapped to their referents, 
in comparison to gestures that depict perceptual qualities such as size and shape. 
In Chapter 4 we tested this hypothesis with a perception study where participants 
were primed with action or shape gestures, and had to determine whether they were 
related to a potential referent (a tool). We wanted to go one step further than classic 
perception studies, and assess gesture comprehension on two levels: processing 
times and accuracy. Our results revealed that action gestures were at a cognitive and 
communicative advantage with respect to shape gestures: they were mapped to their 
referent faster and more accurately, both in a forced-choice task (Experiment I) and in an 
open-choice task (Experiment II). Furthermore, our study revealed a picture advantage 
effect: mapping gestures to pictures was faster (but not more accurate) than mapping 
gestures to words, which aligns with the similarities found in the semantic processing 
of gestures and other representations like photographs (Wu & Coulson, 2011). 
For the sake of simplicity, this study dealt exclusively with highly manipulable objects 
(e.g., tools). It is a possibility that, for less manipulable objects, action gestures might 
not activate the right concepts and would be perceived as disadvantageous (e.g., 
an “eating” gesture produced to depict the object “plate”). Our production studies 
(Chapters 2 & 3) showed that objects low in manipulability were more often depicted 
with gestures expressing perceptual features (e.g., shape). This means that for these 
objects, shape gestures could be at a processing advantage. However, whether this 
is the case, or whether action gestures have a general facilitation effect on referent 
recognition is an issue that remains to be tackled in further investigations beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
Exploring affordance compatibility effects in gesture production  
(Chapter 5)
Although the evidence that speakers gesture more when they simulate action as a 
consequence of perceiving objects with strong affordances is compelling, it remains 
somewhat circumstantial. Chapter 5 constitutes our last empirical study, and attempts 
to establish a more causal link between perceiving object affordances and gesturing. 
After all, given that action gestures are judged to better represent manipulable objects 




more often, to help their addressees. This could have especially increased gesture 
rates for manipulable objects, simply because their gestural representation (i.e., 
demonstrating function) is easier.
Our goal in Chapter 5 was to find affordance effects on gesture production by 
highlighting the affordances of objects without varying the intrinsic properties of such 
objects (that is, without including different object categories as we did in the previous 
chapters). To this aim, we adapted a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm to the 
study of gestures. This paradigm has shown that responses to stimuli are performed 
faster when the participant’s body is optimally positioned to exploit the affordances 
of objects. A seminal study by Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed that participants were 
faster to execute responses to objects with handles (is this object upright or upside 
down?) when the handles of such objects were oriented towards the responding hand. 
In Chapter 5, we conducted two studies: first, we sought to replicate the original 
finding by Tucker and Ellis with updated materials (Experiment I); then, we adapted 
this paradigm to the study of gestures, by having the same right-handed participants 
describe handled objects in different positions to a peer: upright and upside down 
(to be consistent with the first experiment), and with their handles oriented to the 
right (grasping potential enhanced) or to the left (grasping potential diminished) 
(Experiment II). We expected that when handles would be oriented towards the 
speaker’s dominant hand, they would produce more gestures.
Our results were surprising in a number of ways. First, we did not replicate the original 
findings by Tucker and Ellis (1998) claiming that responses would be faster when 
the hand of the participant was aligned with the object’s handle. We still conducted 
the gesture task to check whether affordance effects could arise in less constrained 
settings. However, consistent with the absence of effects in the replication, participants 
did not produce more gestures when grasping potential was enhanced. Naturally, 
these findings do not disprove the idea that action simulations are causally connected 
to the production of gestures. What they do is challenge the ubiquity and automaticity 
of such activation effects altogether, although clearly this topic warrants further 
investigation. 
We did find one unexpected effect: objects in their natural upright position were 
gestured about more than objects shown upside down, which — as far as we know — is 
a new insight in the gesture literature, and could indicate that canceling an affordance 




Given that each of the individual chapters already included a detailed discussion 
of the findings of that chapter, here we limit ourselves to a discussion of the two 
overarching theoretical issues: whether gestures arise from embodied actions (how 
gestures come to be), and if so, how this relates to manual iconicity (how gestures 
come to bear meaning).
The cognitive mechanisms underlying gesture production 
(how gestures come to be)
The findings presented in this dissertation are compatible with the idea that action 
simulations underlie the production of co-speech gestures (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). 
Our results have shown that representational gestures are affected by the degree of 
action potential evoked by their referents, both in terms of their production rate and 
semantic content (Chapters 2 & 3). Furthermore, this relationship appears to go both 
ways, with gestures that depict action — compared with gestures that depict shape 
— having a facilitatory effect on tool recognition and leading to better identification 
scores in closed and open-ended tasks (Chapter 4).
Our attempt to establish a more causal link between action simulations and gesture 
production was, however, not as successful (Chapter 5, Experiment II). We think that 
these results do not speak against the link between action simulation and gesturing, 
but do challenge the idea that affordances inescapably initiate action plans in humans. 
According to Gibson (1986), the affordances in the environment are automatically 
perceived, and predispose humans for action. A more nuanced view, however, is 
that affordances are subjective and that their processing is influenced by top-down 
cognitive processes (Borghi, 2015; Borghi & Riggio, 2015). In addition, one must also 
consider the type of affordances being elicited. Previous research has highlighted that 
there are at least two types of object affordances, and each type might be processed 
differently. Bub and colleagues (Bub, Masson & Bukach, 2003; Bub, Masson & Cree, 
2008) distinguish between volumetric affordances of objects that are associated with 
how-to knowledge (how to touch, move or lift an object) and functional affordances of 
objects associated with what-for knowledge (how to operate a specific object). Their 
research showed that volumetric affordances may become automatically activated 
upon seeing objects in a way that resonates with Gibson’s original theory (their 
processing following a bottom-up, perceptual, directionality), whereas functional 
affordances are not always evoked by seeing objects, because function is semantically 
encoded as part of objects’ concepts and needs to be inferred in a top-down manner. In 
other words, there are different routes to action activation as a consequence of seeing 
or thinking about objects (Yoon, Heinke & Humphreys, 2002; Buxbaum & Kalenine, 
2010; Borghi & Riggio, 2015; Chua, Bub, Masson & Gauthier, 2017), which may give 




of action plans (responding to the structure or to the functions of objects) are often 
activated simultaneously, and we would like to argue they are both reflected in the 
gestures produced by speakers. 
We would like to suggest that bottom-up induced action activation (Chapter 5) may 
have a weaker effect on gesturing than semantically-mediated simulation (Chapters 2 
& 3). Although this notion requires proper scientific testing, we would like to illustrate 
it with some suggestive examples from our empirical studies. 
First of all, linguistic tasks where the semantic system is engaged are likely to recruit 
stable object affordances such as canonical object use, and thus functional information 
may “win” over basic manipulation information (Borghi & Riggio, 2015). Our studies 
in Chapters 2 & 3 have shown strong affordance effects, but these presumably derive 
from having objects with different semantic characteristics (i.e., a function that involves 
direct manipulation of the object, or not), and it is these semantically-guided action 
simulations during message planning which may increase gesturing in speakers. On 
the other hand, in Chapter 5 all the objects belonged to a single semantic category 
(tools with a clear function) and what changed was the depicted orientation of the 
object, in such a way that it would, in one of the conditions, facilitate object use if one 
were to directly interact with the stimuli. In other words, Chapter 5 sought for a bottom-
up affordance effect that may have been too subtle or too irrelevant to differentially 
engage the motor system and enhance gesturing during a linguistic task. 
Another potential source of evidence for a dual activation route stems from Chapter 3 
of this dissertation. In this chapter, we had speakers complete a language production 
task with the stimuli presented as words or as pictures. Our results showed that 
speakers produced more gestures in the pictorial condition, which could be because 
(a) images are rich in detail and there is simply more information susceptible to be 
gesturally encoded, but also b() because both volumetric (touching) and functional 
(using) affordances become active, in combination leading to more gesturing. Our 
representation technique analyses corroborated this idea, by showing that function 
was depicted in gesture more often when speakers had attended to words, and 
volumetric properties of objects were more often depicted in the visual condition, 
mostly by means of shape-molding gestures that are suggestive of the exploration 
and touching of objects.
Throughout this dissertation we have suggested that gestures arise from simulated 
embodied action, but we would like to reiterate here that this is not the sole process 
involved in gesture production. The power of gestures resides in their flexibility, and to 
say that gestures are manifestations of (often unconscious) simulations seems limiting at 
best, almost as if speakers had no control at all over the gestures they produce. Instead, 
speakers adapt their gestures to incorporate what’s available in their immediate visual 
context, as well as to meet task demands (Chapter 3). This is compatible with the idea of 
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a gesture threshold (Hostetter & Alibali, pp. 504-505) that regulates which simulations 
will result in overt movement depending on cognitive and communicative factors. We 
do believe that such a regulatory mechanism indeed exists, but feel that its modus 
operandi is still understudied. Several questions can be asked about the functioning 
of a gesture threshold. To begin with, we could ask what the exact role of the threshold 
is: Is it a fixed barrier that controls for the amount of simulations that will make it into 
gestures, or is this barrier in some way “sensitive” to the content of gestures? The GSA 
hypothesizes that the gesture threshold “may be thought of as being something that 
speakers can raise or lower depending on how beneficial they feel gesture would be 
to their communicative goals and to the listener’s needs” (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, 
p. 505). So, if communicative factors simply lift or lower the threshold, how can we 
account for the tailoring of gestures to meet specific communicative needs (e.g., a 
situation where a shape gesture could be more useful than an action gesture)? Do 
gestures make it through the threshold only because they germinate in stronger action 
simulations, or also because of their potential communicative fit in a given situation?
Perhaps, speakers are to a certain extent aware of what kind of gestures might “work” 
better to express something in a given context, and this knowledge may implicitly bias 
their simulations as they formulate a communicative message. This is compatible with 
our finding in Chapter 4 that addressees have a clear intuition about what gesture 
types are suitable to depict referents. This may be based on their prior experience 
or familiarity with objects, and even on their prior experience with particular gesture 
types (e.g., having been successful or unsuccessful at explaining related concepts in 
the past). We hypothesize that, upon visualizing or thinking about a particular topic, 
multiple affordances may become activated, and that top-down processes select one 
(or more) of these based on suitability and context, and push it into a motor plan 
(following Borghi and Riggio, 2015). When speakers tailor the content of an utterance, 
to better meet a communication goal or because there has been a misunderstanding 
and a rephrasing is needed, these gestures could be seen as reflective of mentally 
approaching a “problem” from several angles. In other words, thinking about how to 
best explain an idea to somebody may give rise to different simulations associated 
with the tentative explanations visited by the speaker, resulting in gestures of different 
nature and form. This would mean that gestures are still very flexible as representational 
tools, but their production need not be very taxing on the speaker, which might explain 
why oftentimes speakers report not even being aware of having produced them (e.g., 
Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012).
We would like to conclude this paragraph a short note about other gesture types. 
Embodied accounts offer a neat explanation for representational gesture production, 
but what about different spontaneous co-speech gesture types, such as beats or 
pragmatic gestures that regulate the flow of an interaction? Our studies have shown 
that only representational gestures were affected by object manipulability (Chapters 
2 & 3) but not non-representational gestures. Chu and Kita (2016) hypothesize that 




However, we would like to argue that it is also conceivable that beat gestures are 
influenced by sensorial simulations, albeit of a different kind (i.e., not practical action). 
For instance, rhythmic-like simulations that become active whilst hearing oneself speak 
and that are associated to prosody (e.g., simulations of music beats or soundwaves). 
Likewise, pragmatic gestures can be seen, metaphorically, as mappings of human 
exchanges such as giving and taking. We think it would be fruitful to explore these 
ideas in more detail, since they might lead to a more integrated explanation of how 
gestures come about.
The selection of particular iconic strategies 
(how gestures come to bear meaning)
Throughout this dissertation, we have analyzed the different ways in which speakers use 
iconicity to gesturally depict objects, with the goal of establishing what motivates the 
use of specific iconic forms. One of our important findings can be read only between 
the lines—namely, the consistency found within and across our studies regarding 
speaker’s preferred depiction techniques (see also Van Nispen et al., 2017; Ortega 
et al., 2016 for similar observations albeit in different contexts). Our data showed that, 
at least in referential communication, handling gestures where speakers demonstrate 
object use, and molding gestures where they sculpt the object’s shape are the two 
most commonly used types of iconicity. When we looked closer into the data, we 
discovered that this preference seemed to be further constrained by object type, with 
manipulable objects eliciting mostly handling gestures and non-manipulable objects 
eliciting mostly molding gestures (Chapters 2 & 3). Our comprehension studies 
offered a mirrored picture of these results, with action (handling) gestures resulting in 
faster and more accurate tool identification than shape gestures. 
These findings have lead us to theorize about the emergence of iconic signs in 
gesturing, a topic that — in our opinion — has not received sufficient scholarly attention. 
To quote Jürgen Streeck (2008, p. 285), “it is not evident how two hands can “be 
like” or “look like” such diverse phenomena as swimming-pools, polka-dots, or an 
acrobat’s routine, to name some random phenomena that gesturing hands can depict 
for us”. And to that, we would like to add that it is not evident either how speakers 
decide among all the possible ways hands can “be like” or “look like” polka-dots and 
swimming-pools.
Throughout this dissertation, we have contended that iconicity is tightly linked to 
embodiment. The way in which hands act as or look like the referents they portray 
could be achieved by virtue of simulations of past bodily experiences. This not only 
includes experience with object use, as shown in this thesis, but it extends to any 
manual experience with the world: from the sensory patterns associated to simple 
object manipulation (for instance their texture, or their weight on our hands as we 
transport them) to our experiences as builders and creators of form (e.g., making a 
snowman, carving on wood or taking things apart). Similarly, the amount and variety 
of bodily experiences accrued may allow us to generate simulations related to objects 
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we may not have experienced before, like igloos or guillotines. In this sense, many of 
the gestural patterns we observe may be reconstructed in this way: handling gestures 
may arise from simulations of utilizing objects; molding gestures may emerge from 
simulations of exploring surfaces and feeling textures; tracing gestures may arise 
from the action of drawing on surfaces, either with the fingers or with tools; placing 
gestures may arise from displacing objects, mounting and dismounting; and even 
those gestures where a body part “embodies” an object or element (e.g., when a hand 
“becomes” a book, or a wave) could be rooted in action simulations, and may be no 
different from other enactments where a speaker embodies a living character such as 
a fellow human being or cat, so long there is a structural similarity that allows for such 
a simulation. 
Earlier, we asked how a simulation-based gesture model can explain the tailoring of 
particular gestures to meet a goal, for instance when speakers modify their gestures 
after an episode of miscommunication (Hoetjes, Krahmer & Swerts, 2015). It became 
clear when analyzing the video data collected in Chapters 2 and 3, that speakers 
would often entirely “rephrase” their gestures if their addressee was not able to guess 
or locate the object described, by using a different technique or describing a different 
aspect of the object. If gestures derive from simulations that are not always conscious, 
how might this selection and tailoring process be explained? In other words, how does 
the simulation account fit in with the notion of communicative intent? This brings us 
back to the mechanism we proposed in the previous section, which we believe may 
apply to the adoption of particular iconic strategies. In short, we hypothesized that 
several compatible simulations may take place as speakers plan their communicative 
message and monitor their visual environment (simulations that could eventually lead 
to different iconic strategies), and a regulatory mechanism may help select which 
ones will be realized as gestures. This regulatory mechanism might be understood 
as a set of multiple pressures with different weights that act in parallel to push down 
certain simulations and prevent them from reaching the gesture threshold, and from 
becoming overt motor plans. One of the factors that carries most weight, as pointed 
by Hostetter and Alibali (2008), is the communicative intent of a speaker in a particular 
situation. The stronger the communicative intent, the more “consciously” a speaker may 
command their use of gestures. This perspective allows us to view the use of iconicity 
in a new light, namely as being both automatic and intentional (Campisi & Mazzone, 
2016). This is compatible with earlier proposals on the origins of iconic forms. For 
example, Taub (2001) proposes a model to account for how iconic signs are created 
that relies on several complex processes, such as retrieving a concept, activating a 
suitable modal representation, schematizing salient features, and encoding them into 
movement. The important thing to note about this model, as clarified by Taub herself 
(p. 44), is that the stages proposed do not necessarily represent a sequence: they 
may be viewed as sets of constrains that synchronously act to shape gestures. In line 
with this, we argue that the creation of spontaneous iconic co-speech gestures is a 
flexible process that need not follow a sequential order, and that is highly facilitated by 




explanation could help account for gestures as flexible and powerful representations 
that are also cognitively feasible.
Conclusion
This dissertation has been, in its entirety, devoted to the understanding of gestures, 
their cognitive origins, and how they create meaning. Investigating these issues is not 
easy. It often requires a leap of faith, as we analyze the visible (the behavior) to infer 
the invisible (the cognition). We hope to have shown, however, that taking this leap is 
feasible and pays off. In our studies, we have found that there is a strong connection 
between the actions we perform daily, and the gestures we produce when we speak, 
and we have suggested that simulation could be the mechanism that confers gestures 
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This dissertation took an embodied cognition perspective to investigate one of the 
most prevailing but least understood aspects of communication: the hand gestures 
we spontaneously produce when we talk to others. Our goal was to better understand 
two fundamental aspects of manual gestures, namely the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying gesture production (how gestures come to be), and the factors motivating 
the selection of particular iconic strategies to depict meaning (how gestures come to 
bear meaning). To this aim, we conducted four empirical studies designed to tap into 
the relationship between action and gesture using a variety of experimental methods 
(referential paradigms, stimuli norming studies, perception tests and reaction times’ 
tasks). 
Our first study, reported in Chapter 2, laid the foundations of the work conducted 
throughout this dissertation, by testing a central claim made by the Gestures as 
Simulated Action framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) that simulations of action give 
rise to gesturing. If this is true, speakers should produce more gestures when faced 
with objects that they can manipulate than with objects that they cannot. And, perhaps 
more importantly, these gestures should to a certain extent “look like” the mental 
simulations they arose from.
To test this, we created a communication game that introduced participants to 
a fictitious scenario where they had to describe objects to each other, who should 
find and mark them on their “shopping list”. We disguised this classic referential 
paradigm as a game to increase spontaneity and dialog between interactants. The key 
manipulation was applied to the stimuli that had to be described, which consisted of 
pictures of objects rated, respectively, as high and low in manipulability, expecting that 
objects that could be manipulated would result into more gestures. We then analyzed 
all the gestures produced by speakers during the communication task and classified 
them into representational and non-representational. Representational gestures 
receive their name because they illustrate or “represent” objects, often by depicting 
their form or movement (e.g., tracing the contour of a house with our index finger). 
After we did this, all representational gestures were further analyzed in terms of the 
iconic form of the gesture used (following Müller, 1998). 
Our findings supported the GSA claims by showing that speakers produced more 
representational gestures when describing manipulable than when describing non-
manipulable objects. Importantly, non-representational gesture rate did not differ 
across conditions. This suggests that perceiving highly manipulable objects does not 
give rise to general movement activation but activates specific motor plans that are 
compatible with the ways objects are held and operated (cf., Bub & Masson, 2006; 
Bub et al., 2003). Our analysis of representation techniques corroborated this idea by 
showing that manipulable objects were most often represented with action gestures 
that demonstrated how the objects were used, and that non-manipulable objects 
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were represented with molding gestures that gave away information about their 
shape and size. This is an important finding because it provided us with a starting point 
to address a severely understudied question in gesture research: how do speakers 
select a particular strategy to manually depict objects? Our results suggested that this 
process is not random, but that there is consistency across gesturers when it comes 
to using their hands to express knowledge, and that the affordances of objects are an 
important constraining factor in the iconic strategy selection process. 
Chapter 3 extended these findings by investigating the effects of referent modality 
(whether referents were presented as words or pictures) and task complexity 
(whether speakers were allowed to or prevented from naming referents) on gesture 
production during a description task. Our results, first of all, successfully replicated 
the manipulability findings obtained in Chapter 2, and these effects were found to be 
independent of referent modality and task complexity. This conceptual replication was 
performed using a larger and more varied dataset than the one used in Chapter 2, 
adding extra validity to our original findings and showing their generalizability. 
The study yielded several additional findings, the most noteworthy being that in 
simple description tasks, speakers relied more on perceptual features (e.g., shape, 
size) when they gesturally depicted objects they could see, and on conceptual features 
(e.g., function) when they gesturally depicted objects that they had to imagine based 
on a verbal referent (i.e., a word on a screen). Altogether, our second study showed 
that what is available in the immediate visual context while we talk to another person, 
and how much effort we put into designing our communication message, influences 
how much we gesture and how we “choose” particular iconic strategies to express 
information (e.g., what we gesture about).
The first two studies thus suggested a strong connection between the function of 
objects and how speakers gesture about them. Is this bias towards action mirrored 
in gesture comprehension? According to recent research (Ping, Goldin-Meadow 
& Beilock, 2014), the motor system could play a role in gesture comprehension: 
watching someone gesture is likely to cause simulations of the actions seen by the 
perceiver, which could in turn facilitate the comprehension of such gestures. If so, 
we would expect gestures that strongly depict practical actions to be more readily 
mapped to their referents, in comparison to gestures that depict perceptual qualities 
such as size and shape. In Chapter 4 we tested this hypothesis with a perception study 
where participants were primed with action or shape gestures and had to determine 
whether they were related to a potential referent (a tool). We wanted to go one step 
further than classic gesture perception work and assess gesture comprehension on 
two levels: processing times and accuracy. Our results revealed that action gestures 
were at a cognitive and communicative advantage with respect to shape gestures: 
they were mapped to their referent faster and more accurately, both in a forced-
choice task (Experiment I) and in an open-choice task (Experiment II). Furthermore, 
our study revealed a picture advantage effect: mapping gestures to pictures was 
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faster (but not more accurate) than mapping gestures to words, which aligns with the 
similarities found in the semantic processing of gestures and other representations 
like photographs (Wu & Coulson, 2011). 
Although the evidence that speakers gesture more when they simulate action as a 
consequence of perceiving objects with strong affordances is compelling, it remains 
somewhat indirect. Chapter 5 attempted to establish a more causal link between 
perceiving object affordances and gesturing. Our goal was to find affordance effects 
on gesture production by highlighting the affordances of objects without varying 
the intrinsic properties of such objects (that is, without including different object 
categories as we did in the previous chapters). To this aim, we adapted a stimulus-
response compatibility paradigm to the study of gestures. This paradigm has shown in 
the past that responses to stimuli are performed faster when the participant’s body is 
optimally positioned to exploit the affordances of objects. A seminal study by Tucker 
and Ellis (1998) showed that participants were faster to execute responses to objects 
with handles (is this object upright or upside down?) when the handles of such objects 
were oriented towards the responding hand. 
We conducted two studies: first, we sought to replicate the original finding by Tucker 
and Ellis with updated materials (Experiment I); then, we adapted this paradigm to 
the study of gestures, by having the same right-handed participants describe handled 
objects in different positions to a peer: upright and upside down (to be consistent with 
the first experiment), and with their handles oriented to the right (grasping potential 
enhanced) or to the left (grasping potential diminished) (Experiment II). We expected 
that when handles would be oriented towards the speaker’s dominant hand, they 
would produce more gestures.
Our results were surprising in a number of ways. First, we did not replicate the original 
findings by Tucker and Ellis (1998) claiming that responses would be faster when 
the hand of the participant was aligned with the object’s handle. We still conducted 
the gesture task to check whether affordance effects could arise in less constrained 
settings. However, consistent with the absence of effects in the replication, participants 
did not produce more gestures when grasping potential was enhanced. While these 
findings do not disprove the idea that action simulations are causally connected to 
the production of gestures, they do challenge the ubiquity and automaticity of such 
activation effects. We did find one other unexpected effect: objects in their natural 
upright position were gestured about more than objects shown upside down, which—
as far as we are aware—was a new insight in the gesture literature and could indicate 
that canceling an affordance by turning an object upside down results in less gestures 
about the object.
In sum, the findings presented in this dissertation revealed a strong connection 
between the actions we perform daily, and the gestures we produce when we speak, 
and are thus compatible with the idea that action simulations underlie the production 
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of co-speech gestures (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Chapter 6 discussed the theoretical 
implications of this body of work and sought to highlight the link between embodied 
cognition and iconicity in the visuo-manual modality, along with tackling remaining 
issues such as the role of communicative intent in gesture production, or the nature of 
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I have played this scene so many times in my head — me, done, writing the words you 
are about to read — that now that the time has come, I am overwhelmed with confusion 
as to where to begin. “Acknowledgements” is usually my favorite part of every PhD 
thesis, the one that I read multiple times, whether I know the person who wrote it, 
or not. The one that reflects the journey, the pain, the happiness, the evolution, the 
catharsis. The pressure is real and, let´s be honest, I am terrified to forget anyone here 
today.
A lot has happened — so much — from the early days when I was an ignorant soul who 
believed “Elsevier” to be the unfortunate misspelling of a famous shampoo brand, 
and who thought academic journals paid authors for their contributions (Can you 
imagine?). I am endlessly proud of the journey I decided to embark back in 2010, 
when I accidentally stumbled upon a Paul Ekman’s book, and decided that I would go 
out there and earn a PhD in psychology. Today, I can say: I made it!
This, of course, would have never happened without the support of my ever-loving 
parents, of Florian and his family (who are now my family too), and of all the friends, 
colleagues and mentors that have helped me along the way, with their wise words or 
simply with some, or a lot of wise wine. I would like to dedicate a few lines to each of 
you.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Emiel and Martijn, for being open, 
accessible, humble, honest and witty. I cannot emphasize enough how blessed I 
feel that you were my mentors. You have been a source of inspiration to me from an 
intellectual standpoint, and you became true role models to me as to what a healthy 
work-life balance should look like. Our meetings were always a lot of fun and often the 
highlight of the week. I will miss those very much (already do!). You also gave me a lot 
of freedom to follow my own path. In retrospect, this could have gone terribly wrong, 
but I know that if it had, you would have been quick to pick me up and have me try 
again. Thank you for everything! And thanks, Martijn, for all the train rides where you 
had work to do and I had way too many questions for you. 
I’m thankful to have stood here today backed by two beautiful, intelligent, talented 
extraordinary women: my paranymphs Marieke and Mariana. Marieke, I should have 
talked to you more, earlier on! I feel like I gained a friend when I was too close to 
leaving, and this is both a beautiful thing (making a friend, that is) but also somewhat 
sad. I will miss planning conference trips together or catching up in some Nijmegen 
café. 
Mariana, who knew that we would be headed in the same post-PhD path! I just wanted 
to tell you that I always felt connected to you, I guess because of both of us being 
peninsular beings and partly sharing cultural traditions. I admire you for being such 
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a creative soul and not losing that spirit in the process of finishing a PhD, changing 
careers and being there for your lovely kids and family. You’re a hero! 
To everyone in TiCC and what used to be DCI: I will forever cherish all the events 
together, always crowned by those legendary speeches by Fons that nobody knew very 
well where they headed, but eventually reached us all (thank you for those speeches, 
Fons!). Without excluding anyone, I’d like to thank a few people who did or said things 
that left a mark. First of all, I’d like to thank Eva and Lauraine for saving my life more 
than once. You are the glue that keeps us all together and running!
I’d also like to thank Marc, for once reminding me that I should not be scared of having 
too many interests, but that I should cherish them instead.
Ad, your help and support were instrumental to our success as ReMa students. You 
taught us how to fly the research skies. I will always fondly remember all the nice get-
togethers, and of course your professorship party! 
Paul, we still have to write that paper since 2014! I will always remember approaching 
you about an assistant position a couple of days after the aforementioned party, praying 
to the skies you had not witnessed my terrible dance moves. Luckily you hadn’t, and 
we got to work together on the Mozambique project, where I got to count more little 
stones and goats than I could have ever imagined — and a few gestures too. I learned 
so much! Although we did not work together as much later on, I liked that you were 
just across the corridor and I could drop by anytime to chat. 
Yevgen, you deserve the medal to the most patient office mate of all times. I still can’t 
believe that, in four years, we never got to celebrate our birthdays together, despite 
them being on the same day! What were the odds of that? I wish you a ton of luck with 
all your future projects, whether swimming the arctic sea or fighting bears with your 
bare hands.
Adriana, we were somehow geographically so distant but culturally so close! I enjoyed 
so much all of our chats about PhD survival, getting used to the Dutch lifestyle, and our 
shared emphasis on proper lunch-time habits. 
Lieke, you were only my office mate for a few months, but I wanted to let you know that 
I think you are so incredibly smart and creative. Never let the world get at you, you can 
do anything you want.
Emmelyn, how wonderful our incursion into the blogging world! I enjoyed so much 
sharing all the Wordpress tips, and just talking about life stuff. At risk of sounding 
superficial, Lieke, I learned so much about makeup and beauty tips with you. Plus, you 
always knew of all the trendy spots for fine dining in Nijmegen. Karin, who knew we 
would end up working on such closely-related topics! You were always so easy-going 
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that for a moment you made me think gestures was an easy topic! For a moment. I 
can’t wait to see what cool research you come up with next.
Yan, omg! My fellow gesture researcher. I wish you so much success and happiness in 
this life. You are truly talented. I will always remember when I first met you, almost 8 
years ago, and we discovered we were both Dr. Who fans, and gesture fans! 
Alright, we’re only halfway here. Hold on…
Uli, Polina, Gaby, Veronica and Terri, we have lived such wonderful times together. I 
cannot even imagine what my life in The Netherlands would have looked like without 
you. I miss you every day, just the simple act of getting together, sharing a laugh and a 
glass of wine. We grew up and evolved so much together, it’s scary!
Ivana & Maria, my sugarpuffs! What a terrifying gang we were, the three of us! Although 
we have been physically separated for quite some time already, you are always in my 
mind and heart, and I am looking forward to our next get-together.
Kate and Tim, my adventurous roadrunners, the time spent with you is always so 
special. Kate, your positivity and livelihood are unbreakable. You always see the bright 
side on everything and everybody, and you infuse those feelings into each person 
around you. I cherish our friendship a lot and I hope to meet you soon again!
Now, moving on to the Nijmegen gang: Vicky, Benny, Rene, Sam, Kai, Gabi, Markus, 
Leti, Jeroen, and that ubiquitous mystical creature named Rodrigo: I love you all! I don’t 
even know what I did to deserve such great friends. Intelligent, nerdy, kind people. We 
always had such weird and marvelous conversations, whether at parties, after cinema 
nights or just hanging out anywhere in Nijmy. 
Vicky, I can’t bail you out of Hema from here, so please behave while I am absent.
Renate, I can’t even begin to describe your transformation from being a prototypical 
single child like myself to… being an adult prototypical single child like myself! I still 
cannot believe how you’ve nailed adulting. You definitely are one of a kind and we all 
love you for that. Don’t cry, I can see you.
To the Hoogeveldt-to-Horres gang for the great times camping at Scheeβel, mud and 
flunkyball included. Thank you so much for being such a well-behaved mentor kid, 
Mareike, for all the great times and friendship!
We are reaching the end, don’t despair yet.
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